What Muslims can learn from Ertugrul

The original version of this article can by found here: What Muslims Can Learn from the Turkish TV Series Ertugrul – The Muslim Vibe

I have recently become addicted to the hit Turkish drama Ertugrul. For those who are unfamiliar with this show, it follows the exploits of a Turkish tribal warrior named Ertugrul during the 13th century when Turkish nomadic tribes were in the process of conquering and settling Anatolia. The first season shows the title character’s Kayi tribe migrating from pasture lands that can no longer support its herds and livestock to new lands near the Syrian city of Aleppo while the second season shows the Kayi tribe migrating back to Anatolia in advance of a pending Mongol attack[1]. The series provides rich historical detail regarding the religious, cultural, social, political, economic, and military dynamics that eventually led to the conquest of Anatolia by Turkish tribes. Ertugrul and the Kayi tribe are of particular interest because Ertugrul is the historical figure who fathered Osman, the founder of the Ottoman Empire. The show therefore provides a window into many of the ideals and values that helped shape the foundations for one of the most powerful and long-lasting empires the world has ever seen.  

As a Muslim who grew up in America, I was initially attracted to the show because it depicts Muslims and Islamic practices and values in a positive light, and I have spent most of my life watching fictional depictions of Muslims that are the opposite. I also love the attention to historical detail provided by the show’s creators. Despite being a fictional drama, the detailed depiction of Islamic and Turkish values and culture in the show can provide valuable lessons to Muslims because it takes place during a time when Muslims were still powerful and more closely adhered to the original values of Islam. As such, this discussion will provide an analysis of the ideas and values depicted in Ertugrul with a view towards suggesting what today’s Muslims can learn from its historical depictions.  

WHAT ERTUGRUL GETS RIGHT:

The need for unity:

Ertugrul does a wonderful job of highlighting important Islamic values. The primary lesson contemporary Muslims should take away from Ertugrul is how important unity is to the preservation of the Muslim community. Throughout the show, the Kayi tribe’s many enemies engage in subterfuge meant to divide and weaken the leadership of the tribe and to prevent them from forming alliances with other groups of Muslims such as the ruler of Aleppo or the Seljuk dynasty. Ertugrul must constantly fight against the instincts of his brother and other tribesmen who do not view attacks on other Muslims as a danger to their own survival and who resent Ertugrul for leading Kayi warriors into battle to defend other, non-Kayi Muslims. As Ertugrul’s ally Wild Demir points out, burying one’s head in sand like an ostrich is not a plan. Similarly, ignoring the slaughter of other Muslims because they are from a different tribe or country will only embolden and strengthen those who seek to divide and conquer Muslims. Just because we may not be related by tribal or even linguistic bonds to other Muslims does not relieve us of our duty to protect each other. Part of the reason contemporary Muslims are so weak is because we have divided ourselves into separate nations and tribes and focus more on our ethnic, linguistic, or doctrinal differences than our common Islamic bonds in direct contradiction of God’s commands. Though it may seem overly simplistic, the need for unity among Muslims cannot be overstated and is one of the primary Islamic values that must be re-emphasized if today’s Muslims are ever going to regain control over their own lands. This becomes even more obvious when one considers that there is no single Muslim nation with the size and resources to compete with the great powers of the world like the US, China, or Russia. In order to develop the strength to compete with these powers, Muslims must emphasize the need for unity so that they can create new entities with the same size, power, and resources as the Ottoman Empire.   

Ertugrul emphasizes the need for unity throughout the series in different ways. For example, in one scene Ertugrul’s alps come upon alps from the Dodurga tribe who have been captured by the Mongols. Although these alps have fought against Ertugrul and were even hunting him when they were captured, his alps still save them. Their willingness to forget their disagreements with their rivals and still fight to save them is an important lesson for contemporary Muslims who seem to spend more time bickering among each other than working together. In the same way that Ertugrul’s alps were willing to put their differences aside and help their fellow Muslims, contemporary Muslims must also bury their animosities and disagreements so that they can begin to work together to build a better future for themselves.  

Throughout the series, Ertugrul and his men take great care not to kill other Muslims, even when those Muslims are trying to kill them. At one point, Ertugrul fights his cousin Tugmetkin and his men but makes sure not to kill any of them. This also subtlety emphasizes the need for unity since the murder of other Muslims, even in self-defense and even if it is for a good cause will inevitably fracture the Muslim community. This is particularly true when the other Muslims, such as Tugmetkin, have been deceived into attacking their fellow Muslims. Ertugrul’s restraint against Muslims who are trying to kill him is a testament to his understanding that murdering these men will only strengthen his enemies. Since the first Muslim civil war, Muslims have been too quick to shed each other’s blood and the consequences of this violence are the deep divisions that continue to separate us today. Violence must be an extreme last resort among Muslims, and it must only be used by governments that have been democratically chosen from among the members of the community against those who have committed grave crimes. In the same way that Ertugrul’s father would not execute his rival, Kurdoglu, without strong evidence, the state’s monopoly on violence must only be exercised in extreme cases after all the evidence has been fairly reviewed and due process has been given to the accused. Aside from this rare exception, violence among Muslims can never be tolerated. Ertugrul seems to understand this as well.  

How Muslim leaders should conduct themselves:

Another extremely important lesson we can learn from Ertugrul relates to how Muslim leaders should conduct themselves. Ertugrul does not seek wealth or power to satisfy his ego. In fact, he must be convinced by his loved ones that he should take over leadership of the Kayi tribe because he keeps insisting that he prefers hunting over ruling the tribe. He always prioritizes the welfare of his people and believes that it is his duty to serve them. Leadership is not a vehicle to wealth and power for Ertugrul, instead it is a burden and a duty. Since he does not attempt to acquire power to enrich himself and views himself as duty bound to protect not just his Kayi tribe, but all Muslims, Ertugrul is able to attract loyal soldiers who are not interested in wealth either. Instead of wealth and power, Ertugrul and his men are bound together by a common sense of duty that is rooted in their Islamic worldview. As such, Ertugrul, though clearly the leader of his men, relates to them as a loving brother. He does not use fear or violence to motivate them. He even serves them food on several occasions. His humility, kindness towards his subordinates, sense of duty and justice, and unwavering commitment to protect his fellow Muslims are his greatest strengths and exemplify the ideal Muslim ruler. This is best contrasted by his cousin, Tugmetkin, who is a brave but young and immature member of the Dodurga tribe allied to the Kayis. Tugmetkin is primarily motivated by ego since he wishes to be seen as a great leader and warrior. Since his primary motivation is rooted in arrogance and ego, he is not an effective leader and must often resort to humiliating his men or harsh corporal punishments to maintain discipline. Tugmetkin is not the only example of poor leadership depicted in Ertugrul. The ruler of Aleppo and many of the leaders of the Kayi and Dodurga tribes are only interested in power so that they can live luxurious lifestyles, accumulate wealth, or satisfy their egos. 

Ertugrul’s leadership qualities and the way in which he treats his people are also important in helping him to turn his Alps into a highly effective fighting force. This is part of the process Ibn Khaldun first described relating to the development of “group feeling[2]” and how this leads to attaining what he terms “royal authority.” According to Ibn Khaldun, “group feeling” refers to the feelings of kinship and loyalty that cause people to work and fight together for their mutual betterment. The term “group feeling” is therefore a shorthand way of describing why and how members of a particular tribe or group develop the military ability to assert political control over their societies by attaining “royal authority.” In Ertugrul, the Kayi tribe develops superior military abilities because its warriors develop personal loyalty and feelings of brotherhood towards each other, which provides exceptional cohesion to its fighting units. The strong “group feeling” of the Kayis allows them to take full advantage of the martial abilities their nomadic lifestyle provides.

All the Turkmen tribes in Ertugrul have similar lifestyles, thus all their alps are excellent archers, cavalrymen, scouts, and light infantry. What separates the Kayis from the other tribes such as the Cavdars or Dodurgas is that their “group feeling” is stronger. This is primarily rooted in the fact that the leaders of the Kayi tribe both in their personal relationships and interactions and in the way they carry out their public leadership roles always strive to be fair, honest, and generous. They treat the members of their tribe and their warriors as family. They share their food and wealth with them and never hoard more than their fair share. Many of the tribe’s warriors refer to Ertugrul’s mother as their own mother. This is because many of them lost their parents fighting the Mongols and were subsequently raised by Ertugrul’s family. By developing a leadership style that emphasizes fairness, advancement through merit, and trust, Ertugrul allows the Kayis and their allies to develop the sort of “group feeling” that provides them with significant military advantages, and this allows Ertugrul to expand his inner circle by developing alliances with others outside of his tribe based on their similar worldviews and values. By treating his allies and warriors as family, Ertugrul creates a “group feeling” among his supporters that gives them strong feelings of loyalty and trust which, in turn, allows them to fight better together. This is consistent with Ibn Khaldun’s view that “group feeling” can only be attained by developing an ethos based on justice and fairness.

The need to retain control over the economy and the need for free trade:

Ertugrul also correctly highlights that allowing outsiders economic control will eventually lead to conquest. In the first season, the Crusaders trick both the ruler of Aleppo and the Kayis into entering into trade agreements that make them more vulnerable to their machinations. Though trade, even between rivals, can often be beneficial to both parties, Ertugrul and the Muslim world’s history of colonial exploitation show that allowing outsiders too much control over the means of economic production will eventually undermine the health and strength of the economy. This will eventually lead to conquest and subjugation. Again, the relevant distinction here is control versus healthy trade. As Ertugrul correctly illustrates, the former is to be avoided at all cost. Though Ertugrul does not deal with the subject of international trade in detail, the history of the Muslim world shows that this can have a positive impact on economic development so long as it is managed properly and does not lead to ceding control over the means of production or undermine them in some way.   

Another lesson Muslims should learn from Ertugrul is the need to promote the free exchange of goods, people, and ideas between the entire Muslim world. Ertugrul depicts a Muslim world that is integrated through interconnected layers of political alliances, trade networks, and religious networks. These connections and the infrastructure that supported them helped to create what was essentially a free trade zone that allowed for the movement of goods, people, and ideas throughout the Islamic world in a manner that helped it to develop a common culture and integrated economy. The Kayis’ interactions with merchants indicate they are part of a trade network that extends to many, far flung parts of the Muslim world. Though Muslims quickly divided themselves politically, most of the Islamic world has historically been linked through commercial links that were reinforced by the ease with which both people and ideas could travel throughout it.

The European conquest of the Muslim world destroyed these links and the dictators that rule the region today have refused to re-create them out of fear that doing so would threaten their power. If Muslims are ever going to resurrect themselves, they must rebuild these links and they must not limit themselves to only commercial ties. They must also rebuild the social and cultural connections that used to bind Muslims together by creating new multi-national organizations that can allow Muslims to develop bonds with each other based on a wide variety of interests such as sports, hobbies, religion, art, poetry, common professional or commercial interests such as trade associations or associations of lawyers, scientists, teachers, law enforcement officials, etc.

Reinforcing such bonds by promoting tourism between Muslim countries and building linked infrastructure to facilitate this exchange of goods, people, and ideas will be vital to promoting the integration of Muslims. For example, one of the show’s main characters, Ibn Arabi, was born in Andalusia. Despite being born in modern day Spain, Ibn Arabi is welcomed by the Turkish speaking Kayis in Anatolia and becomes an important spiritual guide for the tribe.  He also uses his influence to convince Ertugrul to join a Sufi order. By highlighting this order, the show is illustrating how Muslims from different tribal or ethnic backgrounds used such organizations to create ties to each other that transcended their ethnic or tribal identities. The depiction of Sufi brotherhoods that are comprised of members from different parts of the Islamic world can also serve as a guide for the creation of new organizations that can use similar methods to unite Muslims in a way that can overcome their ethnic or linguistic differences. However, since religious associations are not the only way to promote cultural exchange in the modern world, contemporary Muslims should seek to create new international organizations focused on a wide range of interests such as those listed above.

While Ertugrul’s ideas and depictions of Islamic values are mostly positive, there are also lessons to be learned from some of the negative depictions in the show.

WHAT ERTUGRUL GETS WRONG:

How the tribe’s political structure marginalizes its workers and women:

As such, it is now time to discuss the shortcomings depicted in the show. The primary lesson in this category relates to the division of power within the Kayi tribe. Though a meeting of tribal notables called a “headquarters” is held to settle disputes and formulate policy, power is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the tribe’s ruler, the Bey, and this power seems to be disproportionately derived from military power. Two classes of people appear to be permanently excluded from power: the workers who manufacture the tribe’s goods or oversee its food production and its women. 

Headquarter meetings provide a way to get input from the tribe’s notables and matters are usually settled by a vote. These nascent democratic mechanisms help the tribe to formulate intelligent policies and plans. The problem with these meetings is that they exclude all but the most influential members of the tribe. Also, the process used to determine who attends these meeting is unclear but seems to favor men who have proven themselves fighting for the tribe. The accumulation of power by the tribe’s warriors and the exclusion of the tribe’s workers such as its shepherds and craftsmen from headquarter meetings creates an excessive reliance on the tribe’s military class to develop policies. During times of war (such as an impending Mongol attack) it makes sense to defer to the military; however, based on the depictions in Ertugrul, this division of power seems to have been permanent.

Ertugrul depicts the beginning of the Ottoman Empire which eventually collapsed because its military class developed considerably more power than its business class. They then used their political power to allocate far too many resources to the military which undermined the economic foundations of the Empire particularly once the Ottoman military was no longer able to conquer new territory to exploit. When viewed in this light, the ramifications of the division of power within the Kayi tribe become easier to understand. As such, when contemporary Muslims look at how power is distributed in the Kayi tribe, they must understand that the tribe’s excessive reliance on its warriors to make decisions without input from the economically productive members of the tribe is an inherent weakness and that this weakness was present throughout the Ottoman Empire and is still present in far too many modern Muslim societies.  

The second class of people routinely excluded from the tribe’s headquarter meetings are its women. The only woman who consistently participates in these meetings is Ertugrul’s mother, Hayme, and her participation does not occur until after her husband’s death. The lack of political power by the tribe’s women reflects the wider marginalization of women within it. The female characters in Ertugrul are often extremely intelligent and perceptive. They usually have an easier time recognizing who they can trust and who is only serving their own selfish interests than their male counterparts. Despite their clear abilities and talents, aside from Ertugrul’s mother, they are prevented from assuming overt political or military power. Instead, the women in Ertugrul must resort to manipulative tactics to have their voices heard. Though the show often depicts these women as being unscrupulous or overly ambitious, their willingness to resort to tricks to accumulate power is a natural consequence of their inability to assume direct power or even routinely participate in headquarter meetings. When one considers the harem intrigue that caused so much damage during the Ottoman era, one must consider the underlying cause of this intrigue which is directly related to the exclusion of women from power.  

Though excluding women from power was routine during Ertugrul’s time, this same dynamic has continued to haunt contemporary Muslims who still marginalize women. The exclusion of women from power despite their obvious talents solely because of their gender is an indictment of Muslim men who often twist the tenets of the Islamic faith to justify their behavior. This is particularly frustrating when compared to how women were treated during the era of the Rashidun. The headquarter meetings depicted in Ertugrul are similar to the meetings held during the Rashidun era to decide policies; however, during this era women were active participants in these meetings.  The Caliph Omar even appointed a woman as the head of the market in Medina, which is roughly analogous to appointing a woman as the head of the department of commerce in modern times.

Instead of being allowed to utilize their talents for the betterment of the entire Muslim community, Muslim women have been marginalized and disenfranchised in direct contravention of the precedents established under the Rashidun in a manner that has greatly contributed to the Muslim world’s weakness and stagnation. It is impossible to grow and develop in the modern world while preventing half of the potential labor force from participating to the full extent of their talents.

Though Ertugrul is presented as a wise and brave ruler, in my opinion, his sister-in-law Selcan is the most capable member of the Kayi tribe. She is always the first to diagnose subterfuge, has the sharpest business acumen, is brave and would make a worthy ruler. The fact that she is automatically excluded from power explains her volatile personality as she must constantly force people to listen to her while Ertugrul can simply speak during a headquarters meeting. Despite being smarter than almost everyone around her, Selcan is constantly ignored or told to keep her opinions to herself. If Selcan were a man, her intelligence would have catapulted her to a position of leadership but since she is a woman she is ignored and marginalized. The fact that her talents are wasted is an indictment of the tribe’s political structure and the Muslim world in general. The sad truth is that nearly 800 years after the events in Ertugrul, women in the Muslim world are still denied the opportunity to realize their talents and this is one of the main reasons Muslims are so weak and impoverished. 

Glorifying war is not the way to promote an Islamic re-birth:

Another important lesson Muslims should learn from Ertugrul is that its glorification of violence is no longer appropriate. The first two seasons show the Kayi tribe under direct attack from both Crusaders and Mongols. The tribe’s military actions are all defensive in nature and, as such, are presented in a morally defensible light. However, it is important to remember that not all Ottoman military actions were defensive in nature. The Ottoman Empire was historically expansionist in its outlook which means that many of its wars were wars of choice. Instead of relying on simplistic tropes that paint the West (or the Crusaders in Ertugrul) as being motivated only by greed and hatred of Muslims, we must understand how our own actions have contributed to the animosity between Muslims and Christians and we must stop seeking solutions that are only based on war. In the same way that the political power of the tribe’s warriors likely caused them to place too much emphasis on military solutions, contemporary Muslims have also been too quick to use war to settle their disputes. The excessive reliance on military power has taken away valuable resources from education and scientific development which are the real basis for civilizational power. The truth is that war is evil. It is chaos, death, and destruction. War should never be glorified and must only be entered into as an absolute last resort because nothing good comes of war. All wars do is create widows and orphans and destroy families which, in turn, destroys society.  

In Ertugrul, violence is primarily directed towards Crusaders and Mongols that wish to conquer Muslim territory. The reality is that most violence within the Muslim world is perpetrated by Muslims against other Muslims. If the message of Pan-Islamic unity articulated in Ertugrul is ever going to become a reality, Muslims must learn to emphasize economic and political cooperation as a means to achieving unity amongst ourselves and we must realize that war is not the true path. Again, Ertugrul does not appear to advocate for such violence since the military action from the first two seasons is all defensive in nature, but the glorification of war has often been used to justify fratricidal wars among Muslims or wars of conquest against non-Muslims. If Muslims are ever going to unite it cannot be through war. It must be through peaceful and voluntary economic and political integration. A union of Muslims based on war and death could only ever lead to tyranny and dictatorship. Only a union of Muslims entered into freely and based on Islamic ideas of unity and equality that is implemented by the creation of democratic political institutions that fairly share power among Muslims without allowing any one tribe or group of Muslims to unfairly dominate the others can successfully unite Muslims. 

Instead of turning itself into a militarized state, a union of Muslims nations would be better served by investing in its educational institutions so that Muslims can begin developing their scientific abilities. If contemporary Muslims are ever going to follow Ertugrul’s example and resurrect themselves, it will not be through war but by revitalizing the culture and intellectual climate of the Islamic world so that it can reclaim its historical place as the world’s leader in these fields. Muslims once invented algebra, gave Aristotle new life and meaning, pioneered the medical sciences and were the main drivers of culture, technological innovation, and science in the world. We must return to our previous ways of prioritizing intellectual honesty and critical analysis so that we can begin producing a new generation of thinkers that can contribute to humanity’s intellectual development. Glorifying war, though it makes for more exciting television, is not the way to promote the re-birth of the Muslim world.  

CONCLUSION:

Ertugrul is one of my favorite television shows, but it is still just a television show. It can provide valuable lessons for Muslims if we examine its various messages and subplots with a critical eye. If Muslims are ever going to resurrect Islamic civilization, we must do so in a way that accounts for the realities of the modern world while still adhering to the appropriate Islamic values. We must invest in our educational institutions and fundamentally change our cultural attitudes towards discussing taboo subjects. And we must allow our fellow Muslims to live their personal lives as they see fit without interference so that people can feel free to express themselves and follow their passions without fear. This is the only way to unleash people’s creative energy and this energy is the key to technological innovation and growth. It is impossible to limit artistic, personal, or political expression and still create an environment that is conducive to technological innovation or intellectual growth. Authoritarian tendencies bleed over into all aspects of society and even if officially limited to certain areas such as political speech, they will affect unrelated academic areas. If Muslims ever hope to re-establish their former power consistent with the themes developed in Ertugrul we must begin by creating an atmosphere that is conducive to technological innovation and strong economic growth as these are necessary for developing the sort of military abilities that will be necessary to prevent further conquests of Muslim lands. Such inclusive and tolerant attitudes will also be key to uniting Muslims. The Muslim world is so large and diverse that only a culture that embraces diversity and peaceful co-existence can facilitate its unification. Those Muslims who wish to see the unity of the Muslim community restored must therefore embrace Islamic notions of tolerance and compassion as well as the idea that there is no compulsion in religion. Muslims who seek to impose their religious views on others through force or violence are hypocrites because their views and actions prevent the very unity that will be necessary to end the subservience of the Muslim world and the slaughter of innocent Muslims in so many parts of the world. 

This brings us to Ertugrul’s last and most painful lesson. There is no real life Ertugrul. Instead of waiting for an idealized hero to come save us, Muslims must begin to work together to build the sort of institutions that can unite and strengthen us and that can finally provide the Muslim world with the leadership it so desperately needs. Part of the reason the Muslim world has been so devoid of leadership is that its institutions and culture have proven incapable of producing the sort of selfless and clear-sighted leaders that characterized the early Ottoman period. It is unrealistic to expect rulers to be selfless on their own. Instead of expecting rulers to voluntarily put the interest of the community ahead of their own personal interests, Muslims must begin to create governments that feature institutional mechanisms that can act as a restraint on the selfish impulses of its rulers. The lesson Muslims must learn from Ertugrul is that if we want our leaders to act like Ertugrul we must create the sort of political institutions and culture that can attract honest people and that can incentivize them to put the needs of the community first. The only way to counter the inherently selfish nature of human beings is by developing institutional checks on rulers so that they can no longer use their power to accumulate personal wealth. Instead of empowering rulers that seek wealth and comfort, Muslims must focus on finding rulers that prioritize fighting injustice and defending the weak. We can use Ertugrul’s example as a guide, but ultimately, it is up to the people of the Muslim world to begin building the sort of institutions and culture that can force Muslim leaders to finally start prioritizing the needs of their people over their own selfish desires.   


[1] The present discussion is primarily based on the first 2.5 seasons of the show.

[2] Khaldun, Ibn, Trans by Franz Rosenthal. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton University Press. Princeton and Oxford.  1967. At pgs. 107-111.

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The Taliban have no reason to celebrate 

Reports coming out of Afghanistan regarding the Taliban’s celebrations are extremely confusing.  The end of any war is always cause for joy because it brings hope for peace. But anyone who thinks the Taliban’s “victory” is worth celebrating as a triumph of Muslim military prowess is a fool with extremely low standards. Glorifying events in Afghanistan is an implicit acceptance of the Muslim world’s unbelievably weak military abilities.

America conquered Afghanistan with such ease that one could almost forgive its leaders for underestimating the Taliban’s ability to re-group. It only needed a few special forces troops and air power to conquer a nation that is over 650,000 square kilometers in the span of a few weeks. The Taliban were completely outmatched and ran away almost immediately. Its conquest was so easy that it never even bothered to station more than 20,300 troops there during the first five years of its occupation.

America withdrew from Afghanistan because, as explained here, it shot itself in the foot in a variety of ways, leading to the Taliban’s resurgence. It then realized it did not care enough to stay and clean up its mess. So, it left. It decided long ago that Afghanistan was not worth the effort but only stayed for so long due to its stubborn pride and corporate interests. And yet it still took the Taliban twenty years, an estimated 50,000 dead soldiers, and 40,000 dead civilians to convince them to leave. That is not a victory worth celebrating.

Afghanistan was easily conquered and occupied by both Russia and America because it has never been able to build an industrial base capable of generating the military capacity to deter these invasions. It has been unable to do so because a significant number of Afghans are philosophically opposed to the type of reforms needed to modernize. The Taliban’s views are not an aberration within Afghan society or the Muslim world either. They are just an extreme manifestation of the authoritarian tendencies that have prevented Muslims from instituting the changes necessary to thrive in the modern world. As such, the debacle in Afghanistan is an indictment of Afghan society and a reflection of the weakness that has consumed the entire Muslim world.

While it was occupying Afghanistan, the US decided to invade Iraq too. Using fabricated evidence, it concocted a tale to justify an invasion that led to the slaughter of between 200,000 – 1,000,000 innocent Iraqis. No one is sure how many Iraqis died because no one bothered to count all the bodies. It was able to violently maintain control over both nations simultaneously for many years, and only left after it grew tired of wasting resources on countries that were not part of its core national security interests.

America’s embarrassingly easy conquests and overlapping occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq and the inability of the entire Muslim world to prevent these attacks are just one piece of the puzzle. The tiny nation of Israel has established complete military control over the Eastern Mediterranean and bombs its Arab neighbors with impunity when it is so inclined. It also launches clandestine and aerial attacks against Iran, which can only respond with threats and impotent, asymmetric gestures. Pakistan has tried and failed to take Kashmir from India three times. The string of military defeats suffered by Muslims is too long to list in its entirety. But they are all related to the same root causes.

The simple fact is that Muslim societies would not be so prone to conquest if their institutions had not already rotted from within.

There are still too many Muslim nations living under the tyranny of dictatorship. The violent authoritarian control exercised by the region’s military and/or religious elite[1] has crippled the ability of Muslims to build effective governments and social institutions capable of nurturing the economic and technological development necessary to end their appallingly weak military abilities. Until Muslim societies wholeheartedly implement serious reforms to their political, legal, educational, social, and economic systems to free themselves from the shackles of dictatorship, they will continue to be subject to the same pattern of conquest they have endured these past five centuries. Instead of blaming outsiders, Muslims must accept responsibility for their failures. The simple fact is that Muslim societies would not be so prone to conquest if their institutions had not already rotted from within, making them such inviting targets.

The military incompetence of Muslim nations represents an existential threat that can no longer be ignored.

America’s occupations were but the latest in a long line that all prove a simple point. It is time for change. The military incompetence of Muslim nations represents an existential threat that can no longer be ignored. Imagine what would have happened if Afghanistan and Iraq were actually important to the US. It has already proven it will do anything to win a fight, even if that means dropping atomic bombs on an island full of emaciated women and children. America may not care about the Muslim world today, but the world is volatile, and things change. If it decided to come back, no one could stop it.

America is not the only country Muslims should worry about either. Any Muslim welcoming China, given its treatment of the Uighurs, is a hypocrite and an even bigger fool. In some respects, Russia has been an even more brutal conqueror of Muslims than the West. The Czars conquered vast Muslim populations who have repeatedly tried and failed to throw off the yoke of Russian occupation. These examples highlight a glaring pattern of weakness prevalent across nearly the entirety of the Muslim world. The Taliban and those with similar views may see events in Afghanistan as a vindication of their beliefs, but that only proves how foolish they truly are.

Afghanistan’s new rulers appear to have learned how to deal with Western media. One can only hope they have also studied the deeper causes of the Western world’s military dominance, which is the result of its democratic forms of government, inclusive political and social institutions, secure property rights, and free speech protections. These have allowed the West to create governments, schools, and private companies capable of stimulating the economic and technological development necessary to develop advanced military capabilities. Until the Muslim world implements reforms that can lead to similar capabilities, it will continue to be a victim of conquest.

Instead of celebrating, the Taliban should ask themselves why their nation was so easily conquered and why it took so long to evict Russia and America. Doing so requires deciphering why it has been unable to modernize or develop a system of government that allows its diverse people to work together. Until they solve these riddles, they will be unable to develop policies that can ensure they are never conquered again. By extension, the rest of the Muslim world should be asking, to varying degrees, why it has been so weak for so long. If Afghanistan was a victory for Muslim arms, I shudder to think about what a defeat would look like.

Having discussed the problem of the Muslim world’s military incompetence, here are some ideas to correct these issues.

The author is a US Navy veteran and creator of the blog www.mirrorsfortheprince.com where he examines the causes of the Muslim world’s sustained weakness and suggests reforms that can help it modernize.


[1] Kuru Ahmet, “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment,” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 3-6, 9-12, 93-101, 225.

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It is time to create a Muslim NATO

As explained in more detail here, America no longer has the desire to act as the Muslim world’s military hegemon. As such, it is only a matter of time before the US relinquishes its role as the dominant military power within the Islamic world. Though the contours and timing of its withdrawal are still uncertain, Muslim nations must begin considering how this withdrawal will impact them and how they should react. The changes that are likely to transpire represent a “critical juncture[i]” in the history of the Muslim world that will determine its trajectory for several decades. The reaction of Muslim nations will be pivotal in determining this trajectory. The following is not an attempt to predict what Muslim nations will do, but to suggest what they should do.

THERE IS NO SINGLE MUSLIM NATION POWERFUL ENOUGH TO ASSUME THE SECURITY ROLE THE US HAS FULFILLED

There is currently no Muslim nation with the military and economic resources to act as a military hegemon within the Muslim world. In fact, the most powerful military in the Middle East belongs to Israel. Among Muslim nations, Pakistan fields the most powerful military but given its fixation on India and extreme underdevelopment, it does not have the capacity to project military power beyond its borders. Given the current security dynamics in the region and the military weakness of most Muslim states, particularly the Arab states[ii], a withdrawal of US forces from the Islamic world will lead to further instability due to the security vacuum such changes will create[iii]. As such, the governments of the region must devise new policies that can fill the vacuum created by America’s inevitable withdrawal. Though not a direct cause of the Muslim world’s underlying weakness, America’s military presence has certainly helped entrench it and the dependence of Muslim nations on its power will make developing adequate military capabilities considerably more difficult.

There is no single Islamic nation capable of becoming a military hegemon on its own because none of them have the size and resources to compete with Russia, China, the US, or a united Europe. The Ottoman Empire was the last great Islamic empire, and it was never able to overcome the geographic vulnerability of having to defend itself against a powerful and antagonistic Persia to the East, an expansionist Russia to its North and a resurgent Europe to its Northwest. Ultimately, Muslims have no choice but to pursue policies that will lead to the sort of unification that Europe has undergone since the end of WWII since this is the only way to create an Islamic political entity with the resources to provide the Muslim world with the security and stability it so desperately needs.

Talking about the integration of Muslim countries considering their highly fractured relations may strike some as fantasy and to a certain extent, it is. However, it is highly doubtful anyone standing in the rubble of Germany or France after WWII could ever have imagined how integrated and prosperous both countries would be so soon after the end of that conflict. In many respects, Europe has a much greater legacy of conflict between its nations than the nations of the Muslim world. In fact, WWII is most accurately interpreted as the culmination of a series of wars resulting from the evolution of Prussia into modern day Germany. As the individual German states united, the power dynamics in Europe shifted, resulting in a series of wars that included WWI and WWII. The chaos and constant warfare that plagued Europe did not stop until a comprehensive political and economic solution in the form of the European Community was created. Some may counter that it was the absolute military victory of the Allied powers that ended this cycle of conflict, and this is true to a degree. But the Allies also decisively won WWI and despite all the carnage of that conflict, Europe was engulfed in war just two decades later. It was not until Western Europe integrated its economies and created the political institutions to manage this integration that the cycle of warfare between Europe’s nations stopped.

From this perspective, working towards the integration of Muslim nations is a realistic though difficult goal. The Muslim world is obviously in a different situation than Europe at the end of WWII. In some respects, it has advantages that Europe did not have since it has not experienced the destruction of a cataclysmic war and does not need to completely rebuild itself. However, this same advantage is also a handicap since the shock of WWII was likely a catalyst behind the first efforts to integrate Europe. On the other hand, if the conquest of Muslim lands and the continuing domination of Muslims by outside powers is still not enough to convince Muslims that working together to ensure their freedom and prosperity is a goal they should aspire to, then it is unlikely even a conflict on the scale of WWII would have any effect either. The biggest disadvantage Muslims face in their quest to integrate is the fact that the political institutions of most Muslim countries are closed and extractive[iv] whereas Europe’s institutions were mostly open and inclusive. The most difficult part of trying to integrate Muslim countries will therefore be reforming these repressive and closed political institutions. If Muslims can successfully reform these institutions, they have the potential to finally end their protracted weakness.

THERE ARE ONLY A HANDFUL OF MUSLIM STATES WITH THE CAPACITY TO CREATE SUCH AN ENTITY

The only way to strengthen the Muslim world’s military capabilities is to create a new political entity that can assume the security responsibilities America has performed for the past several decades since there is no Muslim nation capable of handling this role by itself. The most logical route to accomplishing this goal is to resurrect the concepts that led to the creation of CENTO. As the US understood in the 1950s, the nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have the capacity to form the backbone of a security alliance that could develop into a hegemonic Muslim power. Due to its geography and strategic concerns, Afghanistan should also join this alliance.

The main difference between CENTO and the entity being proposed here (hereinafter referred to as P.A.I.T.) is that the US should not be an active participant. It should support the creation of such an entity, but since the goal is to relieve the US of its security responsibilities, it would make no sense for it to be actively involved in its creation. Instead, it must grow and develop as a purely regional security system that allows Muslims to develop the capacity to work together for their own protection. Due to the extremely weak nature of most governments within the Muslim world, P.A.I.T. also represents the only Islamic countries with the institutional capacity and strategic incentives to create such an entity. Most of the Arab, African, and Central Asian parts of the Muslim world feature either unstable authoritarian governments that are dependent on American or Russian military and economic assistance to maintain their power or failed states that do not have the requisite degree of state centralization to create political, military, and economic institutions that can form the basis for a stable, democratic government, let alone a new multi-national political entity[v].

A security alliance between P.A.I.T. will not work nor be of lasting duration unless it is underpinned by an economic alliance. The first step in creating such an alliance will therefore be creating free trade agreements that can bind the economies and infrastructures of these nations together. Despite their weaknesses and different strategic concerns, the long-term goals of P.A.I.T. are all best served by economic integration meant to create an entirely new political entity with the strength to fill the power vacuum left by America’s departure. Combining the populations of these four countries would create an entity with a large internal market of over 400 million people that is well endowed with natural resources and defensible borders. The presence of such an entity would allow the US to withdraw its troops from the region by taking over its security responsibilities in the same way that the creation of the UAE allowed the British to withdraw their forces from the former Trucial States.

All four nations face strategic environments that should make their elites more receptive to integrationist ideas. In fact, three out of four are locked in existential conflicts they are not strong enough to resolve on their own. As a result, their governments are not as likely to prevent such an alliance from developing out of fear that it may threaten their grip on power. The main issue is that their elites must see an alliance as being in their interests despite their ethnic and doctrinal differences and the short-term upheaval such changes may cause. Though each has its own weaknesses and strategic concerns, they also have the right combination of institutions and strategic needs to overcome these issues if they can muster the political will and vision to do so.

Part of the impetus for creating a new political entity comprised of P.A.I.T. is that doing so will allow them to consolidate their borders and improve their geostrategic positions by creating advantages of strategic depth and improved internal lines of communication and supply to fortify their frontiers. A Pakistan that can rely on the meaningful support of Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran in its confrontation with India will be much better equipped to handle such a confrontation and would have more options available to it. An Iran that can use free trade agreements with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey to mitigate the effects of US economic warfare and provide strategic depth for its military assets will be better able to resist the aggression of the US or Israel. By entering into free trade agreements with Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, Afghanistan will finally be able to develop the economic strength needed to give its people the peace they have lacked for so long but in a way that does not put it under the undue influence of another power. It may also be the only way to legitimize and moderate the new Taliban government. And the inclusion of Turkey into this alliance will provide it with a well-developed economic base that can be used to facilitate economic development between all four nations while finally allowing Turkey to realize its pan-Islamic foreign policy goals. Essentially, by combining portions of the lands and resources of the old Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires, Muslims can create a new entity that has the land and resources to ensure the great powers of the world can no longer dominate them. Eventually (meaning the distant future), such an entity could expand West and North to include many Arab states as well as the Muslim republics of Central Asia.

P.A.I.T. WILL NEED TO UNDERGO SERIOUS REFORMS

In order to come together to create such an entity, each must first undergo serious internal reforms to either create or strengthen their democratic political institutions. The creation of inclusive and genuine democratic institutions that respect the rule of law and rights of their citizens are absolutely vital for creating dynamic economic institutions[vi] and military capabilities. If Muslims ever hope to end the cycle of conquest and subjugation they have endured for the past several centuries, they must institute deep rooted political and socio-economic reforms because this is the only way that they will ever be able to develop the economic, technological, and military power required to protect themselves.  They must also drastically improve their governing institutions by zealously fighting corruption and ensuring their institutions can provide the government services such an entity will need to thrive. They must work to integrate their infrastructures and create new institutions that can facilitate their integration by increasing trade between all four nations so that their elites can quickly see the benefits of having access to each other’s markets.

They will also need to work to overcome the ethnic and doctrinal rivalries that have consumed the Muslim world. The only way to bridge the divide between Sunnis and Shiites, or Turks and Persians, or Punjabis and Pashtuns, etc. is to create institutions that allow these different ethnic and doctrinal groups to fairly share power with each other. In the modern era, those societies that have been able to create institutions that are successful at fairly sharing resources and settling disputes among its citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious differences have achieved the greatest economic prosperity and sometimes even the greatest amount of military power[vii].  Democratic institutions allow for a greater diffusion of power which leads to a greater diffusion of wealth which empowers groups within a society to continue generating and developing more wealth, creating a reinforcing loop of wealth creation and power diffusion and this usually leads to greater overall wealth for everyone[viii]. Given the diversity of the Islamic world, the only way Muslims will ever come together is by creating such institutions to facilitate their integration.

There seems to be a direct correlation between inclusive, democratic institutions and military power. This is because societies that fairly share political power and economic resources and properly incentivize their members to increase their economic output are typically going to be wealthier. The increased wealth of these societies provides them with more resources to spend on developing their military capabilities and the inclusive political institutions used to facilitate this wealth creation also reduces friction between members of these societies because they do not feel unfairly marginalized or excluded from power. As such, the members of such societies benefit from having the resources and necessary group cohesion to obtain a decisive military edge. This also shows that arguments in favor of creating liberal, inclusive political institutions are not based solely on a sense of morality or fairness but that such institutions are the most effective at allowing a society to develop the military capabilities necessary to protect itself from conquest. Their primary advantage is of a practical nature and a recognition that such institutions are the most effective at allowing members of a society to work together for their own betterment and protection. Conversely, ideologies based on narrow concepts of ethnic, tribal, or national identity are typically not as good at developing the sort of inclusive political institutions that can lead to greater economic growth and military power. This is important because the only way an entity comprised of Pakistanis, Turks, Persians, and Afghans will thrive is if it creates institutions that can allow these different groups to work together and the only way to accomplish this is to create transparent and fair ways for them to share power with each other and work together.

AMERICA’S ROLE

As part of its withdrawal the US must help create a coalition of allies that can prevent another hostile great power from replacing it. As such, facilitating the creation of an alliance between P.A.I.T. is in America’s long-term interest as well. The current strategy of relying on unstable monarchial dictatorships or military strongmen will not work in the long run. Simply put, these regimes do not have the strength to stand on their own. Consequently, continuing to support such allies makes no sense. Instead, the US must seek new allies that can defend themselves without help. The biggest hurdle to this is America’s ongoing conflict with Iran. If the US is serious about withdrawing its troops from the Middle East, then this issue will need to be resolved amicably. Doing so within the framework of an alliance comprised of traditional US allies like Pakistan and Turkey may present the best opportunity to do so in a manner that protects the interests of both nations.

The US must fundamentally change its policies towards the governments of the Islamic world by using its diplomatic and economic power to encourage these governments to respect the human rights of their citizens and institute meaningful democratic reforms. The only path to doing this is by supporting the spread of genuine democracy within the Islamic world. It must also stop being so fearful of governments within the Muslim world that have an Islamist component or perspective. The US has allowed its fear of political Islam to justify supporting brutal dictators that have mired the region in war and conflict. Instead of fearing such governments, the US must learn to work with them. As the people of the Muslim world become accustomed to choosing their own leaders, they may choose leaders that will have an Islamic perspective. This may lead to disagreements but does not have to preclude the development of strong relationships with these nations in the same way that even serious disagreements with its allies in Europe or India have not been allowed to undermine the fundamentals of those relationships.

Such policies would allow for the development of stable and democratic governments that respect human rights and can lay the foundation for the development of strong economies. This will eventually allow Muslims to develop the military capabilities necessary to prevent their conquest by another great power on their own. Though it may sound oxymoronic, helping Muslims become self-sufficient is the best way to help them achieve true independence and this is the best way to ensure these countries are never conquered or dominated by another competing great power that would deny America access to the region or use its resources as part of a broader confrontation with the US[ix].

CONCLUSION

It is only a matter of time before the US withdraws its troops from the Muslim world. Muslim nations must therefore develop new ideas that can allow them to fill the security vacuum its departure will create. The leaders of the Muslim world must begin to implement the reforms suggested above if they ever hope to end the cycle of violence and weakness that has consumed their countries. It is up to the nations and people of the Muslim world to devise new strategies that can allow them to finally end their protracted weakness. The policies they have pursued thus far have clearly not worked. The Muslim world has been in a sustained state of weakness for many centuries, and it will take many years to reverse the effects of its long decline. As such, the ideas presented here will take many years to develop and implement and the entity proposed above may never even materialize. However, even small steps taken towards creating it will have a beneficial impact on the Muslim world by increasing trade and helping Muslims work together. Muslims must therefore begin the process of building such an entity as soon as possible if they ever hope to reverse their fortunes.

The Arab states of the Gulf appear to believe creating an alliance with Israel will shield them from Iran while Pakistan and Iran are developing bi-lateral relationships with China. Neither strategy will work. Israel’s military is powerful enough to protect Israeli interests but, considering their aversion to casualties, it is highly doubtful Israel’s leaders will risk IDF soldiers to protect allies in the Gulf or help them secure the Gulf’s shipping lanes. Muslims rejoicing at America’s departure and welcoming China should be wary as well. China’s ethnic cleansing of its Muslims should serve as a warning to those who believe it will be a kinder benefactor than America. The authoritarian structure of its political institutions and refusal to countenance even mild criticism or non-conformity indicate it will be the opposite. Instead of trying to replace the US with another outside power whose interests will then take precedence, Muslims must learn to look to each other for their security needs.

The best way to start is by allowing the people of the Muslim world to re-create the cultural, social, and commercial links that once bound them. Muslim governments and people both need to begin promoting the free exchange of goods, people, and ideas between each other. Islamic societies were once integrated through interconnected layers of political alliances, trade and religious networks. These connections and the infrastructure that supported them helped to create what was essentially a free trade zone that allowed for the movement of goods, people, and ideas throughout the Islamic world in a manner that helped it to develop a common culture and an integrated economy.  If Muslims are ever going to take control of their security needs, they must rebuild these links so that the interests of the Muslim world’s different nations and people begin to align in a manner that leads to further economic, political, and military cooperation.  Ultimately, the nations of the Muslim world have no choice but to adapt to their changing security environment by learning to rely on themselves and each other. Arguing for an alliance between P.A.I.T. may seem like a desperate plan but after centuries of conquest and subjugation, desperate is a fitting description for the Muslim world. The absolute military, political, and economic weakness of the Muslim world will only be corrected through bold measures.    

These ideas are also consistent with the theories developed by Professor Huntington in his important work “The Clash of Civilizations.” The past few decades have illustrated the prescience of his model for understanding international relations and conflict. As he predicted, the world is moving towards a multi-polar international system largely centered around its major civilizational blocks. Before this system can realize its potential, the Islamic world will need to stabilize itself. Until this happens it will continue to destabilize surrounding regions and it will continue to present a security vacuum that outside powers will try to fill. As Prof. Huntington’s model implies, it will fall upon the people and nations of the Muslim world to help themselves since nations from other civilizational blocks will be both unwilling and unable to do so[x].


[i] A “critical juncture” is when a “confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power.” See Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: Crown Business, 2012) at 106.

[ii] The UAE, a.k.a. “little Sparta” is the only Arab nation that has managed to develop adequate military capabilities.

[iii] Bandow, Doug, “Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops,” Foreignpolicy.com, May 28, 2020,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/us-deficit-military-spending-budget-bring-home-troops/.

[iv] For a more detailed discussion regarding the impact of such institutions, see Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: Crown Business, 2012) at 79-83; 216; 271.

[v] Both Indonesia and Nigeria are too geographically remote, and Nigeria does not face a strategic environment that would cause its elites to support the reforms that would be necessary to join such an entity.

[vi] Again, for a more in-depth discussion of these ideas see Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail, (New York: Crown Business 2012) at 79-83; 216; 271.

[vii] Though he does not explain why in great detail, Prof. Bernard Lewis appears to agree with this conclusion in his article “Why Turkey is the only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, pp. 41-49.

[viii] Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail, (New York: Crown Business 2012) at 306-17.

[ix] The author is obviously thinking about China’s growing influence in the region.

[x] Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order, (New York: Touchstone, 1996) pp. 21-29.

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What WWII can teach America about its defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq

President Biden recently announced his intention to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. It may have taken nearly twenty years, but America is finally ready to admit defeat and bring its troops home. What began as an impressive display of military power has now turned into its longest war, one that history will remember as an embarrassing and mostly self-inflicted defeat. America also lost the war in Iraq in remarkably similar fashion. The best way to explain why the relatively easy conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq eventually turned into such unmitigated disasters is to compare the policies implemented to secure the conquests of each country with the policies used to secure Germany and Japan at the end of WWII.

Germany formally surrendered to the Allies on May 7, 1945, while Japan formally surrendered on September 2, 1945[1]. Both nations remained under formal military occupation for the next ten[2] and seven years[3], respectively. The policies implemented to secure America’s victories over the Axis powers cemented its post WWII power by turning its most implacable foes into two of its closest allies. They also turned both nations into drivers of economic growth that helped to spread prosperity throughout Europe and Asia. The conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq did not lead to similar results.  

The Taliban retreated from their home city of Kandahar on December 7, 2001[4], signaling their defeat at the hands of American and allied Afghan forces. Bagdad fell to American forces on April 9, 2003[5] leading to President Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” celebration aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln less than a month later[6]. The policies implemented to secure the conquests of Iraq and Afghanistan turned what began as impressive victories into stinging defeats that will have a destabilizing impact on the trajectory of the Islamic world for the foreseeable future and raise troubling questions regarding the inability of America’s leaders to use its powerful military to achieve their policy goals.

GERMANY AND JAPAN

As the table below illustrates, the most obvious difference between the occupations of Germany and Japan versus Afghanistan and Iraq is that the US never provided enough troops to secure the latter two nations.

CountrySizePopulationTroops during year 1 of occupationRatio of soldiers to pop. in yr. 1Troop levels in Year 2Troop levels in Year 3
West Germany249,000 sq. km.[7]51 million[8]1.6 million[9]1 per 31.8278,000[10]100,000[11]
Japan378,000 sq. km.[12]77 million[13]430,000[14]1 per 179200,000120,000
Afghanistan652,000 sq. km.[15]21.6 million[16]2,500[17]1 per 8,6409,70013,100
Iraq438,000 sq. km.[18]25.1 million[19]130,000[20]1 per 193143,000141,000

Troop levels in West Germany in 1945 were large enough to provide 6.4 troops/sq. km.  or 1 soldier for every 31.8 German citizens. They dropped drastically within a year, but the US still maintained a large military presence for the first few years of its occupation. Similarly, there was 1 soldier for every 179 people in Japan in 1945 and a large, though reduced military presence for the first few years of the occupation.

These troop levels provided a stable security environment in both nations which allowed for the institution of sweeping political and social changes designed to create fully democratic governments. In Germany, the US dismantled the military, built democratic political institutions, and instituted legal reforms to make sure the Nazis could never take power again[21]. The US also dismantled Japan’s military, gave Japanese women the right to vote, instituted reforms designed to diffuse land ownership more evenly, reformed the educational system, and changed the role of the Emperor in overseeing Japan’s government[22]. These reforms largely explain why these occupations were so successful, but they would not have worked without first providing enough troops to create a security environment conducive to implementing them.

One of the most important issues America had to deal with in both Germany and Japan was how to treat its vanquished enemies. Though many Americans wanted to punish anyone associated with the Nazis and Japan’s elite, the US adopted a more practical approach. It made sure to hold Nazis and Japanese officials guilty of serious crimes accountable for their actions. However, they also allowed lower ranking Nazis to rejoin public life and respected Japanese sentiments by letting the Emperor remain as a figurehead.[23] This practical approach allowed for the inclusion of men into both post-war societies who may otherwise have taken up arms against American forces and helped prevent an insurgency from developing. Thus, America’s military posture and political policies were aligned and reinforced each other by working together to maintain security in each country.

America also provided generous financial aid to help rebuild both economies. It did so in two ways. First, its robust military presence alleviated both nations from the burden of having to pay for their own defense needs which allowed them to allocate their resources towards rebuilding their civilian government institutions and economies instead. Second, the US provided a substantial amount of direct economic aid and made sure this aid was used efficiently. After adjusting for inflation, the Marshal Plan provided the equivalent of $182 billion to Europe between 1946-1952.[24] Germany received the equivalent of $35 billion[25] while Japan received the equivalent of $18[26] billion during this time. This aid was structured to incentivize the recipient countries to open their economies to international trade and provide them with the materials and supplies needed to rebuild their industries. Most importantly, it was designed to make sure neither country would become permanently dependent on American generosity by allowing them to rebuild in a way that benefited local industry[27].

It was this combination of military, political, social, and economic policies and reforms all working together that laid the foundations for the successful consolidation of America’s victories over Germany and Japan. But the glue that held these policies together was the significant presence of American troops to provide security in the immediate aftermath of each conflict. The policies used to consolidate the victories over Afghanistan and Iraq did not complement each other in a manner that could cement either conquest. Instead, they often undermined each other but the reason for this incoherence was primarily rooted in America’s low troop levels.

AFGHANISTAN:

The policies used to secure Afghanistan stand in stark contrast to the policies developed in Germany and Japan. The US did not need a large force to conquer Afghanistan. Its strategy of embedding special forces troops with Afghan militias and supporting them with airpower was adequate to defeat the Taliban, but it was not designed to provide security in the vacuum created by the Taliban’s absence. Despite being much bigger than either Japan or the parts of West Germany under American control, the US never deployed more than 13,100 troops to Afghanistan during the first three years of its occupation and it never provided more than 20,300 troops during the first 5 years of its occupation.[28] Even after accounting for its smaller population, such low troop levels could never have provided the security needed to build a stable government capable of effectively ruling Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) Agency estimated it would take 250,000 troops to secure just the Pashtun dominated Southern parts of the country[29].  

The US tried to institute the same sort of sweeping political and social reforms in Afghanistan[30] as it did in Germany and Japan. But since it never provided enough troops to stabilize the country, it was never able to provide the security necessary to properly implement them. In fact, its low troop levels crucially undermined[31] these reforms because they forced the US to work with Afghanistan’s warlords in a way that made building and empowering a new government capable of properly enacting them impossible.  

Instead of assuming security responsibilities like it did in Germany and Japan, America pursued a dual strategy of building alliances with local warlords and militias to establish control over the country while it helped Afghanistan’s central government build a modern military. Neither strategy worked. The alliances formed with these warlords, and the political compromises they entailed, gave them a disproportionate amount of political and military power in a way that directly undermined Afghanistan’s central government[32]. Consequently, the government created by the Bonn Agreement never developed the capacity to provide the security, government services, and economic development that would have allowed it to secure the victory against the Taliban.

By allying itself with Afghanistan’s tribal and sectarian warlords and militias, America empowered the very people who created the political, security, and socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. Unfortunately, these men did not learn any lessons from their defeat at the hands of the Taliban during the 90’s. Upon resuming power, they quickly developed a reputation for corruption, drug trafficking[33] and violently abusing the people they ruled over by robbing, murdering, torturing, and/or raping them[34]. America had no choice but to overlook these serious problems, including ignoring reports regarding the prevalence of child sex slaves[35] among its allies because it needed their manpower.  

Efforts to build a modern military also suffered from serious flaws. Trying to build a modern military given Afghanistan’s weak state institutions, mosaic of ethnic and tribal rivalries, non-existent industrial base, and extremely low levels of socio-economic development was never a realistic goal. Rather than recognize these simple facts, America’s leaders insisted on wasting resources trying to build a military that Afghanistan could not afford,[36] detracted from the more important mission of building effective civilian government institutions and was unable to defeat the Taliban. America insisted on these strategies despite their obvious shortcomings because it refused to provide enough of its own troops to provide security. As a result, instead of formulating plans that could secure its victory by building a stable government, the US was singularly focused on dealing with the consequences of its inadequate troop levels which forced it to compromise on the political reforms that would have allowed it to consolidate its victory.

It compounded these mistakes with its unwillingness to compromise with those Taliban that tried to surrender. In contrast to the practical approach adopted in Germany and Japan, America did not develop a mechanism to integrate its enemies back into Afghan society, giving them no choice but to resist its presence[37]. Through a combination of arrogance and short-sightedness, America did its best to swell the ranks of the Taliban while refusing to provide enough troops to deal with the threat its policies were creating. These factors worked together to create the conditions that led to the Taliban’s resurgence.

By the time the US realized its mistake and sent more troops, it was too little, too late. Based on the ISI’s estimates, the 100,000 troops[38] sent to deal with the insurgency nine years after its conquest never came close to the amount that would have been necessary to improve security in the country. Even if the US had sent more troops, the decisive moment had passed, and it is unlikely even a massive troop surge would have defeated the Taliban. The insurgency had already taken hold in the security vacuum created by America’s minimal troop deployments and the rapaciousness of Afghanistan’s warlords, who had now accumulated enough power to prevent the central government from significantly curtailing their damaging behavior.

America’s economic assistance to Afghanistan also suffered from serious problems. On paper, the US has given Afghanistan around $130 billion dollars since 2001.[39] The problem is that an estimated 40% of this aid disappeared into the hands of corrupt government officials and their cronies[40]. Yet, another problem is that roughly half of it was used to build Afghanistan’s military instead of its civilian political institutions or economy.[41] Based on these numbers, 90% of the money provided to Afghanistan over the past 20 years has been used to line the pockets of corrupt government officials or pay for its ineffective military.

Those funds that were used for economic development were often used inefficiently in a manner that did not account for the needs of the Afghan people.[42] As such, they did little to spur economic growth that could benefit a wide swath of Afghan society or contribute to the country’s stability. To the extent that this aid was siphoned off by America’s allies, it exacerbated the conflict by further enriching Afghanistan’s warlords and corrupt elite while undermining its state institutions. In short, most of the money given to Afghanistan was criminally wasted and much of it was wasted in a way that helped the Taliban win.[43]  

The US was never able to develop a combination of effective military, social, political, and economic policies that could stabilize Afghanistan like it did in Germany and Japan. By failing to capitalize on its initial victory by providing an effective plan to consolidate its conquest, the US set in motion the varied factors that led to its defeat. In the same way that the large troop levels in Germany and Japan were the foundation of its successful reforms, attempts to reform Afghanistan failed precisely because they lacked similar support and were undermined by the policies developed to compensate for its low troop levels.

American leaders were reluctant to send large numbers of troops to Afghanistan because of its history of violently ejecting invaders. Many were acutely aware of the Soviet Union’s inability to pacify its restless tribes and apprehensive about exposing American troops to similar guerrilla attacks. These concerns, though valid, missed a crucial point. The Red Army’s occupation of Afghanistan was excessively violent and led to the death of roughly a million Afghan civilians in just ten years.[44] Its forces deliberately attacked and destroyed entire villages and its soldiers often murdered, raped, and robbed Afghan civilians, driving millions out of their homes.[45] The Soviet military’s brutal conduct forced most Afghan’s to fiercely resist its occupation.  Though far from perfect, the conduct of American forces would never have reached the systematic level of barbarity shown by the Soviets, particularly since the Taliban were scattered and weak during the first few years of its occupation.

The occupation of Japan supports this argument. Many of the sentiments that dictated troop levels in Afghanistan were shared by US leaders planning the invasion of Japan. These concerns were so great they ultimately led to the use of atomic weapons to secure Japan’s surrender. Despite these concerns and the fact that Japan’s mountainous, heavily forested islands are ideal for guerrilla operations, America still stationed 430,000 troops in Japan during the first year of its occupation. Since these troop deployments were part of a comprehensive reconstruction plan, they did not lead to violent Japanese resistance and were quickly reduced once security was established.  

The key differences between Afghanistan and Germany or Japan is that it is comprised of several different ethnic and tribal groups whereas the latter two nations are relatively homogenous, and it has considerably lower levels of socio-economic development. Stabilizing and modernizing Afghanistan to the degree necessary to prevent the Taliban’s resurgence was never going to be an easy job. Done properly, it would have required a massive commitment on the part of the US and even then, it may have failed. Unfortunately, we will never know if providing enough resources would have worked. What is clear is that the opposite approach failed miserably.   

IRAQ:

The broad strokes of the story in Iraq are similar to events in Afghanistan but differ in some key details. The primary one being that there was no logical reason to invade Iraq. The fact that the US invaded Iraq even though it had nothing to do with 9/11 and had no weapons of mass destruction shows exactly how broken America’s policy formulation process is when it comes to matters of war and national security. Once the ludicrous justifications are discarded, the only short-term logic one can discern is that the war was immensely profitable for the American companies awarded billions in contracts to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and military[46].

Since attempting to explain the logic behind the invasion is an exercise in futility, it is more useful to focus on its impact. The net effect of unnecessarily opening a second front before consolidating the peace in Afghanistan was to ensure that neither theater could receive the resources necessary to achieve victory. The net effect of invading another Muslim country for no logical reason without any regard for the suffering and devastation this caused millions of innocent Iraqis[47] was that it highlighted the hypocrisy and callousness of America to the entire Muslim world. This undermined America’s legitimate security concerns in the aftermath of 9/11 and made addressing those concerns in a meaningful way that much harder.

Since Iraq was not attacked in pursuit of any strategic interests, the invasion was not designed with any in mind. As such, the US never had a plan for consolidating its conquest or how to use the invasion for its benefit within the context of the War on Terror. This becomes painfully obvious when examining the policies enacted to secure America’s victory.

Troop levels in Iraq were sufficient to defeat the token resistance offered by Iraq’s military. However, they were recklessly low with respect to being able to provide security in the aftermath of the Iraqi Army’s defeat.  A comparison of troop levels in the table above shows that after accounting for population, troop levels in Iraq were not far below those in Japan. The raw numbers are misleading because they do not account for two key differences. One, Iraq is comprised of three main competing ethnic/sectarian groups. And two, Iraq’s infrastructure and populace had not been destroyed/subdued to nearly the same degree as either Germany or Japan.   These differences explain why Army leaders planning the invasion thought they would need 500,000 troops[48] to secure the country despite its relatively small population. They also explain why the 130,000-140,000 troops Donald Rumsfeld gave them were not enough. As with Afghanistan, American leaders seemed unable to distinguish between conquering and providing security and never provided enough troops to accomplish the latter.

America’s low troop levels limited its ability to implement reforms that could turn Iraq into a stable, democratic society. But part of the reason it refused to provide enough troops was that, aside from holding elections, it had no plan to modernize or genuinely democratize Iraq. As such, it never attempted to develop a coordinated set of military, economic, social, and political policies that could consolidate its victory. In yet another parallel to Afghanistan, its low troop levels dictated much of its strategy. Since it had neither the desire nor the troop levels to support widespread political and social reforms, it helped create a new government in which power was apportioned to keep the peace between Iraq’s Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites. In doing so, it created a government that merely reinforced Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions. By refusing to implement reforms that could eventually lead to the creation of a stable, democratic ally the US trapped itself in an unwinnable situation.

In a repeat of the arrogant decision making seen in Afghanistan, the US refused to acknowledge its untenable situation by compromising with elements from the former regime. Instead, it took yet another harsh approach and disbanded the Ba’ath party while barring many of its members from further employment. Since being a member of the party was necessary to obtain employment in many public positions, this immediately destroyed Iraq’s ability to deliver important government services. It also put many former members of Iraq’s vast national security apparatus on the street, fueling the insurgency[49]. These mistakes ensured America could not institute the sort of deep-rooted reforms that would have been necessary to create a government capable of keeping Iraq united. Of course, doing so may have been impossible, but America’s lack of commitment prevented it from even trying. Instead, it opted to create a government that would always be weak and unstable.

The economic assistance provided to Iraq followed the same pattern as Afghanistan. A lot of money wasted on corrupt government officials or building a military that was lucrative for American defense contractors but did little to meet Iraq’s security needs[50]. Due to these inefficiencies and misplaced priorities, extraordinarily little of the vast sums sent to Iraq led to meaningful economic growth or improved the nature and quality of government services in a manner that could help America consolidate its victory.

America formally withdrew its forces from Iraq after roughly eight years[51] but left behind an ineffective and corrupt government that is riven by sectarian divisions[52].  The instability created by its invasion gave rise to ISIS, a threat Iraq’s government proved too weak to protect itself from without direct American and Iranian intervention. The only thing holding Iraq together now is that its neighbors refuse to allow the Kurds to have their own country, but it will likely fragment within the next few decades.

THE BIG PICTURE

Instead of turning Afghanistan and Iraq into allies that could help stabilize the wider Islamic world, America’s poorly managed occupations set off a chain reaction that plunged much of it into chaos. America’s actions may have degraded Al Qaeda’s ability to attack it in the short-term, but they also strengthened the appeal and power of similar groups in a manner that will pose a threat to its security for the foreseeable future.

The small military footprint demanded by American leaders combined with their reluctance to engage in nation building prevented the US from securing its victories at the decisive moments it defeated the Taliban and Iraqi army. Instead of securing a lasting peace like the ones achieved with Germany and Japan, America found itself trapped in the very quagmires it was hoping to avoid.

Deciphering why American leaders made such catastrophically bad decisions is beyond the scope of this discussion. The completely avoidable defeats suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been possible without a serious break down in the policy formulation process at several levels and are consistent with a pattern of poor decision making and policy implementation dating back to the Vietnam War. A myriad of factors such as the excessive political influence of the various commercial entities that pushed for these policies, the way that ideology and imperial hubris often informed the uncompromising attitudes behind them, and even good old fashioned ethnic stereotypes and simplistic tropes about Muslims all worked together to create the unbelievably destructive and short-sighted policies that led to America’s defeat.

These dynamics also help illustrate why its broader relationship with the Muslim world has been so problematic. In the same way that its alliances with Afghanistan’s warlords led to its defeat, America’s alliances with the Muslim world’s dictators ensured it would never win the War on Terror. To understand why, it is important to understand the main cause of the Muslim world’s instability and weakness. The prevalence of authoritarian despots throughout the Islamic world is the reason groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda exist. Most Muslim governments are controlled by people who have not been democratically elected and use their power to violently maintain their rule. Their primary goal is not to govern but to steal. That is why Hosni Mubarak stole nearly $700 billion[53] from his country and that is why the Saudi royal family is worth $1.4 trillion[54]! The Muslim world’s dictators are so blinded by greed they cannot stop stealing from their people and murdering those who challenge them. Their refusal to share power with the masses they govern has led to institutional rot, widespread violence, and economic stagnation of the sort that often leads to the development of extreme ideologies. America responded to 9/11 by strengthening its alliances with the dictators primarily responsible for allowing the region’s radical groups to thrive.

This ensured that its tactics were completely divorced from its values and guaranteed its defeat. American intelligence officers shipped (renditioned[55]) prisoners to allies so they could be tortured without stopping to think about how such actions enabled these allies to torture their own political dissidents. American defense companies sold (and continue to sell) weapons to dictators who murder their own people[56]. The author will never forget the shame he felt watching videos of American made F-16s fly over the crowds in Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring. Despite what the realists would have you believe, morality matters. Honor matters. And America compromised both by siding with the Muslim world’s dictators. The double standards and hypocrisy inherent in these actions made it impossible to win. America does not support the legitimate aspirations of people around the world to live freely when it is afraid of who they may choose to lead them or when doing so is not politically expedient. Its willingness to compromise on these values led to its defeat.

Wars often force uncomfortable alliances. America allied itself to some of the most brutal men in history to defeat the Axis powers.  The difference is that neither Stalin nor Mao was an underlying cause of WWII. The unholy alliances formed with the thugs ruling the Muslim world led to defeat because they made addressing the underlying causes of the region’s many problems impossible. By supporting these authoritarian governments, America helped entrench the political systems that are the foundational cause of the Muslim world’s many problems.

CONCLUSION

America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is part of a wider pattern of disengagement from the region. The contours and timing may be uncertain, but it is only a question of time before America substantially reduces its military commitment to the Muslim world. Its troops and finances are exhausted, it no longer needs its oil as desperately, and its leaders are now focused on China. America’s inevitable withdrawal makes it even more important to develop policies to make sure it is never attacked again. Otherwise, the continual stream of extremists created by the repression of its supposed allies will always be a threat. Rather than playing a never-ending game of whack a mole, it is time to devise realistic policies that can finally stabilize and bring prosperity to the region. America must use its soft power to incentivize Muslim governments to develop inclusive and democratic political institutions. It may be messy and will most certainly not be a panacea for everything that ails the Muslim world, but helping Muslims create democratic governments is the only real path to stabilizing the region.

Doing so will require a fundamental shift in American policies. Though President Biden has indicated a desire to make American policies match its democratic values, the administration’s current course is not encouraging as it appears to merely be returning to pre-Trump norms. America’s policies towards the Muslim world were guided by short-sighted ideas that sought to rationalize its inhumane policies long before Trump took office. Many of the Obama administration’s actions, such as its arms sales, prolific use of drones in Pakistan and tacit support for Egypt’s military coup, were equally inconsistent with American values and highlight the degree to which short-sighted agendas have always shaped its policies towards Muslim societies. Until this changes, American policies will continue to de-stabilize the region and fuel further conflict.


[1] Allen, Thomas and Polmar, Norman, “The radio broadcast that ended WWII,” The Atlantic, August 7, 2015. 70 Years After Hiroshima: How Japan’s Emperor Announced the End of World War II – The Atlantic

[2] Glass, Andrew, “Germany surrenders May 7, 1945,” Politico, May 7, 2018. Nazi Germany surrenders, May 7, 1945 – POLITICOBack ButtonSearch IconFilter Icon

[3] “Occupation of Japan,” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 5, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/event/occupation-of-Japan

[4] “A historical timeline of Afghanistan,” PBS News Hour, December 31, 2014. A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan | PBS NewsHour  

[5] “Key dates in the Iraq War,” CNN, December 18, 2011. Key dates in the Iraq war – CNN

[6] “Bush declares victory in Iraq,” BBC News, May 2, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989459.stm

[7] According to the CIA world factbook, Germany is roughly 357,000 sq. km. while the article “How Kohl and Gorbachev sealed the deal on German reunification,” DW, November 14, 2010 indicates E. Germany was roughly 108,000 sq. km. How Kohl and Gorbachev sealed the deal on German reunification | Germany| News and in-depth reporting from Berlin and beyond | DW | 14.07.2010

[8] “Population in the former territories of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic from 1950 to 2016,” Statistica, Accessed April 20, 2021. • Population of East and West Germany 1950-2016 | Statista

[9] Dobb Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), at 8-9. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/MR1753.ch2.pdf

[10] Zimmerman, Hubert, “The improbable permanence of commitment,” Mit Press Journal, 2009. https://watermark.silverchair.com/jcws.2009.11.1.3.pdf

[11] Zimmerman, Hubert, “The improbable permanence of commitment,” Mit Press Journal, 2009. https://watermark.silverchair.com/jcws.2009.11.1.3.pdf

[12] “Japan,” CIA World factbook, accessed April 20, 2021. Japan – The World Factbook (cia.gov)

[13] “Population of Japan from 1800 – 20202,” Statistica, accessed April 20, 2021. • Population of Japan 1800-2020 | Statista

[14] Weintraub, Stanley, “American Proconsul: How Douglas MacArthur Shaped Postwar Japan, HistoryNet. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989459.stm  

[15]“Afghanistan,” CIA World factbook, accessed April 20, 2021. Afghanistan – The World Factbook (cia.gov)

[16] “Afghanistan,” Population Pyramid, accessed April 20, 2021. Population of Afghanistan 2001 – PopulationPyramid.net

[17] Associated Press. “A timeline of U.S. Troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001.” Militarytimes.com. July 6, 2016. A timeline of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001 (militarytimes.com)

[18] “Iraq,” CIA World factbook, accessed April 20, 2021. Iraq – The World Factbook (cia.gov)

[19] “Iraq – Population,” Nations Encyclopedia, accessed April 20, 2021. Population – Iraq – growth, annual (nationsencyclopedia.com)

[20] Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues (fas.org)

[21] Dobb Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), at 8-9. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753/MR1753.ch2.pdf

[22] “Occupation of Japan,” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 5, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/event/occupation-of-Japan

[23] Weintraub, Stanley, “American Proconsul: How Douglas MacArthur Shaped Postwar Japan,” HistoryNet. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989459.stm and Dobb Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003).

[24] Christy, Patrick, “America’s Proud History of Post-war Aid, US News & World Report, June 6, 2014. https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii

[25] “US spends more rebuilding Iraq, Afghanistan than Post WWII Germany,” Face the Facts USA George Washington University, January 18, 2013. The U.S. has spent more reconstructing Iraq and Afghanistan than it did on Germany after World War II (facethefactsusa.org)

[26] Christy, Patrick, “America’s Proud History of Post-war Aid,” US News & World Report, June 6, 2014. https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/06/the-lessons-from-us-aid-after-world-war-ii

[27] Stern, Susan, “Marshal Plan: 1947-97 A German View,” MarshalFoundation.org, July 9, 2006. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Marshall_Plan_1947-1997_A_German_View.pdf

[28] Associated Press. “A timeline of U.S. Troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001.” Militarytimes.com. July 6, 2016. A timeline of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001 (militarytimes.com)

[29] Coll, Steve, Directorate S (Penguin Books, 2018), 89.

[30] Kumar, Radha, “A Roadmap for Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2001. https://www.cfr.org/report/roadmap-afghanistan

[31] Ahmed, Samina, “Warlords, Drugs, Democracy,” International Crisis Group, May 1, 2004. Warlords, Drugs, Democracy | Crisis Group

[32] Vendrell, Francesc, “What Went Wrong After Bonn,” Middle East Institute, April 18, 2012. https://www.mei.edu/publications/what-went-wrong-after-bonn

[33] Ahmed, Samina, “Warlords, Drugs, Democracy,” International Crisis Group, May 1, 2004. Warlords, Drugs, Democracy | Crisis Group

[34] “Afghanistan: Warlords Implicated in New Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, July 29, 2003. Afghanistan: Warlords Implicated in New Abuses | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org)

[35] Goldstein, Joseph, “U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies,” New York Times, September 15, 2020.

[36] Groll, Elias, “The United States has outspent the Marshal Plan to rebuild Afghanistan,” ForeignPolicy.com. July 30, 2014. The United States Has Outspent the Marshall Plan to Rebuild Afghanistan – Foreign Policy

[37] Coll, Steve, Directorate S, (Penguin Books 2018), at 140-44.

[38] Associated Press. “A timeline of U.S. Troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001.” Militarytimes.com. July 6, 2016. A timeline of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001 (militarytimes.com)

[39] Mashal, Mujib, “Afghanistan Needs Billions in Aid Even After a Peace Deal, World Bank Says,” The New York Times, December 5, 2019.

[40] “US Spending in Afghanistan Fueled Rampant Corruption Reports Say,” The World, December 11, 2019. US spending in Afghanistan fueled rampant corruption, reports say | The World from PRX (pri.org)

[41] “Cost of War,” Watson Institute Brown University, updated January 2020. Foreign Assistance Budget | Costs of War (brown.edu)  

[42] Groll, Elias, “The United States has outspent the Marshal Plan to rebuild Afghanistan,” ForeignPolicy.com. July 30, 2014. The United States Has Outspent the Marshall Plan to Rebuild Afghanistan – Foreign Policy

[43] Aikins, Matthieu, “The Bidding War,” The New Yorker, February 28,2016. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/07/the-man-who-made-millions-off-the-afghan-war; Snow, Shawn, “US Weapons Complicate Afghan War,” Military Times, July 25, 2017. US weapons complicate Afghan war (militarytimes.com)

[44] By comparison, American forces killed 40,000 civilians over a twenty-year period. See Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, “Afghans wonder ‘What about us?’ as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw,” New York Times, April 14, 2021. Afghans Wonder ‘What About Me?’ as US Troops Prepare to Withdraw – The New York Times (nytimes.com)

[45] “Doomed: Why the Soviets failed to conquer Afghanistan,” The National Review, October 9, 2020. Doomed: Why the Soviets Failed to Conquer Afghanistan | The National Interest

[46] “Whistleblower exposes $7 billion no-bid Defense Department contracts,” CBS News, June 30, 2019. Whistleblower exposes $7 billion no-bid Defense Department contract – CBS News

[47] Benjamin, Medea and Davies, Nicolas, “The staggering death toll in Iraq,” Salon, March 19, 2018. The staggering death toll in Iraq | Salon.com

[48] Freedman, Lawrence, The Future of War: A History, (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019), at 193.

[49] Al-Shibeeb, Dina, “Where is Iraq’s Baath Party today?” Al Arabiya News, August 21, 2015. Where is Iraq’s Baath party today? | Al Arabiya English;

[50] “Much of $60 Billion from US to rebuild Iraq wasted, special auditor’s final report to Congress shows,” CBS News, March 6, 2013. Much of $60B from U.S. to rebuild Iraq wasted, special auditor’s final report to Congress shows – CBS News

[51] “Key dates in the Iraq War,” CNN, December 18, 2011. Key dates in the Iraq war – CNN

[52] Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq as a failed state,” CSIS, November 12, 2019. Iraq as a Failed State | Center for Strategic and International Studies (csis.org)

[53] O’Connor, Clare, “Egyptian estimate of Mubarak’s wealth soars to $700 Billion,” Forbes.com, April 11, 2011. Egyptian Estimate  Of Mubarak’s Wealth Soars To $700 Billion (forbes.com).

[54] Umoh, Ruth, “This royal family’s wealth could be worth more than $1 trillion,” csnbc.com, August 18, 2018. This royal family’s wealth could be more than $1 trillion (cnbc.com).

[55] Mayer, Jane, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker, February 6, 2005. Outsourcing the Torture of Suspected Terrorists | The New Yorker

[56] Hartung, William, “The US is Addicted to Weapons Sales to the Middle East,” PopularResistance.org, November 23, 2019. The US Is Addicted To Weapons Sales To The Middle East – PopularResistance.Org

Senator Durbin does not understand why we lost in Afghanistan

Senator Dick Durbin recently wrote an opinion piece about Afghanistan in USA Today. In it he argues that America lost its longest war because Afghans refused to “bend to reason or force” and could not accept “outsiders.” I completely disagree with his analysis.

We lost because we repeatedly shot ourselves in the foot in the following ways:

  • We never provided enough troops to properly secure the country once we routed the Taliban.
  • We outsourced security responsibilities to warlords that used their power to enrich themselves through corruption, theft, and drug trafficking while they violently abused the people they ruled over.
  • We wasted far too many resources trying to build a Western style military that Afghanistan could not afford or use properly.
  • We did not adequately manage or control how the vast sums of money we poured into the country were spent. As a result, at least 90% of the nearly $148 billion dollars we provided was either stolen or completely wasted on useless projects or military spending.
  • We never developed a mechanism to integrate those Taliban that tried to surrender back into society, giving many Pashtuns no choice but to support the insurgency.

As he noted in his piece, a lot of people died because of this war. As such, I think it is extremely important that we objectively analyze why we lost instead of relying on simplistic explanations or superficial stereotypes about the Afghan people. We had a small window of opportunity to do something good in Afghanistan and we blew it. That is why we lost.

Senator Durbin’s piece references Afghanistan’s history of violently ejecting invaders. I believe our history at the end of WWII is more instructive. We occupied Germany and Japan for ten and seven years after WWII. The policies implemented to secure both countries turned Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan into two of our closest allies. My point is, we have taken on bigger challenges than the Taliban and resoundingly won.

What is particularly concerning is that, despite fielding the most powerful military the world has ever known, America has forgotten how to win wars. The poor decision making that led to our defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq were remarkably like the mistakes made in Vietnam. Since the end of WW2 America has lost three of the five major military conflicts it has engaged in. This speaks to a troubling pattern that can only be explained by structural issues regarding our policy formulation process when it comes to matters of war and national security.

I realize the Senator’s letter was probably not intended to provide an in-depth explanation, but I still felt obligated to write this because the justifications in his piece are eerily similar to those used to create the unbelievably bad policies that led to our defeat. Until our leaders take the time to seriously reflect on why we lost in Afghanistan, and how this our loss fits within the larger context of the pattern of defeats referenced above, we will continue to waste lives and treasure losing wars that we should have won.

For a more in-depth discussion of these issues please see here.

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Muslims are still too weak and divided to help the Palestinians

The latest round of violence in Gaza galvanized the Muslim world yet again. Demonstrations and social media campaigns in support of Palestine highlighted the deep feelings of sympathy many Muslims have for its long-suffering people. As encouraging as it was to see so many show their support for the Palestinian people, these expressions of empathy and rage will ultimately lead to nothing.

That is because of one inescapable fact: Muslims are still too weak and divided to effectively confront Israel and its key ally, the United States. Iran is one of the few Muslim nations to actively oppose the neo-colonial power structures imposed upon the region by the West and, in return, it has been isolated and subject to brutal sanctions and clandestine military attacks. Until Muslim nations develop the military capacity to deter Israeli and American aggression, they will always be vulnerable to the type of violence that consumed Gaza.

The reasons for the Islamic world’s sustained weakness are too varied and nuanced to adequately address here. Suffice it to say, the prevalence of authoritarian political and social institutions throughout the region have choked off intellectual, political, and economic development in a way that has made it impossible for Muslim nations to develop the military capabilities required to protect themselves. As the always insightful Pervez Hoodbhoy points out in a recent editorial, the Muslim world’s lack of intellectual freedom and investment in education have left it unable to develop the means to counter Western aggression. He is absolutely right. Until the Muslim world revitalizes its intellectual climate, it will never be able to develop the technological base required to free itself from the domination of outside powers.

Compounding the problem is that Muslims refuse to work together. The Arabs are so scared of their Persian neighbors they are willing to work with Israel to weaken them. The Turkish people have finally begun to pivot back to the Muslim world, but their pan-Islamic vision is undermined by their oppression of the Kurds. Pakistan’s generals are so dependent on financial subsidies from their Arab patrons that they refuse to develop meaningful ties with Iran. These divisions play directly into the hands of the men that bombed Gaza and those that empower them. As Mr. Hoodbhoy correctly points out, unity by itself will not be enough. But working towards unification is just one of many changes that Muslims must make if they genuinely wish to change the power dynamics of the current global system in their favor.

The simple fact is that there is no Muslim nation large and powerful enough by itself to challenge the great powers of the world. That is because there is no Muslim nation with the size and resources of the US, China, Russia, or a united Europe. The only way that Muslims will ever end the atrocities in Palestine (or Kashmir, or Xinjiang, or Chechnya, or Burma) is by learning to work together.

The problem is that its authoritarian political institutions make working together impossible because they make it impossible to build the sort of inclusive and open political institutions required for such cooperation. The Muslim world is so large that the only way it will ever come together is by creating inclusive and democratic political institutions that can allow its diverse people to work together for their mutual betterment and protection. As such, the region’s lack of democracy not only limits its intellectual environment, economic strength, and stability but also its ability to bring Muslims together.

If Muslims are serious about helping the Palestinians (or the many other Muslim communities subject to conquest and oppression all over the world) then they must begin to institute deep rooted political and legal reforms to create democratic political institutions and stimulate the sort of intellectual growth necessary to end the dominance of the great powers. Such reforms will be key to supporting economic and technological development which are necessary precursors to acquiring advanced military capabilities.

They must also learn to work together. However, rather than indulge in fantasies about re-creating the Caliphate, ideas that can allow Muslims to work together must be based on a realistic assessment of the political and strategic environment facing the Muslim world today. Sadly, an honest assessment will quickly rule out the Arab, African, and Central Asian Muslim states. Their authoritarian political systems are so entrenched that expecting them to voluntarily reform themselves is not a realistic goal. The only Muslim nations with the right combination of strategic incentives, institutions, and geography that could convince their elites to come together are Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.

All four need to undergo serious reforms as well but three out of four are locked in existential conflicts that should incentivize their elites to at least consider such ideas. Though Turkey does not face the same strategic concerns as Iran, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, its elites should also be receptive to such ideas because they are the only way Turkey will ever be able to fully realize its pan-Islamic foreign policy goals.

Of course, the key to convincing these elites to adopt such ideas will be appealing to their pocketbooks. Consequently, the best way to build a sustainable alliance between these four nations is to start by building stronger economic ties and infrastructure that can allow for the free flow of goods, people, and ideas throughout them. The Muslim world divided itself politically long ago but was historically linked through interconnected layers of religious, trade, and political networks. The European conquest of the Muslim world destroyed these connections and today’s rulers have refused to rebuild them out of fear that doing so will threaten their grip on power. It is time for Muslims to rebuild these links so that their interests begin to align in a manner that can eventually lead to greater political and military cooperation.

Some may find calls for Islamic unity to be antiquated and even cliched, but the devastation being wrought upon so many parts of the Muslim world shows that the need for unity has never been greater. The civilizational based theory of international competition articulated by Samuel Huntington is becoming more of a reality every day as a multi-polar world largely centered on the world’s great civilizational blocks emerges. As this new international order takes shape, the Islamic world will continue to be a source of instability that will invite further conflict until its nations take the steps necessary to finally end their protracted weakness. Unity among Muslims will not be a panacea that will cure all the Muslim world’s problems, but it would certainly be a step in the right direction.

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Islam is in Crisis and has been for centuries

There is no denying that Islam is in crisis. Comments by France’s President Macron last year may have been cynically timed for political gain but that does not make his statement less true. Anyone looking at a map of the Muslim world would be hard pressed to find a part that is not dealing with a crisis of some sort.

For example, the author recently wrote a lengthy essay arguing that the Palestinians have resoundingly lost the struggle to create their own state here. But Palestine is not the only part of the Muslim world dealing with a violent military occupation. Muslim lands in the Caucasus, Western China, and Kashmir have all been conquered by non-Muslims and forcibly integrated into Russia, China, or India. What made the conquest of Palestine so galvanizing was that it represented the heart of the Muslim world and it was conquered by a band of destitute refugees. Despite fielding a poorly equipped militia (the Haganah), these refugees were able to defeat the forces of six Arab armies and conquer the third holiest city for Muslims, cutting the heart of the Islamic world out in the process. Taking a bird’s eye view, one can easily see that the Islamic world is not only in crisis but that much of it is on fire. 

Military losses on the periphery may not elicit the same emotional response as the conquest of Palestine but they stem from the same root causes because the same factors that led to the Russian, Chinese and Indian conquests of the Muslim world’s extremities also led to the conquest of Palestine. As such, these issues are all related and will only be resolved by policies that can address their common root causes. Until the underlying issues causing Islam’s crisis are fixed, there is little hope for the Muslim world. Anyone interested in resolving the Palestinian issue (or the Kashmir issue, or the Uyghur issue, etc.) must therefore resolve the issues that have afflicted the entire Muslim world first.

The conquest of Muslim lands may be the most visible indication of its weakness, but it is just the tip of the iceberg. Civilizations are rarely conquered by outsiders until they have sufficiently rotted from within. The history of the Islamic world over the past few centuries confirms this view. The same weakness that allowed for the conquest of Palestine and the Muslim world’s periphery has manifested itself throughout it in different ways such that nearly the entire Islamic world is consumed by conflict and instability. Ethnic rivalries such as those between Turks and Kurds or Arabs and Persians have consumed the geo-politics of the region. Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, and Libya are torn by civil conflict and no longer meet the definition of a functioning state while Nigeria, Iraq and Lebanon are perpetually on the cusp of disintegrating too.

Even those Muslims living in supposedly peaceful or stable nations are subject to extreme levels of repression and marginalization. Most Muslim nations feature authoritarian governments that have abysmal human rights records and underdeveloped economies characterized by extreme levels of wealth inequality. These economies have left most of their people stuck in poverty. The intellectual environment, whether measured by the number of patents filed, innovative technological breakthroughs, or freedom of expression is not inspiring either. Until these foundational issues are resolved, Muslims will continue to find themselves subject to violence and repression either at the hands of outside powers or each other.

The military weakness of the Muslim world is the combined result of the underlying weaknesses listed above and has impacted the ability of Muslims to develop advanced armaments industries or perform effectively on the battlefield. Muslims have been unable to develop advanced armaments industries because these capabilities cannot develop without strong economies fueled by technological innovation. They have been unable to develop strong economies because this cannot happen without well run government agencies that can provide a regulatory environment, fiscal policies, and dispute resolution mechanisms conducive to such growth. The autocratic and authoritarian governments prevalent throughout most of the Muslim world have been unable to provide these government services thus they have been unable to oversee economic growth conducive to developing such capabilities.

They have also been unable to nurture technological development because this cannot occur without educational institutions capable of helping students develop their critical thinking and technical skills. But educational institutions cannot thrive without a culture that embraces intellectual honesty and vigorous debate. The combination of authoritarian governments and cultural norms that limit intellectual debate and freedom of expression have therefore prevented the development of educational institutions that can support technological innovation.

These same factors have also contributed to the poor performance of Muslim soldiers even when they are equipped with modern weaponry because they have prevented them from developing the critical thinking skills necessary to thrive in combat. Muslim soldiers, particularly its Arab soldiers, have repeatedly proven themselves to be incompetent on the battlefield. Whether equipped with aging Soviet weapons or fancy American ones, most Muslim armies (there are a few notable exceptions) have shown no ability to master combined arms operations or properly operate or even maintain the weapons they buy. These poor tactical skills have led to numerous military defeats.            

The weakness and instability of the Muslim world is the combined result of its repressive political institutions, underdeveloped economies, stagnant educational institutions, and a political environment and culture that stifles intellectual debate. Though independent, these factors work in unison to keep Muslims weak. Until they are resolved by deep rooted legal, political, and social reforms designed to empower and educate the masses of the Muslim world, Islam will continue to find itself in crisis.

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Non-violent resistance is the best chance the Palestinians have left

On April 13, 1919 British General Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to open fire on a crowd of unarmed Indians in the city of Amritsar. They murdered 379 men, women, and children that day. Despite the inevitable calls for revenge, Mahatma Gandhi worked tirelessly to convince his countrymen that non-violent resistance was still their best chance for freedom. It took nearly thirty years and countless more deaths, beatings, and unjust imprisonments, but Gandhi’s tactics eventually freed the Subcontinent from the evils of imperialism. Martin Luther King borrowed many of Gandhi’s ideas to finally free African Americans from the evils of segregation. Though primarily grounded in value systems that abhorred violence, the choices Gandhi and King made were also a reflection of the fact that they were outgunned by men who had no problem murdering women and children. Non-violence was not just a moral choice, but a necessity born of weakness.

The parallels between these examples and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be painfully obvious. The latest fighting claimed the lives of over 250 Palestinians compared to just 12 Israelis. While some may find it crude to compare casualty figures, the huge disparity in these numbers highlights the power differential between both groups and is consistent with numbers from previous conflicts as well. For example, in 2014 Israel killed over 2,100 Palestinians while suffering only 73 fatalities. The lopsided casualties suffered by the Palestinians is based on their inability to match Israel’s military capabilities. They do not have the heavy weapons required to challenge the IDF in a conventional fight and have proven incapable of developing effective guerilla tactics that can do so either. From a military perspective, the Palestinians are incredibly weak while Israelis are incredibly strong.

One of the few American media personalities to correctly diagnose this state of affairs is comedian Trevor Noah who poignantly highlighted on his Daily Show that the Palestinians simply do not have the military ability to protect themselves. Hamas’ ability to attack Israel with rockets may grab headlines but homemade rockets are not going to significantly change the balance of power in this conflict as long as Israel has all the tanks and warplanes. Consequently, the only real path to peace and dignity for the Palestinian people lays in civil disobedience and non-violent resistance aimed at dismantling the Apartheid state most of them have been forced to live in since 1967. Given the serious military imbalance between the parties, this is the only chance for the Palestinians to secure their rights. It also represents their best chance to use the political momentum and sympathy generated from the latest violence to their advantage.

For the most part, the latest round of fighting was depressingly similar to previous bouts of violence that always seem to feature massive Israeli bombardments and disproportionate Palestinian casualties. However, there was one crucial difference this time. For the first time, the Palestinians had vocal support from within the US political establishment. For the first time, Americans are having a conversation about their government’s unequivocal support for Israel. These changing sentiments are still not enough to challenge the vested and powerful interests within America that have always supported Israel, but it shows there is a chink in the armor. And the best way for the Palestinians to exploit this opening is by adopting widespread civil disobedience in which they peacefully refuse to comply with Israel’s Apartheid policies. Doing so would not only secure the moral high ground (given their lack of weapons, this is the only high ground they can hope for), it would also give them new political momentum and significantly change the current dynamics of the conflict which still heavily favors Israel.

Non-violence is the only tactic that has the potential to change the pattern of violence between both parties. Otherwise, these periodic conflagrations will continue repeating themselves because the fundamental dynamics of this conflict will remain unchanged. And the one unchanging fact shaping this conflict for the past 16 years is that Israel has overwhelmingly won both militarily and politically. It won when it crushed the second Intifada and locked Hamas in an open-air prison (along with two million innocent Palestinians for good measure).


The recent détente between Israel and various Arab states and the muted reaction to Israel being labeled an Apartheid state by Human Rights Watch also highlight the degree to which it has won this conflict politically. The sad reality is that the Western world has become numb to the devastation being inflicted upon the Palestinian people. Until this latest round of violence, America’s unwavering support gave Israel carte blanche to do as it pleased to the Arabs under its control and it seemed there was no red line it could cross that would change this, even attacking Islam’s third holiest site during Ramadan. Non-violent resistance is therefore the only path left that has any chance at ending the cycle of violence and securing a favorable outcome for the Palestinians.

The biggest barrier to effectively using such tactics is the fact that no amount of civil disobedience will result in the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Israel’s colonization of the West Bank destroyed that option. The presence of roughly 760,000 settlers and the extensive network of settlements and infrastructure they built across the entire area integrated the West Bank with Israel, creating “facts on the ground” that make building a viable Palestinian state impossible. Many Israelis are adamantly opposed to a one-state solution, but the truth is that their leaders set them on this path the minute they started building settlements in the West Bank (to say nothing of the fact that a nation built in the heart of the Arab world should probably expect to have a few Arab citizens). Israel and the West Bank are already a single state in all but name, controlled by a single political authority. Israel has just hidden behind the legal fiction of the Green Line to create an Apartheid state that denies the Palestinians their fundamental rights.

For non-violence to work, it must be used with a realistic goal in mind that forces Israelis to decide if they would rather live in a Jewish state or a democratic one. And the Palestinians must understand that just because they refuse to resort to violence does not mean Israel will play along. The British did everything they could to goad Indians into fighting back. Similarly, attempts at non-violent protest in Gaza were met by sniper fire in 2018. Israel will do everything in its power to get the Palestinians to keep fighting for the false promise of their own state because violent resistance, even in self-defense, plays into the hands of right-wing Israelis looking to justify their unbelievably hypocritical policies. Despite these obstacles, civil disobedience still represents the best chance for the Palestinians to end their suffering by creating a genuinely democratic state in which all of Israel’s citizens are treated as equals.

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Muslim rulers really need to read Machiavelli’s The Prince

Although widely recognized as an astute student of statecraft today, Machiavelli has historically been one of the more controversial political thinkers in the Western world. His ideas have been criticized because they are primarily concerned with how rulers attain and augment their power. They do not deal with questions related to the moral exercise of power.  As such, the dictators of the Muslim world should pay attention to his ideas because they only seem to care about power as well and have shown no interest in creating governments imbued with any sense of morality or decency. The following discussion is based on George Bull’s translation[1] and will analyze Machiavelli’s ideas in order to suggest what Muslim rulers can learn from Italy’s most infamous political thinker.

The similarities between the political and military situation in Italy that gave rise to the ideas expressed in The Prince and the current political and military dynamics of the Muslim world are quite striking. The Prince was written in response to the fractured nature of Italy’s politics during a time when the French and Spanish were attempting to dominate its smaller and divided city-states. Rather than work together to prevent these powerful kingdoms from subjugating Italy’s city-states, Italy’s rulers pursued policies that prioritized their own short-term retention of power even if doing so allowed powerful outsiders to entrench their dominant positions. This resulted in the effective military control of the Italian peninsula by outside powers during much of Machiavelli’s lifetime. The rulers of the Muslim world have pursued similarly short-sighted policies that have resulted in the complete domination of the Islamic world by the West, Russia, and China. Despite these broad similarities, there are also some important differences.

One of the key differences between Italy during this period and the Muslim world today is that Italy’s problems were mostly political. The political divisions within Italy prevented building armies powerful enough to counter the French or the Spanish. Italian arms were not lacking in technical or tactical skills nor were they weak because Italy’s economy was incapable of equipping Italian soldiers with modern weaponry (by the standards of the time).  The military weakness of the Muslim world is also primarily rooted in its weak political institutions and rulers. However, its inability to develop modern economies capable of producing advanced weapons like those made by the West or to competently use the advanced weapons they import are also based on the cultural climate of the Muslim world which discourages critical thinking and the free exchange of ideas. The stagnant intellectual climate of the Muslim world has therefore greatly contributed to its weakness by preventing Muslims from creating strong economies or vibrant educational and research institutions that can develop the minds of its scientists, soldiers, and industrialists. As such, the military weakness of the Muslim world is best viewed as resulting from a combination of political, economic, cultural, and technical factors whereas Italy’s weakness was mostly political.

It is important to keep these contextual factors in mind when discussing how Machiavelli’s ideas might apply to the Muslim world so they can be analyzed with the proper perspective. Yet another factor to note in this regard is that, as referenced above, The Prince does not provide a coherent political philosophy. Machiavelli wrote his book as an attempt to provide advice to one of Italy’s most prominent rulers by providing him with a practical guide about how to retain and augment his power. He did not write The Prince in order to formulate a new political philosophy that could be used to provide the intellectual basis for Italian unity. Nor did he concern himself with greater questions of political philosophy. It is likely he felt that such concerns were irrelevant so long as the ruler in power was strong and just. As a result, he was focused on developing ideas that could substantially increase the power of a ruler. Given his concentration on how to acquire, maintain, and increase power, his advice should be considered indispensable to the rulers of the Muslim world who also care about power over all other considerations.

The Prince is primarily concerned with analyzing “hereditary principalities[2]” in which power is held by one ruler who can pass on authority to a designated heir. Most nations within the Muslim world are best treated as “hereditary principalities” as well since they consist of kingdoms such as Jordan or Morocco or republics ruled by men who act as though they rule over a kingdom instead of a true republic. For example, even though Egypt under Mubarak was officially designated as a republic, Mubarak was grooming his son to take power and governed Egypt much like it was his own kingdom rather than a republic. Egypt’s current ruler, General Sisi, appears likely to continue this trend.

According to Machiavelli, there are two basic types of “hereditary principalities.” The first are those that are governed by a ruler “to whom everyone is subservient[3]” while the second type are those in which the ruler governs with the aid of nobles who do not owe their position to the ruler’s favor. The basic dichotomy described here is between an absolutist political system in which the ruler concentrates as much power in his person as possible as opposed to a feudal system in which the ruler must share power with nobles. In discussing the former, Machiavelli cites to the Ottoman Empire, stating that “the Turkish empire is ruled by one man; all others are his servants[4]” whereas “the king of France is surrounded by a long-established order of nobles[5]” who have their own subjects and are “loved by them[6].” According to Machiavelli, principalities governed like the Turkish empire are difficult to conquer because outsiders cannot manipulate elements within it to support an invasion. An enemy attempting to conquer absolutist principalities must therefore defeat its army in the field before it can assume control whereas an enemy trying to conquer a principality that features an independent nobility will have an easier time conquering it because it can use the nobles against the ruler. Once conquered; however, it is much easier to maintain control over an absolutist principality whereas it is much harder to maintain control over principalities that feature multiple independent power centers. This seems logical since principalities with a powerful nobility will have leaders with their own troops who can resist an invasion even if the ruler falls. While principalities governed by absolutist rulers will have no other power centers that can resist an invasion once the ruler is defeated because no other groups within it have been allowed to accumulate the power to do so. Applying these ideas to the Muslim world, one can see how its absolutist political institutions made it more prone to conquest and colonization once the West was able to develop military tactics and technology that the Muslim world could not match. Once European armies defeated the absolutist rulers of the Muslim world there were no independent power centers that could oppose them. As such, one of the first and most basic lessons today’s Muslims can learn from Machiavelli is that their absolutist political institutions made it easier for Europeans to conquer and colonize them and the continuing prevalence of such political institutions continues to make the Muslim world vulnerable to conquest.

Machiavelli also discusses the various ways that rulers acquire and maintain power. One tactic that rulers often use is to form a client relationship with a foreign power to obtain the support they need to either seize or maintain their power. Machiavelli believed that relying on the favor of a foreign power leads to instability because it makes rulers dependent on the “goodwill and fortune of those who have elevated them[7].” Instead, Machiavelli states that rulers must have their own armies, loyal only to them, and must come to power exclusively by this power rather than using foreign troops[8]. Dependence on foreign military assistance is therefore viewed as a fatal weakness by Machiavelli, one that will often lead to the demise of the ruler. The history of the Muslim world confirms Machiavelli’s views. For example, the only branch of the Hashemite dynasty installed by the British to have survived past its infancy is the one that was able to develop an alliance with local Bedouin and Circassian tribes that gave it the independent military power necessary to ensure its survival. Neither dynasty in Egypt nor Iraq was able to do so, much to their regret. The current leaders of both Iraq and Afghanistan are in the process of learning this lesson as well since neither can rely on their militaries to ensure their power. Their inability to develop military power independent from the United States will likely result in the disintegration of Iraq within the next few decades and the development of an entirely new government in Afghanistan that, at best, will have to share power with the Taliban in the near future.

This illustrates that those Muslim rulers that are reliant on foreign military forces to maintain their regimes should be wary. Machiavelli would argue that you are setting yourselves up for failure and conquest. The Arab nations of the Persian Gulf are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Their reliance on foreign military contractors (a.k.a. mercenaries) to ensure their advanced imported arms remain operable is a serious vulnerability.  As is their general reliance on the military power of the United States to ensure their rule. This makes their continued power subject to the whims and fortunes of the US instead of placing their fate in their own hands. Machiavelli’s views on mercenaries[9] and the use of foreign military power highlight a general animosity towards reliance on the aid of others, instead he seems to understand what common sense also dictates: that a nation must be able to rely on itself when it comes to matters of defense. As such, those Muslim rulers that have outsourced this responsibility to a foreign power or are dependent for such matters on the goodwill of another nation must begin to seriously reconsider their policies.

This extends to those Muslim nations that remain dependent on outside suppliers to meet their most advanced defense requirements. The same logic that dictates a ruler must have resort to his own army and cannot be dependent on foreign troops to maintain his power also extends to the conclusion that no military can claim to be powerful until its armaments are manufactured within territories under its direct control. The Muslim world’s dependence on imported weapons is therefore a serious military vulnerability that impacts its ability to prevent the conquest of Muslim nations. Again, the historical record of the Muslim world and its string of military defeats and territorial contraction over the past few centuries confirms this view.

In addition to discussing military matters, Machiavelli also discusses internal political matters. He suggests that there are three main interests a ruler must balance. The people, the nobles[10], and the army[11]. According to Machiavelli, the people are easy to appease because they ask only not to be oppressed while the nobles and the army are the most difficult to placate because the nobles actively seek to oppress the people while the army constantly demands to go to war and will often resort to violence to get its way[12]. In today’s parlance we would replace the word nobles with the word elite, but the same concept applies. The political and economic institutions of the Muslim world are dominated by an elite comprised mostly of its military and large landowning class that have concentrated power in the hands of an extremely small elite which often uses it power to maintain violent control over their people. As such, the rulers of the Muslim world have traditionally come from and served the interests of what Machiavelli would call the nobles and the army. He would likely disapprove of this power structure because he suggests that the first thing a ruler must do to secure power is to seek the friendship of the people as he correctly understands that power is ultimately derived from them[13]. The instability of the Muslim world and the weakness of so many of its governments can therefore be directly attributed to power structures that intentionally marginalize the masses they govern. This is particularly frustrating because Machiavelli states that all a ruler has to do to maintain order is make sure he executes people only when there is good cause to do so and abstain from disturbing the property or women of his subjects.[14] This is consistent with his statement that the only thing people really want is to not be oppressed. Sadly, most of the rulers of the Muslim world have been unable to meet these depressingly low standards. Their inability to check their greedy impulses to steal and enrich themselves and their willingness to use violence against their subjects without proper justification has resulted in the severe oppression of their people. Instead of trying to maintain the friendship of their people as Machiavelli advises, the rulers of the Muslim world have sided with their elites (nobles) and soldiers. This has led to the instability and weakness that has plagued the Muslim world for centuries.

Machiavelli states that one of the key institutions necessary to ensure good laws and governance is a parliament since it alleviates rulers of the need to pick sides with either the people or the nobles. He explains that the nobles and people can use this institution to govern together, stating there is “no better or more sensible institution, nor one more effective in ensuring the security of the king and the kingdom[15].” Although many Muslim nations have governments featuring legislative assemblies, most of them are not adequately empowered to govern their nations as most power is concentrated in the hands of an executive position or within a military/landowner/tribal oligarchy of some sort. As such, the political structure of most Muslim societies concentrates power in the hands of people from its elite and/or military class in a manner that has undermined its ability to develop effective representative bodies, the very institution highlighted as being key to a well governed state and the longevity of the ruler.

Based on their complete disregard for Machiavelli’s advice, the author can only conclude the rulers of the Muslim world have yet to read The Prince. This is unfortunate because they could have benefited from his observations. The fragility of so many Muslim governments proves that these rulers have ignored the advice discussed above to their great sorrow. Those rulers that have survived thus far should not fool themselves into thinking they can ignore the lessons of history either. They have not survived due to their own prowess but rather because fortune has favored them.[16] Eventually fortune will turn as it always does and, given their refusal to adhere to the sensible ideas discussed above, they will likely find themselves unprepared. The author humbly suggests they take some time to read what their former colleagues in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and far too many other Muslim nations ignored to their detriment or they are likely to suffer similar fates.


[1] Machiavelli, Niccolo, Trans by George Bull. The Prince. Penguin Books. London. 1961.

[2] Id. at 5.

[3] Id. at 13-14.

[4] Id. at 14.

[5] Id. at 14.

[6] Id. at 13-15.

[7] Id. at 20.

[8] Id. at 20-26.

[9] Id. at 39.

[10] Id. at 30-33.

[11] Id. at 60-61

[12] Id. at 31; 60-61; 65.

[13] Id. at 32-33.

[14] Id. at 53.

[15] Id. at 59.

[16] Id. at 20-21.

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Why Iran’s proposed alliance with China will be bad for Iran

It has recently come to light that Iran and China are negotiating a sweeping new agreement to integrate their economies. Though details are scarce, the agreement will likely be similar to the CPEC agreement between China and Pakistan in that it will fund infrastructure meant to integrate Iran into China’s economic orbit. Entering into such an agreement will alleviate Iran’s short-term economic issues but at a serious cost to its long-term strength and independence. Iran is making the same mistake as every other Muslim nation that enters into unequal bi-lateral arrangements with more powerful nations. The power disparity inherent in these relationships creates unequal alliances that puts the weaker party at a significant disadvantage. This results in economic development that decidedly favors the stronger party such as deals to extract oil on terms that are extremely favorable to it. The elites of the Muslim world are happy to enter such arrangements because they benefit from the corruption and bribes used to cement these deals.

If the conservative faction currently running Iran’s government gives in to the temptation to enter into such an agreement, they will be confirming themselves in the same sort of dictatorship that has governed the Muslim world for far too long. Instead of compromising with the progressive elements within their society in order to develop political and economic institutions that can allow Iran to develop its economic resources in a manner that prioritizes the needs of its people, its leaders will skew its development by prioritizing China’s needs. And they will do so in the sort of corrupt manner that will incentivize them to continue using violence and repression to maintain their control of Iran’s government.

Not only would such actions entrench Iran’s dictatorship, they would also prove that Iran’s rulers have no interest in preserving Islamic values or leadership. The Chinese government is actively murdering its Muslim Uighur population in a genocidal campaign designed to facilitate the colonization of Western China by Han Chinese. They have created camps full of innocent Muslim women and children and are in the process of slowly murdering and sterilizing them. Humanity has stood by and done nothing so perhaps it is unfair to blame Muslims for not caring either, but one would think that a country that claims to care so deeply about the Muslims of Palestine would be just as concerned for the well-being of China’s Muslims. The fact that Iran’s conservative faction is likely pushing for the deal is even more galling since they claim to care the most about Muslims and use these claims to justify their usurpation of power. No Muslim should be doing business with China until it has freed every single Uighur from these camps. But those Muslim countries that claim to care about the plight of oppressed Muslims as part of their official government policies should be particularly ashamed.

Muslims do not criticize China out of fear. This fear is rooted in our weakness and this weakness is primarily rooted in our divisions and dysfunctional political institutions. China can easily deal with just one Muslim nation speaking out and since Muslim governments do not work together, they only ever speak as individual nations. Organizations like the Arab League that claim to represent Islamic unity are just vehicles used to create the illusion of unity without any of the substance. But if Muslims finally stood together China would have to take notice. It is only when Muslims learn to stand together that we will be able to stop such atrocities and our strength would be such that we would not even have to resort to violence. If Muslims were united, a conversation would suffice. Instead of turning to a nation that is engaged in the ethnic cleansing of other Muslims to protect itself from the US and Israel, Iran should look to its brothers in Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan for help. And its brothers in Pakistan, Turkey, and Afghanistan should be ashamed that they have not more vehemently offered their help. If these four countries were united as brothers, a conversation would have also put the troubles between Israel and Iran to bed. Instead of working together, Muslim leaders continue to allow themselves to be divided and conquered. The only way to rebuild the bonds of brotherhood that once kept Muslims united is to rebuild the networks of trade, social, and cultural exchange that once turned the Muslim world into a common cultural and economic zone. Rather than negotiating a massive investment deal with China, Iran should be discussing a similar agreement with Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to link their infrastructures and develop the ties that can bind these nations together.

The most efficient way to accomplish this would be by strengthening the rule of law in each country by zealously fighting corruption. This would allow the political institutions of these nations to work together in a transparent manner to help each other prosper through trade. The creation of inclusive political institutions like those that led to the development of the EU would be vital to efforts to integrate Muslim nations as well. Sadly, most Muslim nations are run by governments that will not allow such links or reforms to develop. They prevent these reforms because they are governed by dictators who only care about preserving their power so they can steal as much money as possible. Their greed and shortsighted obsession with control has blinded them to what real power is. The rulers of the Muslim world import luxury cars from Europe and parade around pretending to be royal when they are just thieves. The only difference between a common thief and these rulers is that they have stolen so much money that they were able to buy themselves titles. Instead of working for the betterment of their people and faith, these rulers resort to violence and oppression to maintain their power. The great powers of the world help them stay in power out of a combination of greed and fear of what Muslims would do if they were ever freed from the shackles of dictatorship. Policies rooted in fear and greed can only ever lead to chaos and destruction and that is exactly what has consumed the Muslim world.

If Muslims ever hope to revitalize ourselves, we will need to begin looking inward by examining the cultural and social factors that have led to the current state of affairs. Ultimately, the oppressive governments of the Muslim world are a reflection of its people. In order to correct the issues of governance that have plagued the Muslim world, its people must engage in an intellectually honest debate regarding how best to correct the deep-rooted issues in Islamic societies that have prevented the development of vibrant and effective political and economic institutions. The current authoritarian governments in the Muslim world have prevented this much needed debate from happening and must be significantly reformed before an intellectually honest environment can be created. Until that happens, we will continue to see leaders like those in Iran who sell their souls for power and money. Although the need for reform has been clear for centuries, the absence of an intellectual environment conducive to honest and unfiltered debate has prevented Muslims from correctly analyzing the root causes of our weakness. Out of pride, we refuse to admit that we are a conquered people. We have been so thoroughly thrashed by the West in the ancient conflict between our two civilizations that we do not even think about picking ourselves up from off the floor to rebuild our societies. Since most Muslims cannot even admit defeat, it has been impossible to convince them of the need to implement reforms meant to reverse this defeat. Without serious reforms, our subjugation will never end, and we will continue to see atrocities such as those being perpetrated against China’s Muslim population.

Rather than enter into an agreement with China that will likely use Chinese firms and technical expertise to build its infrastructure, Iran should enter into agreements with its Muslim neighbors designed to improve their technical abilities and economic foundations. Using Iranian, Pakistani, Turkish, and Afghan companies to plan, design, and build the infrastructure that will be necessary to integrate their economies will allow these nations to truly modernize. Instead of importing the machinery needed to exploit its mineral resources from China, Iran should work with Muslim allies to create a free trade zone with each other in which local firms are incentivized to build the equipment and infrastructure needed to modernize. Utilizing local companies would allow investments in infrastructure to benefit the local economy while simultaneously improving the technical skills of their people. Until Muslim nations develop the capacity to build high quality machine tools, construction and mining equipment, fiber optic relays, automobiles, electronics and computer hardware and software, etc., they will always be impoverished. Rather than allow China to import its unprocessed natural resources for its own industrial needs, Iran should build an industrial infrastructure that can turn its natural resources into finished goods, and it should work with Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to accomplish this goal. Though this path is considerably more difficult, it would lead to real and sustained economic and technological development for all four nations. Iran’s potential deal with China is unlikely to lead to the development of these capabilities. Instead, it will probably follow the same path as Pakistan which has used Chinese loans to hire Chinese firms and buy Chinese equipment to build infrastructure China needs without improving its indigenous capabilities.

The economic policies suggested above will not work until Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan build the political and educational institutions to implement and support them and this process will also be extremely difficult. Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims have consistently relied on foreign capital and technical expertise to build modern infrastructure in their quest to develop industrial economies. In every instance this has led to economic dependence and conquest. While building modern roads and infrastructure are vital for economic development, they are not the most important aspects of modernization. True modernization cannot happen without political and socio-economic reforms meant to empower and educate the masses. The reason most Muslim governments have been so bad at modernizing themselves is because they refuse to share political power with their people. Most of their reforms have only addressed the superficial symbols of modernity while ignoring the foundations upon which such reforms should be based. They have done this because their primary focus is retaining power. Only those reforms that do not threaten their power have been allowed and these have not been enough. Also, using foreign capital removes the need to improve their governing institutions and capacity to generate the tax revenue necessary to finance economic development locally. Again, they have chosen this path because, as counterintuitive as it may seem, improving their governing institutions such as their law enforcement agencies, tax collection agencies, or courts would threaten their power which is based on subverting these institutions in order to maintain their rule. Muslim rulers do not want functioning courts or administrative agencies because they are afraid these bodies may serve as a check on their power. Without the important government services these agencies are supposed to provide, the economic growth the Muslim world so desperately needs will never happen and its people will remain trapped in the same cycle of poverty and disenfranchisement that has ensnared them for centuries.

If Muslim rulers continue on their current trajectories, they will doom their people to slavery, and they will doom themselves to rebellion and weakness. Instead of suffering the fate of the Romanov or Pahlavi dynasties, Muslim rulers must embrace the path of Japan’s feudal rulers who prioritized the well-being of their people and power of their civilization by giving up much of their own power to oversee Japan’s transition to modernity. Muslims must create the democratic political institutions necessary to oversee such change and invest in educational, economic and scientific development if they ever hope to end their subservience to outsiders. As an astute, though cynical, man once noted, rulers that come to power by betraying their fellow citizens through treachery and murder may achieve power, but they will never achieve glory[1]. It is time for the rulers of the Muslim world to start thinking about the glory of their people and civilization rather than just chasing power. 


[1] Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, trans. by George Bull. London: Penguin Books, 1961 at pg. 27.

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