I recently watched the hit Netflix movie “Don’t Look Up” about a comet full of precious metals hurtling towards Earth. In the movie, America is the only nation capable of saving the day. However, once its leaders realize how valuable the comet is, they try to mine it instead of destroying it. The movie is a metaphor for climate change but, like all good movies, it has more than one important message. When I watched it, I came away with two subtle lessons that its makers may not have intended.

The first is that our solar system is full of similar rocks that contain wealth measured in quintillions, not trillions. Thankfully, none of them are hurtling towards us. Instead, they are sitting out there waiting to be mined. Before you start to think I’m ignoring the movie’s message by focusing on this wealth, let me expand.

People like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos already know about these asteroids. A few of the world’s governments, like the American, Chinese, and Indian ones do too. That is why they are spending billions developing the technology that will eventually lead to mining them. Some have ridiculed Musk and Bezos for their trips to space by characterizing them as a self-indulgent waste of resources. This criticism is as short-sighted as it is illogical. These trips and the improved technological abilities they represent are laying the foundations that will allow them to reach these asteroids. In the movie, America already has the technical abilities to attempt mining the comet. But the truth is that it will take several decades to develop this technology since doing so will require substantial leaps in many scientific fields related to space travel as well as building the infrastructure to bring these metals back to Earth. The process is still in its early stages, but those with the capacity to do so are already positioning themselves to control this wealth by investing in the technology that will lead to it.

These potential breakthroughs are the real reward since they will have both commercial and military uses here on Earth that will lead to even more wealth and power for those that develop them. The nations or companies that invest in creating the industrial and scientific capabilities to develop this technology will be the real winners of the race to mine space because doing so will give them the means to dominate global trade and politics for a long time.

The last time something this momentous happened, it led to the conquest and colonization of nearly the entire world by Western Europe. 500 years ago, Western nations developed technology that enabled them to build sailing vessels armed with cannons that were so powerful, fast, and large they took control of the seas. They used this power to conquer and colonize the Americas while simultaneously attacking communities throughout Asia and Africa. The wealth acquired from these conquests, particularly the untapped wealth of the Americas, fueled a cycle of technological and economic development that perpetuated and fed off itself. This led to a continuous stream of advancements in military capabilities that were used to establish Western control over the rest of the world that continues today.

Portugal used its new ships and cannons to conquer trade routes in the Indian ocean by destroying Muslim communities from East Africa to the Sub-continent. The Dutch used theirs to conquer the islands that comprise modern day Indonesia. The English used theirs to conquer modern day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Spain used its ships to conquer much of Latin America. I could go on (and on and on), but the relevant point is that these technological advances led to imperial wars of conquests that destroyed millions of lives.

Muslims need to pay close attention because they were and continue to be one of the main victims of this violence. America’s conquests of Iraq and Afghanistan were just the most recent in a long line of wars launched by the West that trace their roots to the developments described above. If Muslims do not independently acquire the power to access and protect the solar system’s mineral wealth themselves, the pattern will repeat itself. History always does until you take the time to learn from it. Those nations that acquire the ability to control space will prosper while those that do not will be at their mercy. Not just because of the massive wealth but because the technology used to acquire it will give them incredible power.

America has already created a military branch specifically focused on fighting in space. Though it will never openly admit it, it is probably developing satellite-based weapons systems that will give it the ability to monitor and attack targets located anywhere on Earth at any time without having to worry about flying over hostile territory or refueling its drones. As always, the technological developments taking shape today will impact how nations fight each other tomorrow. If history is any guide, those nations that do not invest in this technology will regret it.

Thus far, Iran and Turkey are the only Muslim nations that have made meaningful (though limited) progress in mastering the technology to get to space. However, both suffer from the same structural problems, just to lesser degrees, that have prevented most Muslim nations from developing the necessary technical and industrial capabilities.

The Muslim world’s lack of inclusive governments that allow for the fair distribution of political and economic power and its toxic intellectual climate have crippled their ability to nurture and support the type of economic and technological growth necessary to reach space. Ironically, these same factors also allowed Europe to surpass and then conquer it centuries ago.

Amazingly, Europe’s conquest of the Muslim world did not motivate most of its rulers to implement reforms that could prevent such violence from ever occurring again. As such, the prospect of seeing these patterns entrench themselves for another few centuries will probably not change their minds either. But that is exactly what will happen if Muslim societies do not implement serious and deep-rooted reforms to their political and social systems that can lead to rapid technological and economic development.  

The urgent need for these reforms is best understood by discussing the movie’s underrated but very important second lesson. The movie depicts fictional politicians, media personalities, and business leaders that are so morally and intellectually bankrupt that they are incapable of taking the measures required to protect themselves, let alone others. Sadly, these fictional depictions are a frighteningly accurate portrayal of America’s elite. The progression of America’s leaders over the past several decades shows a devolution towards leaders that are intellectual lightweights (G.W. Bush did not even know who the leader of Pakistan was when asked during his primary campaign), morally bankrupt (Regan, Clinton, Trump), and increasingly unhinged (Marjorie Taylor Greene). Given these trends, it is not unreasonable to fear America will use the powerful weapons and technology it develops to control space to visit more death and destruction on the Muslim world. If not America, the violent policies implemented in Kashmir and Xinjian indicate India or China certainly will.

Instead of relying on the kindness of others to keep them safe, Muslims must take their fate into their own hands by developing the means to protect and save themselves. Otherwise, the violence and displacement they have endured these past five centuries will continue for many more, costing countless more lives.  

The author is a Pakistani-American, US Navy veteran, and an attorney in the field of intellectual property law. He writes about ways to reform the Muslim world on his blog, www.mirrorsfortheprince.com.  

India and Pakistan are likely to fight another war sometime during the next few decades. Given their history, this is not a particularly bold prediction. But perhaps this is: Pakistan will lose this war in dramatic fashion. It has already lost every war it has fought against India, so maybe this is not a bold prediction either. But India’s growing power means their next war will result in a catastrophic defeat for Pakistan.

The next South Asian war will be driven by a mix of factors. The primary one being that Pakistan will soon run out of water. Its exploding population, archaic agricultural practices, climate change, and the fact that the headwaters of its major river systems all emanate in Indian controlled Kashmir (rivers India keeps promising to dam) will significantly increase the risk of war over the next few decades. Though primarily driven by resource scarcity, ideology and hubris will also play decisive roles.

Pakistan’s recent victory in Afghanistan has already led to a resurgence in the popularity of right-wing Islamists ideas. This will inevitably lead to more violence in Kashmir once the Taliban consolidates its victory (which may take a few years). Having spent decades sponsoring guerrilla groups against both the Soviet and American empires, it is unlikely Pakistan’s generals will hesitate to continue using similar tactics against an Indian state they view as significantly weaker than both.

The popularity of right-wing Islamist ideology among its military elite and their overconfidence after events in Afghanistan will lead Pakistan’s generals to sponsor attacks that could easily lead to another war. India’s airstrikes near the town of Balakot in 2019 indicate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will not deter similarly aggressive responses in the future.

Although Indian leaders will blame this violence entirely on Pakistani machinations, the truth is that the primary catalyst will be their refusal to give Kashmiris their democratic rights. It is a universal truth that repression always breeds resistance. If Kashmir was meant to be a part of India, it would not take 500,000 troops enforcing a brutal military occupation to keep it and roughly 100,000 Kashmiris would not have sacrificed their lives fighting to be free of Indian rule. India’s elite is incapable of understanding this simple truth because they have embraced their own right-wing Hindutva ideology. Their shift to the right has turned India into the world’s most authoritarian democracy while illustrating the prescience of those who fought so hard to create Pakistan. The Indian elite’s Jai Hind mentality will make it impossible for them to empathize with the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people, making conflict inevitable. The BJP’s continuing electoral popularity and speculation about Modi’s potential successor indicate India will only shift more to the right with time, meaning its government will get even more aggressive towards its restless Muslim populations.

Realizing the tea leaves point to war is not that hard. What is more difficult is understanding why Pakistan is destined to lose its next war. India and Pakistan have been locked in conflict since the moment they gained their freedom from the British. Due to the size and resource disparity between them, India has always had a distinct advantage over its smaller neighbor. Despite these advantages, Pakistan has managed to attain a minimal degree of parity with its larger rival. Unfortunately, India’s advantages are poised to grow exponentially over the next few decades as it reaps the rewards of its economic liberalization. The growing gap in power between the two nations represents an existential threat to Pakistan that can no longer be ignored. Consequently, its military leaders must fundamentally rethink many of their national security strategies and policies.

WHY PAKISTAN WILL LOSE ITS NEXT WAR

Let’s start with the obvious comparison: defense budgets. India has been spending a lot on its military over the past few years. But since its economy has been growing, the ratio of these expenditures to GDP has not increased significantly. For example, in 2019 it spent a little over $71 billion on its military versus just over $10 billion for Pakistan. But that sum was only 2.4% of its GDP whereas Pakistan’s defense spending represented nearly 4% of its GDP.

These defense budgets and their relationship to GDP reflect each country’s economic strength. India liberalized its economy by empowering its private sector in 1991. Since that time its economy has grown from $266 billion dollars to $2.3 trillion in 2018. India’s growth has been uneven at times, and like all world economies, it has been seriously hurt by the COVID-19 Pandemic; however, the trends are clear. India’s economy will continue growing, giving it the wealth to continue upgrading its military.

India’s reforms have not only made it wealthier, they have also made it a partner worthy of American and Israeli attention. Its growing alliance with these nations will provide it access to some of the most sophisticated weapons available. India has historically underinvested in its military, but over the next few years it will undergo a massive modernization of its arsenal with the best weapons the West has to offer. The Balakot incident may have ended in serving India’s downed pilot tea, but future engagements will have very different endings once its aging MIG jets are replaced with advanced stealth fighters from the West.

As Saudi Arabia’s military incompetence in Yemen so vividly illustrates, larger budgets and access to fancy new weapons are not, by themselves, enough to guarantee victory. But they certainly help. And they speak to trends that should give Pakistan’s generals pause because India has already won all their wars without heavily investing in its military. Now that it is finally committing substantial resources to its armed forces, its dominance will only become more pronounced.

Lastly, India also benefits from a technological advantage. Predicting how technology will impact war is always a tricky business. But it seems likely computers and AI software will play important roles in the wars of the future. Those nations capable of harnessing this technology to engage in wide ranging cyberwarfare while controlling the flow of information will be able to cripple their enemies without firing a shot. India’s educational institutions and technology sector will give it another massive advantage over Pakistan in this emerging arena as well.

By comparison, Pakistan’s economy was worth a little over $45 billion in 1991 and had grown to $263 billion by 2020. Pakistan’s economy suffers from a variety of structural defects that all work together to prevent strong growth. Chief among them are its repressive political and social institutions which have prevented building a government capable of providing the services necessary for dynamic economic and technological growth such as competent law enforcement agencies, courts, or regulatory agencies, and vibrant educational institutions. As long as Pakistan’s economy is hamstrung by its non-responsive government and repressive social institutions, it will never be able to keep pace with India’s development.

Both nations are on drastically different trajectories that will eventually place Pakistan at a severe and dangerous disadvantage. Despite vague promises to focus on “geo-economics,” Pakistan has yet to implement the type of reforms that could allow it to close the gap with India. Paul Kennedy’s work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, shows why it should be wary. His theories indicate wars are usually won by the party with the greater industrial and scientific capacity to wage them. Given India’s growing abilities in these areas, it will soon develop an overwhelming edge against its longtime foe. Its growing defense budgets are merely a reflection of these changing dynamics and are the easiest way to quantify the effects of each nation’s differing economic policies which are, in turn, based on their differing political systems.

A BRIEF RECAP – WHY PAKISTAN LOST ITS LAST TWO WARS

Pakistan features a mixed political system with an elected government and a powerful military that holds the lion’s share of power. Its generals have been the architects of its national security policies for most of its history. Their unchecked power is the primary reason Pakistan has lost all its wars with India and best explains its economic and technological underdevelopment.

To illustrate why, we need to start in 1971. That was the last time both nations fought a major war. Pakistan lost so badly that it was dismembered, leading to the creation of Bangladesh and the capture of 90,000 of its troops. Pakistan’s military was firmly in charge at the time and prosecuted the war without any civilian oversight. As such, responsibility for this defeat belongs entirely to the incompetent generals in charge at the time.

Pakistan’s generals have always blamed this embarrassing loss on the impossible predicament of having to defend its disconnected Western and Eastern wings. This analysis misses the issue entirely. Pakistan was dismembered because its Punjabi and Pathan military and political elite refused to share power with their Bengali countrymen. Instead of honoring the democratic wishes of their fellow Pakistanis, they responded with brutality and widespread human rights abuses, creating a situation that India was able to exploit with ease. West Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 was a direct result of the military’s refusal to compromise or share power with its ethnically and linguistically distinct East Pakistani citizens. In other words, it was a political and human rights failure totally attributable to its generals.

It took nearly thirty years for another major conflict to erupt. Though not as catastrophic as the loss suffered in 1971, Kargil was a complete disaster for Pakistan and was the result of incredibly poor tactical and strategic decision making. Again, the generals who planned and initiated the operation did so with no civilian involvement.

Tactically, Pakistan’s military planners deployed light infantry into fixed defensive positions with no means of resupply or maneuver. They sent their soldiers to die and congratulated themselves on the high cost imposed upon their enemies for re-taking these positions.

Strategically, Kargil was planned with no coherent political or even military goal other than to inflict damage. The idea that taking those few peaks would result in a permanent change to the LoC without also taking the entire province is so laughable that Pakistan’s generals could not possibly have thought their stated objectives were realistic. Their only real goals were to inflict losses on their enemies and embarrass them by exposing a weakness in their defenses. Not only did this operation needlessly waste the lives of many brave Pakistani soldiers, it tipped India to a weakness that could have been exploited in a meaningful conflict and spurred it towards improving its defenses. It also made Pakistan the subject of nearly universal condemnation and highlighted India’s preeminence on the world stage like never before. Kargil may not have been as disastrous as the debacle in ’71 but it was still a complete failure in every respect.

Both conflicts, though spaced nearly three decades apart, highlight patterns of governance and civil-military relations that have crippled Pakistan’s ability to competently wage war. Despite its horrible track record, Pakistan’s military has retained its dominant political position and uses this power to give itself control over the country’s most important policies. The methods it has developed to assure its power and the policies favored by its military elite have stunted Pakistan’s economic and technological development which has prevented it from building a military that can protect it from India.

HOW PAKISTAN’S MILITARY PREVENTS ECONOMIC GROWTH

As India’s growing military abilities and America’s military dominance show, military power in the modern age is correlated to economic and technological power. The ability to develop this sort of power is, in turn, dependent on the presence of inclusive and open political systems that can provide the government services necessary to stimulate and nurture them. Pakistan’s history of military coups and the ways in which its military undermines its civilian leaders and institutions has therefore significantly undermined its economic potential. Additionally, the opportunity cost of its high military spending also limits growth by preventing the re-investment of tax revenue for economic or social spending. Pakistan’s generals have always used their political power to secure the largest share of the nation’s resources on the grounds that doing so was necessary to counter India. But by undermining their civilian counterparts and prioritizing military spending, they have impoverished the nation in both the short and long term.

The military’s involvement in commercial activity has also hurt long term economic growth. According to Ayesha Siddiqa, its businesses were worth roughly $20 billion dollars and controlled about a third of the nation’s manufacturing as far back as 2008. Pakistan’s generals justify their behavior by arguing that their businesses generate economic activity that benefits the entire nation. Once again, they are missing the bigger picture.

Since they have ignored or vilified all the modern scholars that have highlighted the negative impact of their involvement in trade, we will rely on one of the Muslim world’s greatest thinkers to explain why the military’s involvement in commerce is so unhealthy. According to Ibn Khaldun, when “Amirs[1] and other men in power[2]” engage in commerce they depress economic activity over the long run. They eventually crowd out private merchants who cannot compete with the favorable pricing and access to resources these men enjoy. This leads to decreased investment, long-term growth, and tax revenue. The degree to which Pakistan’s military elite have used their political power to build personal wealth for themselves while preventing the development of a strong commercial class proves Khaldun’s point. Allowing those with both political and military power to use that power to create wealth for themselves creates an unfair and inefficient trade environment that reduces economic growth.

Economics aside, as a matter of common sense, it should be obvious that allowing those charged with defending the nation to also engage in trade will distract them from their primary mission. Despite these glaring drawbacks, Pakistan’s military has worked tirelessly to become the nation’s most powerful political and economic institution. By prioritizing power and wealth above all else they have prevented their country from acquiring both.

HOW SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISTS AND INSURGENTS STUNTS ITS TECHNOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the military’s key policies since the Zia years has been propping up Islamist groups as domestic political allies and guerrilla proxies. Support for guerillas in Afghanistan eventually led to the creation of similar groups focused on Kashmir and led to increased domestic support for these groups which entailed supporting their political and social agendas. This “alliance[3]” with Pakistan’s Islamists also illustrates the short-sighted thinking that dominates Pakistan’s military.

With respect to Kashmir, proxies have been used to keep India involved in low intensity anti-guerilla operations that are best viewed as a short-term holding action. By continuing to arm Kashmiri separatists, Pakistan has gained a slight tactical advantage in that its minimal investment of resources has forced India to commit large numbers of troops to maintain security in Kashmir in a manner that has been financially burdensome. Forcing India into counter-insurgency operations has also compelled it to reduce its training and preparedness for more conventional conflicts, which gives Pakistan a slight advantage should another armed conflict arise. Ultimately, however, this strategy is self-defeating because the short-term tactical gains are overshadowed by the long-term strategic losses.

The problem with supporting guerillas in Kashmir is that they will never inflict enough damage to convince India to withdraw without first provoking a wider war that Pakistan cannot win. Comparisons with the successful campaigns to evict Russia and America from Afghanistan are mis-placed because Afghanistan was never important to either nation. As such, the cost imposed by Pakistan’s proxies was enough to convince them to leave, though it still took several decades. Similar tactics will never force India out of Kashmir because its elite views the province as an integral part of their country.

In the long run, the support provided to these groups has only hurt Pakistan’s ability to develop the scientific and economic base necessary to defend itself because it has made it harder to create the political and educational institutions required to support such development. If Pakistan is ever going to build an economy and scientific base that can support an advanced armaments industry it must prioritize political stability and education. But doing so is impossible if its domestic Islamists are supported by the military and intelligence agencies because of their adamant opposition to modern education, intellectual freedom, and inclusive political systems.

The Taliban’s victory has only emboldened likeminded groups within Pakistan who have always fought against the deep-rooted legal and social reforms necessary to modernize to the degree required to build an industrial and scientific base that can support an armaments industry capable of protecting it from India’s growing strength. Neither a friendly government in Afghanistan, proxies in Kashmir, or an alliance with domestic Islamists will provide for Pakistan’s security in the way that developing its own scientific and technical abilities would.

Although Pakistan’s current technical abilities have allowed it to develop an armaments industry that is sufficient to meet many of its military’s basic needs, it is not technically advanced enough to provide dominant capabilities like those enjoyed by Israel in its confrontation with its Arab neighbors. Pakistan must strive to develop such capabilities if it is ever going to have a realistic chance of reducing the power disparity between itself and India given the differences in size and resources between the two belligerents.

PAKISTAN’S ALLIANCE WITH CHINA

Part of the reason Pakistan’s military has been content to let the nation’s educational institutions and intellectual climate rot while its economy languishes is because of their relationship with China, its “iron brother” which it uses as a crutch to compensate for its weak economy and technical abilities. The military has been a key driver of this alliance and has also taken a leading role in CPEC, which is based on using Chinese assistance to make significant improvements to its infrastructure. Despite wholeheartedly agreeing with the goal of improving Pakistan’s infrastructure, an excessive reliance on China is not the best way to achieve this result for a myriad of reasons.

The difference in power between China and Pakistan will eventually turn Pakistan into a Chinese client and will lead to development that is more conducive to growing China’s economy than Pakistan’s. Also, the opaque nature of the CPEC agreement creates significant room for waste and corruption which will ultimately reduce the efficiency of these infrastructure projects and wastefully increase the debt burden on an already impoverished Pakistan.

The bigger issue, however, is that relying on China is merely a continuation of the neo-colonial alliance patterns that nearly all the Muslim world’s authoritarian leaders have used to avoid implementing the political and social reforms necessary to modernize on their own. Just as the Ottoman alliance with Germany ended in failure, Pakistan’s alliance with China is also doomed to fail. Cracks in the Sino-Pakistani alliance are already visible. Pakistan’s muted response to the wholesale imprisonment of China’s Muslim population is a natural consequence of the power disparity between the two nations and shows that this relationship will disappoint Pakistan in the same way its alliance with America did.

Relying on China to supply the capital, equipment, and technical expertise used to develop its infrastructure only provides the false hope of modernization. Genuine modernization cannot occur without first empowering and educating the masses. By allowing themselves to become dependent on China, Pakistan’s leaders are once again taking a short-sighted approach that creates the illusion of modernization without any of the substance.

KNOWING IS HALF THE BATTLE…SORT OF

The solutions to the many issues highlighted above are obvious and have been for a long time. Pakistan’s soldiers need to stay in their barracks. They must re-evaluate their relationship with Pakistani civilian leaders and their involvement in economic activity. By constantly undermining Pakistan’s weaker civilian led institutions, they have significantly increased their own political and economic power but in a way that has seriously hurt Pakistan’s overall geopolitical and economic strength.

Instead of using their political power to ensure the military receives a disproportionate share of economic resources, its generals would be better served striking a bargain like the one struck between China’s generals and civilian leadership in the 1970s. When China first began to reform its economy, its generals agreed to prioritize the development of its industrial base for several decades before using this new wealth to develop their military-industrial base.

Pakistan’s national security establishment must also stop supporting Islamist allies and using them as proxies in Kashmir. Though the plight of the Kashmiri people must never be forgotten, armed resistance at this point has proven counterproductive. Pakistan must always provide its long-suffering people diplomatic and economic assistance while making sure the world knows about India’s horrific human rights abuses. But it should no longer arm them.

It must also re-think its relationship with China. Instead of replacing their former American patrons with Chinese ones, Pakistanis must learn to look to themselves for their development needs. They must reform their government institutions to create an efficient and effective government apparatus that can provide the services necessary to promote economic growth. They must drastically increase spending on education, the judiciary, agriculture, healthcare, and infrastructure and do so using capital generated internally to prevent the further ballooning of Pakistan’s debt. These steps, if taken together, would allow Pakistan to rely on its nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive action by India while its economic, scientific, and industrial capabilities developed.

Domestic reforms and increased social spending will not be possible until Pakistanis start paying taxes. Although Pakistan has attempted to expand its tax base in the past, it has yet to tackle the biggest impediment to such reforms: corruption. Pakistan is currently ranked as the 120th most corrupt nation out of 180. Its high levels of corruption have been used by its military to justify their power grabbing and it has been used by Pakistanis to rationalize their refusal to pay taxes. Reforming Pakistan’s tax code and expanding its tax base will be impossible until Pakistan tackles its endemic corruption. 

Though the solutions are obvious, implementing them is an entirely different story. Considering the political and economic realities, it is extremely unlikely Pakistan’s military elite will ever agree to any of these changes despite the growing chorus of voices begging them to do so. Ayesha Siddiqa, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Ahmed Rashid, and countless others have been sounding the alarm for years and have either been ignored or banished.

HOW TO FOCUS ON GEO-ECONOMICS

The refusal of Pakistan’s generals to listen to reason has not only mired the nation in ineffective and counter-productive policies, but it has also prevented it from building meaningful relationships with Muslim allies. Which, ironically enough, is the only way it will ever have the strength to resist Indian hegemony.

Pakistan is one of the most populous Muslim countries in the world and it is the only one armed with nuclear weapons. It has never assumed a place of leadership within it; however, because of its massive underdevelopment. As such, for most of its history it has been a recipient of aid from sympathetic Muslim allies but has never been able to develop strong relationships with them based on trade. The reforms suggested above would not only allow Pakistan to prosper individually, they would also allow it to form the sort of mutually beneficial relationships with other Muslim states upon which strong, enduring alliances are built.

Even if Pakistan were to fully adopt all the reforms suggested above, India’s larger size would still give it considerable advantages. As a result, Pakistan needs allies, but it needs allies that can enhance its long-term power rather than just provide subsidies.

CPEC is designed to enhance China’s power while throwing some crumbs to Pakistan’s elite. Real power comes from building semiconductors, machine tools, satellites, solar panels, construction equipment, etc. because only an industrial base capable of building such goods can support an advanced armaments industry. CPEC is not designed to help Pakistan build real power but to turn it into a FedEx distribution route for everything China makes.

If Pakistan’s generals want real power, they should develop an alliance with their Muslim neighbors predicated on creating a free trade zone between them that can lead to building such goods. Pakistan could easily use its valuable geographic position to turn itself into the linchpin of an alliance between itself, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey (P.A.I.T) that would significantly increase its power and wealth.

This alliance would simultaneously solve the strategic and economic dilemmas of all four nations while creating an entity that could finally stabilize much of the Muslim world. It may sound grandiose but there is already a blueprint for building one. In fact, the European Union provides not only a blueprint of what to do, but what not to do.

Here’s the kicker though: the only way this works is if the leaders in all four nations genuinely commit to implementing the reforms described above. Because creating responsive governments that can ensure a healthy trade environment is a vital pre-condition for European Union style integration. The corrupt, patronage dominated systems currently in place in all four countries makes such integration impossible. The author has addressed the merits of such an alliance on several occasions such as here and here. As such, the following analysis will provide a condensed discussion.

The benefits to Pakistan in its conflict with India are obvious but the benefits to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan would be just as great. Turkey is equally desperate for dependable allies as its days in NATO are coming to an end. As the two most militarily powerful Muslim states, Pakistan and Turkey have the potential to create a powerful block but for two small problems: geography and doctrine. Pakistan and Turkey must, of necessity, include Shi’ite Iran to create a viable alliance. Luckily, entering this alliance would also solve many of Iran’s problems since it may be the only way to convince America and Israel to leave it in peace.

The inclusion of Afghanistan would complete the puzzle and create a sustainable balance of power between all four states. Only a combination of Pakistani, Turkish, and Iranian influence can provide Afghanistan with the stability and economic assistance its needs to finally end its four decades of conflict. Pakistan’s generals may view Afghanistan as their domain, but history shows what happens to outsiders who try to rule that rugged land. The only way to stabilize Afghanistan is to build a government that represents the interest of all its people and the only way to do that given the current dynamics is to create an alliance between PAIT that can allow them to use their influence to help all of Afghanistan’s people to work together.

Such an alliance, comprised of over 400 million people, if properly connected could control trade from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, creating an entity with the potential to fundamentally re-balance power in favor of the Muslim world. But the only way to bring together the mosaic of tribes, ethnic groups, and sects that populate these lands is by creating governments in each country that allow all these groups to work together and trade with each other. And the only way to do that is to build inclusive, democratic political institutions that adhere to the rule of law. Only once those institutions are in place can additional ones designed to facilitate trade and connectivity between all four nations be created.

By aligning their economic interests and developing shared infrastructure, these nations have the potential to turn their trade relationships into a security alliance as well. Essentially, Pakistan’s generals must re-think their goal of attaining strategic depth by taking a more expansive and deep-rooted approach to establishing the sort of relationships that will allow for the creation of meaningful strategic depth with its Muslim neighbors.

Pakistan must also re-orient its current relationships with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations and begin to focus on developing closer ties to Iran. The amount of trade between these two neighbors is pitiful and it is imperative that both nations begin to develop infrastructure and trade as a precursor to stronger relations. Pakistan has avoided developing close relations with Iran to avoid angering its allies in the Gulf and the US and has received large financial subsidies and help absorbing its excess labor in return. This assistance, though generous, is not nearly enough to satisfy its development needs. Pakistan’s elite have been happy to rely on these subsidies because doing so has allowed them to avoid making the difficult policy choices that will be necessary to modernize their economy. But the days of allowing outsiders to dictate who Pakistan trades with must end if it is ever going to create the sort of wealth it will need to compete with India. If America or the Arabs want to punish Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan for doing business together as neighbors should, they are welcome to do so but are only hurting themselves.

By choosing to establish client relationships with the Gulf nations, the US, and China, Pakistan’s elites have used the subsidies from their patrons for their own benefit and to alleviate pressure from the masses to manage the economy better. But doing so has caused severe structural deficiencies in Pakistan’s economy and it has reduced pressure to implement the sort of political and socio-economic reforms that will be necessary if Pakistan ever wishes to develop an advanced industrial and scientific base.

CONCLUSION

Despite Pakistan’s many missteps and miscalculations, it has not suffered more in its conflict with India due to the latter’s incompetence. India has relied on its superior size to dominate its smaller neighbor but has always suffered from poor management that has directly impacted its ability to counter its nemesis. Its gradual shift to the right and the long-term problems this will create for the political cohesion of India’s heterogeneous society only reinforces this argument. However, relying on the incompetence of an adversary is not a strategy. Particularly when that enemy is using its newfound wealth to invest massive resources into its military.

The policies pursued by Pakistan’s military have put it on a path towards continued instability and weakness that could eventually lead to the disintegration of Pakistan as it is currently constructed or a sever reduction in its geopolitical power. Pakistan’s smaller size and more precarious geo-strategic position do not afford it much margin for error.

Its leaders clearly believe their nuclear weapons will protect them. That may be true today but also shows their short-sighted perspective. Technology is always changing and advances in anti-missile defenses, nanotechnology or cyber warfare could easily be used to attack their delivery systems, rendering their powerful nuclear bombs useless. Instead of putting all their eggs in a nuclear basket, they must take a holistic and multi-faceted approach to ensuring the nation’s security. The wars of the future will not be decided by nuclear technology but by those who possess the means to attack and defend from space, the fastest computers, and the best software. Acquiring those capabilities will require massive investments in Pakistan’s scientific and educational base. As such, its leaders must immediately begin to recalibrate their policies consistent with the suggestions offered above if they wish to resolve this conflict in their favor. Pakistan’s leaders must stop seeking short term gains that reduce their ability to achieve their long-term strategic goals.

It may be easy to dismiss the arguments presented above as overly alarmist since the full extent of the threat posed by India’s reforms will take decades to fully manifest themselves. But if drastic measures are not taken to correct course soon, the next generation of Pakistanis will suffer for our mistakes. It is time for Pakistan’s leaders to start thinking about the impact their short-sighted policies will have on their future. The changes proposed above would be extremely controversial and cause significant upheaval; however, if managed properly by leaders with the vision to see them through, these reforms would significantly change the balance of power on the subcontinent.

The author is a Pakistani-American, US Navy veteran, attorney, and creator of the blog www.MirrorsforthePrince.com where he discusses ways to reverse the Muslim world’s military weakness. He is currently working on a book that will provide a holistic explanation of these issues. You can find him on Twitter under the handle @mirrors_for_the.

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[1] “Amir” in this context is a direct reference to military commanders.

[2] Khaldun, Ibn, Trans by Franz Rosenthal. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton University Press. Princeton and Oxford. 1967. At pgs. 232-34.

[3] Kuru, Ahmet. Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment. Cambridge University Press. 2019. At pgs. 3-6; 45.

I recently tried to write an essay about hypocrisy in the Muslim world. I began by looking in the dictionary which defines hypocrisy as behavior that shows one’s stated moral principles or beliefs are not sincere. As I read these words the first example that came to mind had nothing to do with Muslims. I immediately thought about America’s weapons sales to nations that flagrantly violate the human rights it claims to care about so deeply. Hypocrisy also allows America to vilify the human rights abuses of its adversaries while ignoring those of its allies like Israel’s apartheid policies or India’s repression of its Muslims. Israeli and Indian policies are themselves rooted in their own hypocrisy. Israel was created as a homeland for Jews by depriving the Palestinians of their homeland. India claims to be the world’s largest democracy but denies Kashmiris their democratic rights.

Muslim rulers often complain about the double standards and hypocrisy that characterizes today’s Western dominated international system and their complaints are certainly justified.  However, part of the reason these complaints are often met with skepticism is that these same rulers are unbelievably hypocritical in their own ways. Leaders in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey advocate on behalf of Kashmiris and/or Palestinians while violently oppressing their own people and ignoring both Russian and Chinese crimes against other Muslims. For its part, China complains about the world’s neo-colonial security structure but has violently pursued its own colonial ambitions in Tibet and Xinjian. As its power grows it seems to have no problem strong-arming its neighbors just like Europe’s colonial powers once did to it.

This contradictory behavior makes it difficult to understand the world or develop a coherent narrative that can explain these inconsistencies. For those of us who are not experts, there are three books necessary to understand these geopolitical oddities and their repercussions. The first is Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations. Be warned, this is a controversial book. According to Huntington, the world is divided along tribal lines that correspond to its major civilizations. Part of the reason no one likes to talk about Huntington’s ideas is that we do not like what they say about our tribal tendencies. His ideas are both a sad reminder of how unevolved we are as a species and the easiest way to understand geopolitics. Huntington’s theories do not mean that civilizations must clash. They just help us to understand why different nations view each other with suspicion, why certain countries will align with each other against others and what can happen if these issues are not dealt with constructively.

Huntington explains that the West represents a distinct civilization that is in the process of splitting between its English-speaking parts, a German-Franco dominated bloc in continental Europe, and a mostly Spanish speaking offshoot in Latin America. The West is breaking under the weight of its success. The Western powers conquered nearly the entire world, colonizing radically different parts of the globe such as North and South America and Australia that do not have a history of interconnectedness. The divisions taking shape today such as France’s exclusion from AUKUS reflect these trends.

The world has also developed unique Japanese and Indian societies. Russia is the preeminent power of the Slavic world, while China represents another civilization. The Islamic world has fractured along multiple fissures due to the legacy of European conquests. The Muslim world decisively lost its war with Europe and has yet to fully regain its freedom or re-build itself. Lastly, sub-Saharan Africa is just starting to recover from the scars of colonialism and slave raids financed by both Western and Islamic civilizations. These blocs represent the world’s major tribes, though each contains many fault lines and sub-tribes.

China’s rise is causing uncertainty and fear much like Germany’s did during the 19^th and 20^th centuries. As its growing power changes the dynamics that have held since the Soviet Union’s collapse, government reactions are largely following the civilizational contours predicted by Huntington with different tribes aligning with each other to deal with these new challenges. The English-speaking Western nations of Australia, America, and the UK have allied themselves to Britain’s former colonial subjects in India, as well as Japan and South Korea. Mainland Europe does not seem as interested in China or war in general but its vulnerability to Russian aggression (China’s ally) will likely keep it in the Western camp for the foreseeable future.

China is developing alliances within the Muslim world with Russian backing, but these are also shaped by Islam’s many internal divisions. Most of the Arab states have sold themselves to the West in return for continued support for their dictatorships. Pakistan and Iran are firmly in China’s camp while Afghanistan is certain to join them. Europe’s refusal to accept Turkey (largely due to their civilizational differences) will eventually place it in this camp too.

It is only when one understands the tribal nature of geopolitics that the inconsistencies referenced above start to make sense. America and Israel are from the same tribe, thus American leaders ignore or downplay Israel’s racist policies. America and India may represent different tribes, but they are allies against China which means Indian abuses in Kashmir are swept under the rug. Likewise, the passionate concern Muslim leaders have for Palestinians and Kashmiris does not extend to the Uighurs due to their alliance with China.

It can be tempting to view this competition and the resulting alliances as a reflection of the political institutions that govern each country. That would be a mistake. The narrative of democracy versus autocracy may be popular in the West, but it is a superficial and, given the available data, inaccurate way to interpret these dynamics. Democratic India, for example, has often found itself aligned with authoritarian Russia. Autocratic Saudi Arabia and Egypt are important American allies whereas China’s key Muslim ally, Pakistan, features a quasi-democratic system. America’s allies in Taiwan and South Korea only transitioned to democracy in the late 1980’s and it was no less friendly to either nation when they were governed by dictators. During the Cold War, America courted China as a counter to Soviet Russia even though both featured authoritarian political systems.

Conflict between America and China is not one between democracy and authoritarianism but between an established, dominant power versus a rising one. Peter Frankopan’s book The Silk Roads puts this competition into its proper historical context by explaining that the world has been playing this game for a long time. Hypocritical jockeying for geopolitical position and competition over trade routes has defined world politics for millennia. Shifting alliances and the inconsistent policies they create reflect these age-old tensions which have erupted into war many times. Reactions to China’s ascent could easily do the same.

Rather than provide neutral and impartial analysis that can reduce tensions, academics and journalists inflame them as they gleefully cheer for their own tribes while condemning similar behavior by those outside their tribes. This hypocrisy allows a supposedly liberal website like foreignpolicy.com to publish an article arguing America should substantially increase its military assistance to Israel in anticipation of large-scale hostilities with Iran and its various regional allies while fretting over China’s military assertiveness towards Taiwan. It also explains why FP supports America’s attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear program while it lauds plans to equip Australia with nuclear submarines or ignores Israel’s nuclear weapons entirely.

Articles warning against China’s naval build up have been a feature of Western publications for years. Unsurprisingly, they rarely analyze China’s ambitions with reference to America’s powerful fleet which has twenty of its own aircraft carriers and a network of forward bases that allow it to deploy its military all over the world. Instead, FP recently published an article arguing America must counter China’s growing Navy by expanding its fleet to over 400 ships. Rather than asking who will control the seas, these publications should be asking how we can all share them, but our tribal international system and its enablers seem incapable of doing so.

Tensions in the Pacific are themselves driven by the legacy of previous conflicts. America has been at war with either Germany and its allies, the Soviets, or the Muslim world for most of the past 80 years. As a result of these conflicts, it has developed a hyper-militarized political economy that has a hard time compromising or viewing problems as anything other than a nail in need of hammering. As such, the idea of allowing China to reign supreme even in its own backyard is anathema to its elite.

China has become so determined to re-assert itself after being conquered by the West and Japan that it has adopted many of their tactics. It spent decades patiently building its economic and military power and now that it has developed advanced military abilities and senses America’s vulnerability, it is flexing its muscles.

According to Paul Kennedy’s work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, it is overestimating its strength. Kennedy explains that modern wars featuring multiple belligerents are won by the coalition with the greater combined industrial and scientific capacity to wage war. Consequently, China and its Muslim and Russian allies are at a distinct disadvantage vis-vis the Western alliance.  

Hypocrisy and war have always been a part of geopolitics but those beating their war drums today seem to be forgetting one crucial difference: the next great war will feature multiple nations armed with nuclear weapons! To make matters worse, the next few decades will witness the development of nanotechnology, AI and automated weapons. In other words, the next world war will make the last one look like a walk in the park. The coalitions forming today have the potential to drag nearly the entire world into a war that could destroy civilization as we know it.

Climate change, unstable political situations in America and China, populations that are exploding in some areas while shrinking in others, and excessive military spending are all going to make managing global tensions a lot harder. The multi polar world that is emerging will only remain peaceful if the interests of each of its main blocs are respected. The Western world, as the declining bloc, will have the hardest time accepting this. But developing a modus vivendi between all the world’s major tribes is the only realistic path forward. The best way to do that is to ensure no civilization can be dominated by the others and that the interest of each is respected. Instead of constantly pushing for war, we need to start talking about peaceful solutions that can deal with the challenges ahead.

The author is a US Navy veteran and creator of the blog www.mirrorsfortheprince.com where he discusses ways to reform and modernize the Muslim world.  

As talks meant to revive the agreement with Iran to curtail its nuclear program stall, the Western powers are once again ratcheting up the rhetoric by threatening violence if it does not acquiesce to their demands.

Israel argues that Iranian nuclear weapons pose an existential threat while America argues that, as a government full of bad actors, the Iranian regime cannot be trusted with such powerful weapons. None of their arguments make any sense.

Let’s start with the most obvious hole in their reasoning: the Iranian government, despite its many flaws, is a rational actor. It cares about staying in power above all other considerations. Since it understands that deploying nuclear weapons against the US or Israel would lead to a massive retaliatory strike, it would never actually use them because doing so would threaten its power (and existence). It has used violence to achieve policy goals like any other state but has always done so in a calculated and rational way. For example, after the US murdered its top general, it responded with a missile barrage that was specifically designed to ensure it did not inflict heavy casualties. Its response was calculated to show its capabilities without escalating the violence that America initiated. Not only does this show Iran is a rational actor, but it also highlights a remarkable degree of restraint. It is hard to imagine America or Israel showing similar restraint had the tables been turned. The argument that Iran’s Islamic government is irrational and, as a result, cannot be trusted with these weapons is not supported by the facts.

The only reason it wants these weapons is that it knows they are the only way to guarantee its security. In other words, its goal is to develop a deterrent against further aggression and secure its power. Given America’s and Israel’s violent behavior and the power disparity between these nations, nothing could be more rational. 

What is irrational is trying to stop Iran from acquiring these weapons after creating the political and military conditions that made them necessary in the first place.

The US is the only country to ever use atomic weapons and it used them against cities full of women and children. Instead of recoiling at the horrors unleashed by these weapons, American leaders still occasionally threaten their adversaries with nuclear annihilation. It has the means to make good on these threats because it has a stockpile of almost 4,000 nuclear bombs and has built delivery systems capable of dropping them anywhere it chooses.

The US also has a violent history in the Middle East. Most point to the CIA’s involvement in overthrowing Iran’s government in 1953 as evidence of US perfidy but one does not need to go that far back to understand why Iran may believe it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself. It was the Reagan administration that gave Iraq the chemical weapons it used against Iran during their long war. More recently, America conquered two of Iran’s neighbors leading to the death of hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of Iraqis and Afghans. It sometimes threatens Iran with similar violence. It has followed through on these threats by conducting or supporting clandestine military operations to murder Iranian officials and scientists on numerous occasions. These threats are also supported by America’s substantial military forces in the region, including a large fleet stationed in the Persian Gulf.

Israel has a stockpile of nuclear weapons and a sophisticated nuclear triad capable of delivering them to any target in the Middle East too. It also has a history of using violence against its neighbors. It invaded and occupied Lebanon for 18 years, destroying its infrastructure and stoking a civil war that claimed thousands of lives. It often conducts airstrikes and clandestine military operations throughout the region. Ironically, Israel justifies these attacks by blaming Hezbollah’s attempts to arm itself even though it is only doing so in response to Israel’s aggressive military posture. Hezbollah would not exist if Israel had not first invaded and occupied Lebanon for so long. And, for better or worse, it is the only military organization that has proven it can defend Lebanon from further attacks.

These facts are important because they show exactly why Iran wants and even needs these weapons. As such, the goal of stopping Iran’s nuclear program is completely hypocritical and unrealistic. This debate is usually couched in national security terms, but at its core, it is about Islamophobia and a clash of civilizations. Iran is a Muslim nation and the idea of another Muslim nation acquiring such powerful weapons scares many in the West. Though unfortunate, these fears do not justify the violence and economic warfare perpetrated against it.

Instead of using thinly veiled racist arguments to justify hypocritical policies, America’s leaders should reflect on their reckless behavior which also includes its erratic non-proliferation efforts. It did not help Israel develop its nuclear weapons (that was France) but has provided billions to subsidize the cost of its military which has obviously helped defray the cost of these weapons and their delivery systems. It did the same for Pakistan, even selling it F-16s capable of delivering nuclear payloads[1]. It is rumored to have helped South Africa’s Apartheid regime develop its nuclear weapons and it signed a treaty with India in 2008 designed to improve its nuclear capabilities. To describe America’s non-proliferation efforts as inconsistent would be a gross understatement.

Many Americans now understand how systemic racism has fueled inequality and violence in the US. The next step is to understand how Islamophobia has also fueled policies towards the Muslim world. The facts described above show that efforts to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons are not grounded in legitimate national security concerns but in the determination of the US and Israel to maintain their hegemonic control of the Middle East. Both scream about their right to defend themselves while denying Muslims this same right because their policies are rooted in their imperialist (read racist) worldviews.

Sadly, it is unlikely these arguments will have any effect since they challenge the idiotic idea of American exceptionalism and consider the Muslim perspective (a truly radical idea, to be fair). That is unfortunate because their current policies will only lead to more violence and unnecessarily ruin more lives. At least America’s and Israel’s defense companies will be happy.

Since they are unlikely to change course, Iran must devise new strategies to protect itself. It has thus far pursued a strategy of developing asymmetric capabilities and regional sub-state allies to deter further aggression. This strategy is unlikely to lead to military capabilities that can sufficiently dissuade its adversaries from attacking it.

The best way to do that is to develop an alliance with other states that can help it to defend itself.  Despite the many obstacles to creating an alliance between them, Turkey and Pakistan are the most logical candidates for the job. The author has already discussed the benefits of such an alliance here (discussing how Muslim states should react to America’s inevitable military withdrawal from the region) and here (discussing why Iran should create a free trade zone with Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan), so there is no need to re-hash them.

Pan-Islamic ideas may sound antiquated in today’s climate, but the truth is that the Muslim world has been subject to brutal levels of violence for centuries. This violence will only stop when Muslim nations take responsibility for their collective security needs. The sanctions imposed on Iraq in the years leading to its 2003 invasion killed 500,000 Iraqi children. Even after it was clear the sanctions were strengthening Saddam Hussein’s government instead of weakening it, the US insisted on maintaining its embargo despite the horrific toll. It is following the same script against Iran and given the trajectory of America’s relationship with Turkey and Pakistan, it is not inconceivable that one or both nations will find themselves similarly targeted in the future. The Western dominated international system is predicated on survival of the fittest, not the rule of law. As such, the only recourse Muslims have is to work together to develop the means to protect themselves.

The need to do so is particularly urgent given the unstable nature of America’s leadership. Bush’s war crimes gave way to Trump’s amoral buffoonery which has now given way to Marjorie Taylor Greene’s overtly racist stupidity. As this progression shows, America’s leaders are not only getting dumber, but they are also becoming more unhinged and dangerous with each election cycle. This proves Muslims must take immediate steps to ensure their safety and that the world should be far more worried about America’s vast arsenal than Iran’s attempts to protect itself.

None of this should be construed as arguing Iran should develop nuclear weapons but only that it has the right to do so without Western interference. There is no denying that the Iranian regime has a horrible human rights record. It proves exactly why religion and politics do not mix. Politicians are by their very nature corrupt and self-serving. When those charged with nurturing a society’s moral and spiritual development engage in politics, they taint themselves and inevitably give in to the temptations and trappings of power and its pursuit. Iran’s ayatollahs have proven themselves every bit as corrupt and hypocritical as the Shah they replaced. But that does not justify murdering innocent women and children. Ultimately, the militaristic policies of the West will lead to exactly that. If America and Israel are serious about convincing Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, they should start by eliminating their own nuclear stockpiles and ending their imperialist military policies in the region. The fact that they never will merely proves Iranian policies are not only rational but necessary.

The author is a Pakistani-American, US Navy veteran, attorney in the field of intellectual property law and discusses how to modernize the Muslim world on his blog, www.mirrorsfortheprince.com. 

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[1] It had no choice but to ignore Pakistan’s program because of the war in Afghanistan but still subjected it to harsh sanctions as punishment once doing so was politically feasible. The sanctions were only lifted once Pakistan became indispensable again after 9/11.

Pakistan’s leaders have found a new favorite mantra: geo-economics. Almost as soon as they started repeating it; however, the experts started explaining why their focus on geo-economics is likely to fail.

To be fair, the barriers are substantial, but so are the potential benefits. So instead of talking about all the obstacles, let’s start by talking about how this might work and what it will take to get there.

First things first: America will not be part of this equation. As you will see by the end of this piece, the US is far more likely to be one of those aforementioned obstacles. The attempts by Pakistani leaders to entice America into a new type of alliance are admirable but, ultimately, a waste of time.

The sad fact is America holds a grudge and will not soon forget its loss in Afghanistan. Right or wrong, it blames Pakistan for this defeat. It took decades before it was willing to forgive the Vietnamese people for having the audacity to defend themselves. Pakistan and its friends in Afghanistan are likely to suffer similar treatment. As such, political realities within America mean that a new partnership with Pakistan focused on trade is a non-starter. Thankfully, America’s participation is unnecessary and would probably hurt more than it helped.

The most important part of geo-economics is the economics and Pakistan can handle that by itself. The main ingredient for good economic policy has always been simple: good governance. Consequently, if Pakistan’s leaders have finally realized how much wealth and power they can gain by a successful pivot to geo-economics, they must begin competently providing the government services necessary to support strong economic growth.

To do that, Pakistan will need to turn itself into a country that is easy to do business in for both local and foreign investors. That requires ensuring everyone is playing by a neutral set of rules that are easily enforced by well-run courts properly empowered to carry out their judgments. A healthy business environment and the rule of law go hand in hand.

Creating a government that can deliver these services requires democratic mechanisms to ensure civilian rule and prioritizing the needs of its merchant class. In other words, Pakistan’s soldiers will need to stay in their barracks and stop acting like used car salesmen.

Once Pakistan takes care of the economics, it can sort the geo part out. Which will also be complicated. America is out. India is out. Afghanistan is in, but it’s more of a liability than an asset with the Taliban in charge. Some of the Central Asian republics might be interested, but Russia will prevent them from meaningfully connecting to Pakistan.

China is in but wants to turn Pakistan into a distribution hub for its goods. Which is fine but will not lead to real power or wealth. That comes from building semi-conductors, machine tools, electric cars, solar panels, heavy construction equipment, and similar goods. If Pakistan is serious about focusing on geo-economics, it will need to connect to countries that can help it develop an industrial and scientific base capable of building the sort of goods that can generate real wealth. That is the only way the benefits will outweigh the many barriers.

Unless I’m rusty on my geo, that leaves Iran as Pakistan’s best and only real option. We all know the reasons these two have never formed a true partnership: the Shiite-Sunni divide, pressure from the Arabs and Americans, the distances and harsh terrain that separate their main population centers, and Iran’s desire to befriend India.

None of that matters because without Iran, Pakistan cannot access Turkey. And Turkey is the key to Pakistan’s geo-economic success. As two of the more powerful Sunni states, Pakistan and Turkey have always been natural allies. But if they want to build a real alliance with linked infrastructure and lots of trade and people going back and forth, they will need to include Shiite Iran.

Luckily, Iran needs this alliance too. It will need more than just regional militias and Syria to protect itself from the ruthless and hypocritical economic and clandestine campaigns being conducted against it. It will need to form alliances with states that enhance its power.

It is already linking itself to China, but the smarter move is to create a free trade zone with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey designed to develop all of their industrial capabilities. Including Afghanistan is also the only way to stabilize that poor nation. As farfetched as this alliance might sound, it has the potential to simultaneously solve the strategic and economic dilemmas faced by all four nations while greatly increasing their power and finally stabilizing a huge chunk of the Muslim world.

Now that we understand how geo-economics can work and its potential, we need to talk about the barriers. The corrupt, patronage-based systems prevalent in all four nations will need to go. They will need to be replaced by political institutions that can allow the various tribes, sects, and ethnic groups that populate these countries to work together transparently and fairly. That will involve reforms that will upset a lot of entrenched interests in each country.

No one else will like it either. The Saudis and Emiratis will do everything in their power to stop it, even though they should be trying to join it. Same for Israel. America will sanction everyone and kick Turkey out of NATO. But any fool can see Turkey’s days in NATO are numbered. America will throw a tantrum, but its opinion no longer matters. As discussed here, its days as the dominant military force in the Muslim world are numbered.

Even if America wants a vote, it is not entitled to one. America’s wars and love of dictators and warlords have ravaged the region. Its actions have directly and indirectly led to the murder of hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of innocents. As long as the leaders responsible for this violence, particularly the fraud induced violence perpetrated against Iraq, are free to make silly paintings instead of being treated like the war criminals they are, America has no right to an opinion on the Muslim world.

If it wants to cut ties with 400 million plus souls from Anatolia to the Subcontinent, it is welcome to do so. Given the succession of idiotic leaders it has produced from Bush to Trump, to Marjorie Taylor Green, America is bound to do the dumbest thing possible. Especially since its leaders seem to be following the script from a bad movie by getting dumb and dumber. As it continues to embrace its own right-wing lunacy, the danger it poses to the region will only grow. Instead of wasting time worrying about or trying to placate America, Muslims must build the strength to protect themselves from its violent stupidity. A focus on geo-economics that follows the roadmap described above is the best route to building this strength.

President Biden recently announced his intention to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan by September 11, 2021. It may have taken nearly twenty years, but America is finally ready to admit defeat and bring its troops home. What began as an impressive display of military power has now turned into its longest war, one that history will remember as an embarrassing and mostly self-inflicted defeat. America also lost the war in Iraq in remarkably similar fashion. The best way to explain why the relatively easy conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq eventually turned into such unmitigated disasters is to compare the policies implemented to secure the conquests of each country with the policies used to secure Germany and Japan at the end of WWII.

Germany formally surrendered to the Allies on May 7, 1945, while Japan formally surrendered on September 2, 1945[1]. Both nations remained under formal military occupation for the next ten[2] and seven years[3], respectively. The policies implemented to secure America’s victories over the Axis powers cemented its post WWII power by turning its most implacable foes into two of its closest allies. They also turned both nations into drivers of economic growth that helped to spread prosperity throughout Europe and Asia. The conquests of Afghanistan and Iraq did not lead to similar results.  

The Taliban retreated from their home city of Kandahar on December 7, 2001[4], signaling their defeat at the hands of American and allied Afghan forces. Bagdad fell to American forces on April 9, 2003[5] leading to President Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” celebration aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln less than a month later[6]. The policies implemented to secure the conquests of Iraq and Afghanistan turned what began as impressive victories into stinging defeats that will have a destabilizing impact on the trajectory of the Islamic world for the foreseeable future and raise troubling questions regarding the inability of America’s leaders to use its powerful military to achieve their policy goals.

GERMANY AND JAPAN

As the table below illustrates, the most obvious difference between the occupations of Germany and Japan versus Afghanistan and Iraq is that the US never provided enough troops to secure the latter two nations.

Country	Size	Population	Troops during year 1 of occupation	Ratio of soldiers to pop. in yr. 1	Troop levels in Year 2	Troop levels in Year 3
West Germany	249,000 sq. km.[7]	51 million[8]	1.6 million[9]	1 per 31.8	278,000[10]	100,000[11]
Japan	378,000 sq. km.[12]	77 million[13]	430,000[14]	1 per 179	200,000	120,000
Afghanistan	652,000 sq. km.[15]	21.6 million[16]	2,500[17]	1 per 8,640	9,700	13,100
Iraq	438,000 sq. km.[18]	25.1 million[19]	130,000[20]	1 per 193	143,000	141,000

Troop levels in West Germany in 1945 were large enough to provide 6.4 troops/sq. km.  or 1 soldier for every 31.8 German citizens. They dropped drastically within a year, but the US still maintained a large military presence for the first few years of its occupation. Similarly, there was 1 soldier for every 179 people in Japan in 1945 and a large, though reduced military presence for the first few years of the occupation.

These troop levels provided a stable security environment in both nations which allowed for the institution of sweeping political and social changes designed to create fully democratic governments. In Germany, the US dismantled the military, built democratic political institutions, and instituted legal reforms to make sure the Nazis could never take power again[21]. The US also dismantled Japan’s military, gave Japanese women the right to vote, instituted reforms designed to diffuse land ownership more evenly, reformed the educational system, and changed the role of the Emperor in overseeing Japan’s government[22]. These reforms largely explain why these occupations were so successful, but they would not have worked without first providing enough troops to create a security environment conducive to implementing them.

One of the most important issues America had to deal with in both Germany and Japan was how to treat its vanquished enemies. Though many Americans wanted to punish anyone associated with the Nazis and Japan’s elite, the US adopted a more practical approach. It made sure to hold Nazis and Japanese officials guilty of serious crimes accountable for their actions. However, they also allowed lower ranking Nazis to rejoin public life and respected Japanese sentiments by letting the Emperor remain as a figurehead.[23] This practical approach allowed for the inclusion of men into both post-war societies who may otherwise have taken up arms against American forces and helped prevent an insurgency from developing. Thus, America’s military posture and political policies were aligned and reinforced each other by working together to maintain security in each country.

America also provided generous financial aid to help rebuild both economies. It did so in two ways. First, its robust military presence alleviated both nations from the burden of having to pay for their own defense needs which allowed them to allocate their resources towards rebuilding their civilian government institutions and economies instead. Second, the US provided a substantial amount of direct economic aid and made sure this aid was used efficiently. After adjusting for inflation, the Marshal Plan provided the equivalent of $182 billion to Europe between 1946-1952.[24] Germany received the equivalent of $35 billion[25] while Japan received the equivalent of $18[26] billion during this time. This aid was structured to incentivize the recipient countries to open their economies to international trade and provide them with the materials and supplies needed to rebuild their industries. Most importantly, it was designed to make sure neither country would become permanently dependent on American generosity by allowing them to rebuild in a way that benefited local industry[27].

It was this combination of military, political, social, and economic policies and reforms all working together that laid the foundations for the successful consolidation of America’s victories over Germany and Japan. But the glue that held these policies together was the significant presence of American troops to provide security in the immediate aftermath of each conflict. The policies used to consolidate the victories over Afghanistan and Iraq did not complement each other in a manner that could cement either conquest. Instead, they often undermined each other but the reason for this incoherence was primarily rooted in America’s low troop levels.

AFGHANISTAN:

The policies used to secure Afghanistan stand in stark contrast to the policies developed in Germany and Japan. The US did not need a large force to conquer Afghanistan. Its strategy of embedding special forces troops with Afghan militias and supporting them with airpower was adequate to defeat the Taliban, but it was not designed to provide security in the vacuum created by the Taliban’s absence. Despite being much bigger than either Japan or the parts of West Germany under American control, the US never deployed more than 13,100 troops to Afghanistan during the first three years of its occupation and it never provided more than 20,300 troops during the first 5 years of its occupation.[28] Even after accounting for its smaller population, such low troop levels could never have provided the security needed to build a stable government capable of effectively ruling Afghanistan. For example, Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) Agency estimated it would take 250,000 troops to secure just the Pashtun dominated Southern parts of the country[29].  

The US tried to institute the same sort of sweeping political and social reforms in Afghanistan[30] as it did in Germany and Japan. But since it never provided enough troops to stabilize the country, it was never able to provide the security necessary to properly implement them. In fact, its low troop levels crucially undermined[31] these reforms because they forced the US to work with Afghanistan’s warlords in a way that made building and empowering a new government capable of properly enacting them impossible.  

Instead of assuming security responsibilities like it did in Germany and Japan, America pursued a dual strategy of building alliances with local warlords and militias to establish control over the country while it helped Afghanistan’s central government build a modern military. Neither strategy worked. The alliances formed with these warlords, and the political compromises they entailed, gave them a disproportionate amount of political and military power in a way that directly undermined Afghanistan’s central government[32]. Consequently, the government created by the Bonn Agreement never developed the capacity to provide the security, government services, and economic development that would have allowed it to secure the victory against the Taliban.

By allying itself with Afghanistan’s tribal and sectarian warlords and militias, America empowered the very people who created the political, security, and socio-economic conditions that gave rise to the Taliban in the first place. Unfortunately, these men did not learn any lessons from their defeat at the hands of the Taliban during the 90’s. Upon resuming power, they quickly developed a reputation for corruption, drug trafficking[33] and violently abusing the people they ruled over by robbing, murdering, torturing, and/or raping them[34]. America had no choice but to overlook these serious problems, including ignoring reports regarding the prevalence of child sex slaves[35] among its allies because it needed their manpower.  

Efforts to build a modern military also suffered from serious flaws. Trying to build a modern military given Afghanistan’s weak state institutions, mosaic of ethnic and tribal rivalries, non-existent industrial base, and extremely low levels of socio-economic development was never a realistic goal. Rather than recognize these simple facts, America’s leaders insisted on wasting resources trying to build a military that Afghanistan could not afford,[36] detracted from the more important mission of building effective civilian government institutions and was unable to defeat the Taliban. America insisted on these strategies despite their obvious shortcomings because it refused to provide enough of its own troops to provide security. As a result, instead of formulating plans that could secure its victory by building a stable government, the US was singularly focused on dealing with the consequences of its inadequate troop levels which forced it to compromise on the political reforms that would have allowed it to consolidate its victory.

It compounded these mistakes with its unwillingness to compromise with those Taliban that tried to surrender. In contrast to the practical approach adopted in Germany and Japan, America did not develop a mechanism to integrate its enemies back into Afghan society, giving them no choice but to resist its presence[37]. Through a combination of arrogance and short-sightedness, America did its best to swell the ranks of the Taliban while refusing to provide enough troops to deal with the threat its policies were creating. These factors worked together to create the conditions that led to the Taliban’s resurgence.

By the time the US realized its mistake and sent more troops, it was too little, too late. Based on the ISI’s estimates, the 100,000 troops[38] sent to deal with the insurgency nine years after its conquest never came close to the amount that would have been necessary to improve security in the country. Even if the US had sent more troops, the decisive moment had passed, and it is unlikely even a massive troop surge would have defeated the Taliban. The insurgency had already taken hold in the security vacuum created by America’s minimal troop deployments and the rapaciousness of Afghanistan’s warlords, who had now accumulated enough power to prevent the central government from significantly curtailing their damaging behavior.

America’s economic assistance to Afghanistan also suffered from serious problems. On paper, the US has given Afghanistan around $130 billion dollars since 2001.[39] The problem is that an estimated 40% of this aid disappeared into the hands of corrupt government officials and their cronies[40]. Yet, another problem is that roughly half of it was used to build Afghanistan’s military instead of its civilian political institutions or economy.[41] Based on these numbers, 90% of the money provided to Afghanistan over the past 20 years has been used to line the pockets of corrupt government officials or pay for its ineffective military.

Those funds that were used for economic development were often used inefficiently in a manner that did not account for the needs of the Afghan people.[42] As such, they did little to spur economic growth that could benefit a wide swath of Afghan society or contribute to the country’s stability. To the extent that this aid was siphoned off by America’s allies, it exacerbated the conflict by further enriching Afghanistan’s warlords and corrupt elite while undermining its state institutions. In short, most of the money given to Afghanistan was criminally wasted and much of it was wasted in a way that helped the Taliban win.[43]  

The US was never able to develop a combination of effective military, social, political, and economic policies that could stabilize Afghanistan like it did in Germany and Japan. By failing to capitalize on its initial victory by providing an effective plan to consolidate its conquest, the US set in motion the varied factors that led to its defeat. In the same way that the large troop levels in Germany and Japan were the foundation of its successful reforms, attempts to reform Afghanistan failed precisely because they lacked similar support and were undermined by the policies developed to compensate for its low troop levels.

American leaders were reluctant to send large numbers of troops to Afghanistan because of its history of violently ejecting invaders. Many were acutely aware of the Soviet Union’s inability to pacify its restless tribes and apprehensive about exposing American troops to similar guerrilla attacks. These concerns, though valid, missed a crucial point. The Red Army’s occupation of Afghanistan was excessively violent and led to the death of roughly a million Afghan civilians in just ten years.[44] Its forces deliberately attacked and destroyed entire villages and its soldiers often murdered, raped, and robbed Afghan civilians, driving millions out of their homes.[45] The Soviet military’s brutal conduct forced most Afghan’s to fiercely resist its occupation.  Though far from perfect, the conduct of American forces would never have reached the systematic level of barbarity shown by the Soviets, particularly since the Taliban were scattered and weak during the first few years of its occupation.

The occupation of Japan supports this argument. Many of the sentiments that dictated troop levels in Afghanistan were shared by US leaders planning the invasion of Japan. These concerns were so great they ultimately led to the use of atomic weapons to secure Japan’s surrender. Despite these concerns and the fact that Japan’s mountainous, heavily forested islands are ideal for guerrilla operations, America still stationed 430,000 troops in Japan during the first year of its occupation. Since these troop deployments were part of a comprehensive reconstruction plan, they did not lead to violent Japanese resistance and were quickly reduced once security was established.  

The key differences between Afghanistan and Germany or Japan is that it is comprised of several different ethnic and tribal groups whereas the latter two nations are relatively homogenous, and it has considerably lower levels of socio-economic development. Stabilizing and modernizing Afghanistan to the degree necessary to prevent the Taliban’s resurgence was never going to be an easy job. Done properly, it would have required a massive commitment on the part of the US and even then, it may have failed. Unfortunately, we will never know if providing enough resources would have worked. What is clear is that the opposite approach failed miserably.   

IRAQ:

The broad strokes of the story in Iraq are similar to events in Afghanistan but differ in some key details. The primary one being that there was no logical reason to invade Iraq. The fact that the US invaded Iraq even though it had nothing to do with 9/11 and had no weapons of mass destruction shows exactly how broken America’s policy formulation process is when it comes to matters of war and national security. Once the ludicrous justifications are discarded, the only short-term logic one can discern is that the war was immensely profitable for the American companies awarded billions in contracts to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and military[46].

Since attempting to explain the logic behind the invasion is an exercise in futility, it is more useful to focus on its impact. The net effect of unnecessarily opening a second front before consolidating the peace in Afghanistan was to ensure that neither theater could receive the resources necessary to achieve victory. The net effect of invading another Muslim country for no logical reason without any regard for the suffering and devastation this caused millions of innocent Iraqis[47] was that it highlighted the hypocrisy and callousness of America to the entire Muslim world. This undermined America’s legitimate security concerns in the aftermath of 9/11 and made addressing those concerns in a meaningful way that much harder.

Since Iraq was not attacked in pursuit of any strategic interests, the invasion was not designed with any in mind. As such, the US never had a plan for consolidating its conquest or how to use the invasion for its benefit within the context of the War on Terror. This becomes painfully obvious when examining the policies enacted to secure America’s victory.

Troop levels in Iraq were sufficient to defeat the token resistance offered by Iraq’s military. However, they were recklessly low with respect to being able to provide security in the aftermath of the Iraqi Army’s defeat.  A comparison of troop levels in the table above shows that after accounting for population, troop levels in Iraq were not far below those in Japan. The raw numbers are misleading because they do not account for two key differences. One, Iraq is comprised of three main competing ethnic/sectarian groups. And two, Iraq’s infrastructure and populace had not been destroyed/subdued to nearly the same degree as either Germany or Japan.   These differences explain why Army leaders planning the invasion thought they would need 500,000 troops[48] to secure the country despite its relatively small population. They also explain why the 130,000-140,000 troops Donald Rumsfeld gave them were not enough. As with Afghanistan, American leaders seemed unable to distinguish between conquering and providing security and never provided enough troops to accomplish the latter.

America’s low troop levels limited its ability to implement reforms that could turn Iraq into a stable, democratic society. But part of the reason it refused to provide enough troops was that, aside from holding elections, it had no plan to modernize or genuinely democratize Iraq. As such, it never attempted to develop a coordinated set of military, economic, social, and political policies that could consolidate its victory. In yet another parallel to Afghanistan, its low troop levels dictated much of its strategy. Since it had neither the desire nor the troop levels to support widespread political and social reforms, it helped create a new government in which power was apportioned to keep the peace between Iraq’s Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites. In doing so, it created a government that merely reinforced Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions. By refusing to implement reforms that could eventually lead to the creation of a stable, democratic ally the US trapped itself in an unwinnable situation.

In a repeat of the arrogant decision making seen in Afghanistan, the US refused to acknowledge its untenable situation by compromising with elements from the former regime. Instead, it took yet another harsh approach and disbanded the Ba’ath party while barring many of its members from further employment. Since being a member of the party was necessary to obtain employment in many public positions, this immediately destroyed Iraq’s ability to deliver important government services. It also put many former members of Iraq’s vast national security apparatus on the street, fueling the insurgency[49]. These mistakes ensured America could not institute the sort of deep-rooted reforms that would have been necessary to create a government capable of keeping Iraq united. Of course, doing so may have been impossible, but America’s lack of commitment prevented it from even trying. Instead, it opted to create a government that would always be weak and unstable.

The economic assistance provided to Iraq followed the same pattern as Afghanistan. A lot of money wasted on corrupt government officials or building a military that was lucrative for American defense contractors but did little to meet Iraq’s security needs[50]. Due to these inefficiencies and misplaced priorities, extraordinarily little of the vast sums sent to Iraq led to meaningful economic growth or improved the nature and quality of government services in a manner that could help America consolidate its victory.

America formally withdrew its forces from Iraq after roughly eight years[51] but left behind an ineffective and corrupt government that is riven by sectarian divisions[52].  The instability created by its invasion gave rise to ISIS, a threat Iraq’s government proved too weak to protect itself from without direct American and Iranian intervention. The only thing holding Iraq together now is that its neighbors refuse to allow the Kurds to have their own country, but it will likely fragment within the next few decades.

THE BIG PICTURE

Instead of turning Afghanistan and Iraq into allies that could help stabilize the wider Islamic world, America’s poorly managed occupations set off a chain reaction that plunged much of it into chaos. America’s actions may have degraded Al Qaeda’s ability to attack it in the short-term, but they also strengthened the appeal and power of similar groups in a manner that will pose a threat to its security for the foreseeable future.

The small military footprint demanded by American leaders combined with their reluctance to engage in nation building prevented the US from securing its victories at the decisive moments it defeated the Taliban and Iraqi army. Instead of securing a lasting peace like the ones achieved with Germany and Japan, America found itself trapped in the very quagmires it was hoping to avoid.

Deciphering why American leaders made such catastrophically bad decisions is beyond the scope of this discussion. The completely avoidable defeats suffered in Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been possible without a serious break down in the policy formulation process at several levels and are consistent with a pattern of poor decision making and policy implementation dating back to the Vietnam War. A myriad of factors such as the excessive political influence of the various commercial entities that pushed for these policies, the way that ideology and imperial hubris often informed the uncompromising attitudes behind them, and even good old fashioned ethnic stereotypes and simplistic tropes about Muslims all worked together to create the unbelievably destructive and short-sighted policies that led to America’s defeat.

These dynamics also help illustrate why its broader relationship with the Muslim world has been so problematic. In the same way that its alliances with Afghanistan’s warlords led to its defeat, America’s alliances with the Muslim world’s dictators ensured it would never win the War on Terror. To understand why, it is important to understand the main cause of the Muslim world’s instability and weakness. The prevalence of authoritarian despots throughout the Islamic world is the reason groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda exist. Most Muslim governments are controlled by people who have not been democratically elected and use their power to violently maintain their rule. Their primary goal is not to govern but to steal. That is why Hosni Mubarak stole nearly $700 billion[53] from his country and that is why the Saudi royal family is worth $1.4 trillion[54]! The Muslim world’s dictators are so blinded by greed they cannot stop stealing from their people and murdering those who challenge them. Their refusal to share power with the masses they govern has led to institutional rot, widespread violence, and economic stagnation of the sort that often leads to the development of extreme ideologies. America responded to 9/11 by strengthening its alliances with the dictators primarily responsible for allowing the region’s radical groups to thrive.

This ensured that its tactics were completely divorced from its values and guaranteed its defeat. American intelligence officers shipped (renditioned[55]) prisoners to allies so they could be tortured without stopping to think about how such actions enabled these allies to torture their own political dissidents. American defense companies sold (and continue to sell) weapons to dictators who murder their own people[56]. The author will never forget the shame he felt watching videos of American made F-16s fly over the crowds in Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring. Despite what the realists would have you believe, morality matters. Honor matters. And America compromised both by siding with the Muslim world’s dictators. The double standards and hypocrisy inherent in these actions made it impossible to win. America does not support the legitimate aspirations of people around the world to live freely when it is afraid of who they may choose to lead them or when doing so is not politically expedient. Its willingness to compromise on these values led to its defeat.

Wars often force uncomfortable alliances. America allied itself to some of the most brutal men in history to defeat the Axis powers.  The difference is that neither Stalin nor Mao was an underlying cause of WWII. The unholy alliances formed with the thugs ruling the Muslim world led to defeat because they made addressing the underlying causes of the region’s many problems impossible. By supporting these authoritarian governments, America helped entrench the political systems that are the foundational cause of the Muslim world’s many problems.

CONCLUSION

America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan is part of a wider pattern of disengagement from the region. The contours and timing may be uncertain, but it is only a question of time before America substantially reduces its military commitment to the Muslim world. Its troops and finances are exhausted, it no longer needs its oil as desperately, and its leaders are now focused on China. America’s inevitable withdrawal makes it even more important to develop policies to make sure it is never attacked again. Otherwise, the continual stream of extremists created by the repression of its supposed allies will always be a threat. Rather than playing a never-ending game of whack a mole, it is time to devise realistic policies that can finally stabilize and bring prosperity to the region. America must use its soft power to incentivize Muslim governments to develop inclusive and democratic political institutions. It may be messy and will most certainly not be a panacea for everything that ails the Muslim world, but helping Muslims create democratic governments is the only real path to stabilizing the region.

Doing so will require a fundamental shift in American policies. Though President Biden has indicated a desire to make American policies match its democratic values, the administration’s current course is not encouraging as it appears to merely be returning to pre-Trump norms. America’s policies towards the Muslim world were guided by short-sighted ideas that sought to rationalize its inhumane policies long before Trump took office. Many of the Obama administration’s actions, such as its arms sales, prolific use of drones in Pakistan and tacit support for Egypt’s military coup, were equally inconsistent with American values and highlight the degree to which short-sighted agendas have always shaped its policies towards Muslim societies. Until this changes, American policies will continue to de-stabilize the region and fuel further conflict.

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[7] According to the CIA world factbook, Germany is roughly 357,000 sq. km. while the article “How Kohl and Gorbachev sealed the deal on German reunification,” DW, November 14, 2010 indicates E. Germany was roughly 108,000 sq. km. How Kohl and Gorbachev sealed the deal on German reunification | Germany| News and in-depth reporting from Berlin and beyond | DW | 14.07.2010

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[37] Coll, Steve, Directorate S, (Penguin Books 2018), at 140-44.

[38] Associated Press. “A timeline of U.S. Troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001.” Militarytimes.com. July 6, 2016. A timeline of U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan since 2001 (militarytimes.com)

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[44] By comparison, American forces killed 40,000 civilians over a twenty-year period. See Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, “Afghans wonder ‘What about us?’ as U.S. troops prepare to withdraw,” New York Times, April 14, 2021. Afghans Wonder ‘What About Me?’ as US Troops Prepare to Withdraw – The New York Times (nytimes.com)

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[48] Freedman, Lawrence, The Future of War: A History, (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019), at 193.

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[51] “Key dates in the Iraq War,” CNN, December 18, 2011. Key dates in the Iraq war – CNN

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[53] O’Connor, Clare, “Egyptian estimate of Mubarak’s wealth soars to $700 Billion,” Forbes.com, April 11, 2011. Egyptian Estimate  Of Mubarak’s Wealth Soars To $700 Billion (forbes.com).

[54] Umoh, Ruth, “This royal family’s wealth could be worth more than $1 trillion,” csnbc.com, August 18, 2018. This royal family’s wealth could be more than $1 trillion (cnbc.com).

[55] Mayer, Jane, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker, February 6, 2005. Outsourcing the Torture of Suspected Terrorists | The New Yorker

[56] Hartung, William, “The US is Addicted to Weapons Sales to the Middle East,” PopularResistance.org, November 23, 2019. The US Is Addicted To Weapons Sales To The Middle East – PopularResistance.Org