It is time to create a Muslim NATO:

As explained in more detail here, America no longer has the desire to act as the Muslim world’s military hegemon. As such, it is only a matter of time before the US relinquishes its role as the dominant military power within the Islamic world. Though the contours and timing of its withdrawal are still uncertain, Muslim nations must begin considering how this withdrawal will impact them and how they should react. The changes that are likely to transpire represent a “critical juncture[i]” in the history of the Muslim world that will determine its trajectory for several decades. The reaction of Muslim nations will be pivotal in determining this trajectory. The following is not an attempt to predict what Muslim nations will do, but to suggest what they should do.

THERE IS NO SINGLE MUSLIM NATION POWERFUL ENOUGH TO ASSUME THE SECURITY ROLE THE US HAS FULFILLED

There is currently no Muslim nation with the military and economic resources to act as a military hegemon within the Muslim world. In fact, the most powerful military in the Middle East belongs to Israel. Among Muslim nations, Pakistan fields the most powerful military but given its fixation on India and extreme underdevelopment, it does not have the capacity to project military power beyond its borders. Given the current security dynamics in the region and the military weakness of most Muslim states, particularly the Arab states[ii], a withdrawal of US forces from the Islamic world will lead to further instability due to the security vacuum such changes will create[iii]. As such, the governments of the region must devise new policies that can fill the vacuum created by America’s inevitable withdrawal. Though not a direct cause of the Muslim world’s underlying weakness, America’s military presence has certainly helped entrench it and the dependence of Muslim nations on its power will make developing adequate military capabilities considerably more difficult.

There is no single Islamic nation capable of becoming a military hegemon on its own because none of them have the size and resources to compete with Russia, China, the US, or a united Europe. The Ottoman Empire was the last great Islamic empire, and it was never able to overcome the geographic vulnerability of having to defend itself against a powerful and antagonistic Persia to the East, an expansionist Russia to its North and a resurgent Europe to its Northwest. Ultimately, Muslims have no choice but to pursue policies that will lead to the sort of unification that Europe has undergone since the end of WWII since this is the only way to create an Islamic political entity with the resources to provide the Muslim world with the security and stability it so desperately needs.

Talking about the integration of Muslim countries considering their highly fractured relations may strike some as fantasy and to a certain extent, it is. However, it is highly doubtful anyone standing in the rubble of Germany or France after WWII could ever have imagined how integrated and prosperous both countries would be so soon after the end of that conflict. In many respects, Europe has a much greater legacy of conflict between its nations than the nations of the Muslim world. In fact, WWII is most accurately interpreted as the culmination of a series of wars resulting from the evolution of Prussia into modern day Germany. As the individual German states united, the power dynamics in Europe shifted, resulting in a series of wars that included WWI and WWII. The chaos and constant warfare that plagued Europe did not stop until a comprehensive political and economic solution in the form of the European Community was created. Some may counter that it was the absolute military victory of the Allied powers that ended this cycle of conflict, and this is true to a degree. But the Allies also decisively won WWI and despite all the carnage of that conflict, Europe was engulfed in war just two decades later. It was not until Western Europe integrated its economies and created the political institutions to manage this integration that the cycle of warfare between Europe’s nations stopped.

From this perspective, working towards the integration of Muslim nations is a realistic though difficult goal. The Muslim world is obviously in a different situation than Europe at the end of WWII. In some respects, it has advantages that Europe did not have since it has not experienced the destruction of a cataclysmic war and does not need to completely rebuild itself. However, this same advantage is also a handicap since the shock of WWII was likely a catalyst behind the first efforts to integrate Europe. On the other hand, if the conquest of Muslim lands and the continuing domination of Muslims by outside powers is still not enough to convince Muslims that working together to ensure their freedom and prosperity is a goal they should aspire to, then it is unlikely even a conflict on the scale of WWII would have any effect either. The biggest disadvantage Muslims face in their quest to integrate is the fact that the political institutions of most Muslim countries are closed and extractive[iv] whereas Europe’s institutions were mostly open and inclusive. The most difficult part of trying to integrate Muslim countries will therefore be reforming these repressive and closed political institutions. If Muslims can successfully reform these institutions, they have the potential to finally end their protracted weakness.

THERE ARE ONLY A HANDFUL OF MUSLIM STATES WITH THE CAPACITY TO CREATE SUCH AN ENTITY

The only way to strengthen the Muslim world’s military capabilities is to create a new political entity that can assume the security responsibilities America has performed for the past several decades since there is no Muslim nation capable of handling this role by itself. The most logical route to accomplishing this goal is to resurrect the concepts that led to the creation of CENTO. As the US understood in the 1950s, the nations of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have the capacity to form the backbone of a security alliance that could develop into a hegemonic Muslim power. Due to its geography and strategic concerns, Afghanistan should also join this alliance.

The main difference between CENTO and the entity being proposed here (hereinafter referred to as P.A.I.T.) is that the US should not be an active participant. It should support the creation of such an entity, but since the goal is to relieve the US of its security responsibilities, it would make no sense for it to be actively involved in its creation. Instead, it must grow and develop as a purely regional security system that allows Muslims to develop the capacity to work together for their own protection. Due to the extremely weak nature of most governments within the Muslim world, P.A.I.T. also represents the only Islamic countries with the institutional capacity and strategic incentives to create such an entity. Most of the Arab, African, and Central Asian parts of the Muslim world feature either unstable authoritarian governments that are dependent on American or Russian military and economic assistance to maintain their power or failed states that do not have the requisite degree of state centralization to create political, military, and economic institutions that can form the basis for a stable, democratic government, let alone a new multi-national political entity[v].

A security alliance between P.A.I.T. will not work nor be of lasting duration unless it is underpinned by an economic alliance. The first step in creating such an alliance will therefore be creating free trade agreements that can bind the economies and infrastructures of these nations together. Despite their weaknesses and different strategic concerns, the long-term goals of P.A.I.T. are all best served by economic integration meant to create an entirely new political entity with the strength to fill the power vacuum left by America’s departure. Combining the populations of these four countries would create an entity with a large internal market of over 400 million people that is well endowed with natural resources and defensible borders. The presence of such an entity would allow the US to withdraw its troops from the region by taking over its security responsibilities in the same way that the creation of the UAE allowed the British to withdraw their forces from the former Trucial States.

All four nations face strategic environments that should make their elites more receptive to integrationist ideas. In fact, three out of four are locked in existential conflicts they are not strong enough to resolve on their own. As a result, their governments are not as likely to prevent such an alliance from developing out of fear that it may threaten their grip on power. The main issue is that their elites must see an alliance as being in their interests despite their ethnic and doctrinal differences and the short-term upheaval such changes may cause. Though each has its own weaknesses and strategic concerns, they also have the right combination of institutions and strategic needs to overcome these issues if they can muster the political will and vision to do so.

Part of the impetus for creating a new political entity comprised of P.A.I.T. is that doing so will allow them to consolidate their borders and improve their geostrategic positions by creating advantages of strategic depth and improved internal lines of communication and supply to fortify their frontiers. A Pakistan that can rely on the meaningful support of Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran in its confrontation with India will be much better equipped to handle such a confrontation and would have more options available to it. An Iran that can use free trade agreements with Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey to mitigate the effects of US economic warfare and provide strategic depth for its military assets will be better able to resist the aggression of the US or Israel. By entering into free trade agreements with Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, Afghanistan will finally be able to develop the economic strength needed to give its people the peace they have lacked for so long but in a way that does not put it under the undue influence of another power. It may also be the only way to legitimize and moderate the new Taliban government. And the inclusion of Turkey into this alliance will provide it with a well-developed economic base that can be used to facilitate economic development between all four nations while finally allowing Turkey to realize its pan-Islamic foreign policy goals. Essentially, by combining portions of the lands and resources of the old Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal empires, Muslims can create a new entity that has the land and resources to ensure the great powers of the world can no longer dominate them. Eventually (meaning the distant future), such an entity could expand West and North to include many Arab states as well as the Muslim republics of Central Asia.

P.A.I.T. WILL NEED TO UNDERGO SERIOUS REFORMS

In order to come together to create such an entity, each must first undergo serious internal reforms to either create or strengthen their democratic political institutions. The creation of inclusive and genuine democratic institutions that respect the rule of law and rights of their citizens are absolutely vital for creating dynamic economic institutions[vi] and military capabilities. If Muslims ever hope to end the cycle of conquest and subjugation they have endured for the past several centuries, they must institute deep rooted political and socio-economic reforms because this is the only way that they will ever be able to develop the economic, technological, and military power required to protect themselves.  They must also drastically improve their governing institutions by zealously fighting corruption and ensuring their institutions can provide the government services such an entity will need to thrive. They must work to integrate their infrastructures and create new institutions that can facilitate their integration by increasing trade between all four nations so that their elites can quickly see the benefits of having access to each other’s markets.

They will also need to work to overcome the ethnic and doctrinal rivalries that have consumed the Muslim world. The only way to bridge the divide between Sunnis and Shiites, or Turks and Persians, or Punjabis and Pashtuns, etc. is to create institutions that allow these different ethnic and doctrinal groups to fairly share power with each other. In the modern era, those societies that have been able to create institutions that are successful at fairly sharing resources and settling disputes among its citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious differences have achieved the greatest economic prosperity and sometimes even the greatest amount of military power[vii].  Democratic institutions allow for a greater diffusion of power which leads to a greater diffusion of wealth which empowers groups within a society to continue generating and developing more wealth, creating a reinforcing loop of wealth creation and power diffusion and this usually leads to greater overall wealth for everyone[viii]. Given the diversity of the Islamic world, the only way Muslims will ever come together is by creating such institutions to facilitate their integration.

There seems to be a direct correlation between inclusive, democratic institutions and military power. This is because societies that fairly share political power and economic resources and properly incentivize their members to increase their economic output are typically going to be wealthier. The increased wealth of these societies provides them with more resources to spend on developing their military capabilities and the inclusive political institutions used to facilitate this wealth creation also reduces friction between members of these societies because they do not feel unfairly marginalized or excluded from power. As such, the members of such societies benefit from having the resources and necessary group cohesion to obtain a decisive military edge. This also shows that arguments in favor of creating liberal, inclusive political institutions are not based solely on a sense of morality or fairness but that such institutions are the most effective at allowing a society to develop the military capabilities necessary to protect itself from conquest. Their primary advantage is of a practical nature and a recognition that such institutions are the most effective at allowing members of a society to work together for their own betterment and protection. Conversely, ideologies based on narrow concepts of ethnic, tribal, or national identity are typically not as good at developing the sort of inclusive political institutions that can lead to greater economic growth and military power. This is important because the only way an entity comprised of Pakistanis, Turks, Persians, and Afghans will thrive is if it creates institutions that can allow these different groups to work together and the only way to accomplish this is to create transparent and fair ways for them to share power with each other and work together.

AMERICA’S ROLE

As part of its withdrawal the US must help create a coalition of allies that can prevent another hostile great power from replacing it. As such, facilitating the creation of an alliance between P.A.I.T. is in America’s long-term interest as well. The current strategy of relying on unstable monarchial dictatorships or military strongmen will not work in the long run. Simply put, these regimes do not have the strength to stand on their own. Consequently, continuing to support such allies makes no sense. Instead, the US must seek new allies that can defend themselves without help. The biggest hurdle to this is America’s ongoing conflict with Iran. If the US is serious about withdrawing its troops from the Middle East, then this issue will need to be resolved amicably. Doing so within the framework of an alliance comprised of traditional US allies like Pakistan and Turkey may present the best opportunity to do so in a manner that protects the interests of both nations.

The US must fundamentally change its policies towards the governments of the Islamic world by using its diplomatic and economic power to encourage these governments to respect the human rights of their citizens and institute meaningful democratic reforms. The only path to doing this is by supporting the spread of genuine democracy within the Islamic world. It must also stop being so fearful of governments within the Muslim world that have an Islamist component or perspective. The US has allowed its fear of political Islam to justify supporting brutal dictators that have mired the region in war and conflict. Instead of fearing such governments, the US must learn to work with them. As the people of the Muslim world become accustomed to choosing their own leaders, they may choose leaders that will have an Islamic perspective. This may lead to disagreements but does not have to preclude the development of strong relationships with these nations in the same way that even serious disagreements with its allies in Europe or India have not been allowed to undermine the fundamentals of those relationships.

Such policies would allow for the development of stable and democratic governments that respect human rights and can lay the foundation for the development of strong economies. This will eventually allow Muslims to develop the military capabilities necessary to prevent their conquest by another great power on their own. Though it may sound oxymoronic, helping Muslims become self-sufficient is the best way to help them achieve true independence and this is the best way to ensure these countries are never conquered or dominated by another competing great power that would deny America access to the region or use its resources as part of a broader confrontation with the US[ix].

CONCLUSION

It is only a matter of time before the US withdraws its troops from the Muslim world. Muslim nations must therefore develop new ideas that can allow them to fill the security vacuum its departure will create. The leaders of the Muslim world must begin to implement the reforms suggested above if they ever hope to end the cycle of violence and weakness that has consumed their countries. It is up to the nations and people of the Muslim world to devise new strategies that can allow them to finally end their protracted weakness. The policies they have pursued thus far have clearly not worked. The Muslim world has been in a sustained state of weakness for many centuries, and it will take many years to reverse the effects of its long decline. As such, the ideas presented here will take many years to develop and implement and the entity proposed above may never even materialize. However, even small steps taken towards creating it will have a beneficial impact on the Muslim world by increasing trade and helping Muslims work together. Muslims must therefore begin the process of building such an entity as soon as possible if they ever hope to reverse their fortunes.

The Arab states of the Gulf appear to believe creating an alliance with Israel will shield them from Iran while Pakistan and Iran are developing bi-lateral relationships with China. Neither strategy will work. Israel’s military is powerful enough to protect Israeli interests but, considering their aversion to casualties, it is highly doubtful Israel’s leaders will risk IDF soldiers to protect allies in the Gulf or help them secure the Gulf’s shipping lanes. Muslims rejoicing at America’s departure and welcoming China should be wary as well. China’s ethnic cleansing of its Muslims should serve as a warning to those who believe it will be a kinder benefactor than America. The authoritarian structure of its political institutions and refusal to countenance even mild criticism or non-conformity indicate it will be the opposite. Instead of trying to replace the US with another outside power whose interests will then take precedence, Muslims must learn to look to each other for their security needs.

The best way to start is by allowing the people of the Muslim world to re-create the cultural, social, and commercial links that once bound them. Muslim governments and people both need to begin promoting the free exchange of goods, people, and ideas between each other. Islamic societies were once integrated through interconnected layers of political alliances, trade and religious networks. These connections and the infrastructure that supported them helped to create what was essentially a free trade zone that allowed for the movement of goods, people, and ideas throughout the Islamic world in a manner that helped it to develop a common culture and an integrated economy.  If Muslims are ever going to take control of their security needs, they must rebuild these links so that the interests of the Muslim world’s different nations and people begin to align in a manner that leads to further economic, political, and military cooperation.  Ultimately, the nations of the Muslim world have no choice but to adapt to their changing security environment by learning to rely on themselves and each other. Arguing for an alliance between P.A.I.T. may seem like a desperate plan but after centuries of conquest and subjugation, desperate is a fitting description for the Muslim world. The absolute military, political, and economic weakness of the Muslim world will only be corrected through bold measures.    

These ideas are also consistent with the theories developed by Professor Huntington in his important work “The Clash of Civilizations.” The past few decades have illustrated the prescience of his model for understanding international relations and conflict. As he predicted, the world is moving towards a multi-polar international system largely centered around its major civilizational blocks. Before this system can realize its potential, the Islamic world will need to stabilize itself. Until this happens it will continue to destabilize surrounding regions and it will continue to present a security vacuum that outside powers will try to fill. As Prof. Huntington’s model implies, it will fall upon the people and nations of the Muslim world to help themselves since nations from other civilizational blocks will be both unwilling and unable to do so[x].


[i] A “critical juncture” is when a “confluence of factors disrupts the existing balance of political or economic power.” See Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: Crown Business, 2012) at 106.

[ii] The UAE, a.k.a. “little Sparta” is the only Arab nation that has managed to develop adequate military capabilities.

[iii] Bandow, Doug, “Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops,” Foreignpolicy.com, May 28, 2020,  https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/us-deficit-military-spending-budget-bring-home-troops/.

[iv] For a more detailed discussion regarding the impact of such institutions, see Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (New York: Crown Business, 2012) at 79-83; 216; 271.

[v] Both Indonesia and Nigeria are too geographically remote, and Nigeria does not face a strategic environment that would cause its elites to support the reforms that would be necessary to join such an entity.

[vi] Again, for a more in-depth discussion of these ideas see Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail, (New York: Crown Business 2012) at 79-83; 216; 271.

[vii] Though he does not explain why in great detail, Prof. Bernard Lewis appears to agree with this conclusion in his article “Why Turkey is the only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, pp. 41-49.

[viii] Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James, Why Nations Fail, (New York: Crown Business 2012) at 306-17.

[ix] The author is obviously thinking about China’s growing influence in the region.

[x] Huntington, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order, (New York: Touchstone, 1996) pp. 21-29.

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Muslim rulers really need to read Machiavelli’s The Prince

Although widely recognized as an astute student of statecraft today, Machiavelli has historically been one of the more controversial political thinkers in the Western world. His ideas have been criticized because they are primarily concerned with how rulers attain and augment their power. They do not deal with questions related to the moral exercise of power.  As such, the dictators of the Muslim world should pay attention to his ideas because they only seem to care about power as well and have shown no interest in creating governments imbued with any sense of morality or decency. The following discussion is based on George Bull’s translation[1] and will analyze Machiavelli’s ideas in order to suggest what Muslim rulers can learn from Italy’s most infamous political thinker.

The similarities between the political and military situation in Italy that gave rise to the ideas expressed in The Prince and the current political and military dynamics of the Muslim world are quite striking. The Prince was written in response to the fractured nature of Italy’s politics during a time when the French and Spanish were attempting to dominate its smaller and divided city-states. Rather than work together to prevent these powerful kingdoms from subjugating Italy’s city-states, Italy’s rulers pursued policies that prioritized their own short-term retention of power even if doing so allowed powerful outsiders to entrench their dominant positions. This resulted in the effective military control of the Italian peninsula by outside powers during much of Machiavelli’s lifetime. The rulers of the Muslim world have pursued similarly short-sighted policies that have resulted in the complete domination of the Islamic world by the West, Russia, and China. Despite these broad similarities, there are also some important differences.

One of the key differences between Italy during this period and the Muslim world today is that Italy’s problems were mostly political. The political divisions within Italy prevented building armies powerful enough to counter the French or the Spanish. Italian arms were not lacking in technical or tactical skills nor were they weak because Italy’s economy was incapable of equipping Italian soldiers with modern weaponry (by the standards of the time).  The military weakness of the Muslim world is also primarily rooted in its weak political institutions and rulers. However, its inability to develop modern economies capable of producing advanced weapons like those made by the West or to competently use the advanced weapons they import are also based on the cultural climate of the Muslim world which discourages critical thinking and the free exchange of ideas. The stagnant intellectual climate of the Muslim world has therefore greatly contributed to its weakness by preventing Muslims from creating strong economies or vibrant educational and research institutions that can develop the minds of its scientists, soldiers, and industrialists. As such, the military weakness of the Muslim world is best viewed as resulting from a combination of political, economic, cultural, and technical factors whereas Italy’s weakness was mostly political.

It is important to keep these contextual factors in mind when discussing how Machiavelli’s ideas might apply to the Muslim world so they can be analyzed with the proper perspective. Yet another factor to note in this regard is that, as referenced above, The Prince does not provide a coherent political philosophy. Machiavelli wrote his book as an attempt to provide advice to one of Italy’s most prominent rulers by providing him with a practical guide about how to retain and augment his power. He did not write The Prince in order to formulate a new political philosophy that could be used to provide the intellectual basis for Italian unity. Nor did he concern himself with greater questions of political philosophy. It is likely he felt that such concerns were irrelevant so long as the ruler in power was strong and just. As a result, he was focused on developing ideas that could substantially increase the power of a ruler. Given his concentration on how to acquire, maintain, and increase power, his advice should be considered indispensable to the rulers of the Muslim world who also care about power over all other considerations.

The Prince is primarily concerned with analyzing “hereditary principalities[2]” in which power is held by one ruler who can pass on authority to a designated heir. Most nations within the Muslim world are best treated as “hereditary principalities” as well since they consist of kingdoms such as Jordan or Morocco or republics ruled by men who act as though they rule over a kingdom instead of a true republic. For example, even though Egypt under Mubarak was officially designated as a republic, Mubarak was grooming his son to take power and governed Egypt much like it was his own kingdom rather than a republic. Egypt’s current ruler, General Sisi, appears likely to continue this trend.

According to Machiavelli, there are two basic types of “hereditary principalities.” The first are those that are governed by a ruler “to whom everyone is subservient[3]” while the second type are those in which the ruler governs with the aid of nobles who do not owe their position to the ruler’s favor. The basic dichotomy described here is between an absolutist political system in which the ruler concentrates as much power in his person as possible as opposed to a feudal system in which the ruler must share power with nobles. In discussing the former, Machiavelli cites to the Ottoman Empire, stating that “the Turkish empire is ruled by one man; all others are his servants[4]” whereas “the king of France is surrounded by a long-established order of nobles[5]” who have their own subjects and are “loved by them[6].” According to Machiavelli, principalities governed like the Turkish empire are difficult to conquer because outsiders cannot manipulate elements within it to support an invasion. An enemy attempting to conquer absolutist principalities must therefore defeat its army in the field before it can assume control whereas an enemy trying to conquer a principality that features an independent nobility will have an easier time conquering it because it can use the nobles against the ruler. Once conquered; however, it is much easier to maintain control over an absolutist principality whereas it is much harder to maintain control over principalities that feature multiple independent power centers. This seems logical since principalities with a powerful nobility will have leaders with their own troops who can resist an invasion even if the ruler falls. While principalities governed by absolutist rulers will have no other power centers that can resist an invasion once the ruler is defeated because no other groups within it have been allowed to accumulate the power to do so. Applying these ideas to the Muslim world, one can see how its absolutist political institutions made it more prone to conquest and colonization once the West was able to develop military tactics and technology that the Muslim world could not match. Once European armies defeated the absolutist rulers of the Muslim world there were no independent power centers that could oppose them. As such, one of the first and most basic lessons today’s Muslims can learn from Machiavelli is that their absolutist political institutions made it easier for Europeans to conquer and colonize them and the continuing prevalence of such political institutions continues to make the Muslim world vulnerable to conquest.

Machiavelli also discusses the various ways that rulers acquire and maintain power. One tactic that rulers often use is to form a client relationship with a foreign power to obtain the support they need to either seize or maintain their power. Machiavelli believed that relying on the favor of a foreign power leads to instability because it makes rulers dependent on the “goodwill and fortune of those who have elevated them[7].” Instead, Machiavelli states that rulers must have their own armies, loyal only to them, and must come to power exclusively by this power rather than using foreign troops[8]. Dependence on foreign military assistance is therefore viewed as a fatal weakness by Machiavelli, one that will often lead to the demise of the ruler. The history of the Muslim world confirms Machiavelli’s views. For example, the only branch of the Hashemite dynasty installed by the British to have survived past its infancy is the one that was able to develop an alliance with local Bedouin and Circassian tribes that gave it the independent military power necessary to ensure its survival. Neither dynasty in Egypt nor Iraq was able to do so, much to their regret. The current leaders of both Iraq and Afghanistan are in the process of learning this lesson as well since neither can rely on their militaries to ensure their power. Their inability to develop military power independent from the United States will likely result in the disintegration of Iraq within the next few decades and the development of an entirely new government in Afghanistan that, at best, will have to share power with the Taliban in the near future.

This illustrates that those Muslim rulers that are reliant on foreign military forces to maintain their regimes should be wary. Machiavelli would argue that you are setting yourselves up for failure and conquest. The Arab nations of the Persian Gulf are particularly vulnerable in this regard. Their reliance on foreign military contractors (a.k.a. mercenaries) to ensure their advanced imported arms remain operable is a serious vulnerability.  As is their general reliance on the military power of the United States to ensure their rule. This makes their continued power subject to the whims and fortunes of the US instead of placing their fate in their own hands. Machiavelli’s views on mercenaries[9] and the use of foreign military power highlight a general animosity towards reliance on the aid of others, instead he seems to understand what common sense also dictates: that a nation must be able to rely on itself when it comes to matters of defense. As such, those Muslim rulers that have outsourced this responsibility to a foreign power or are dependent for such matters on the goodwill of another nation must begin to seriously reconsider their policies.

This extends to those Muslim nations that remain dependent on outside suppliers to meet their most advanced defense requirements. The same logic that dictates a ruler must have resort to his own army and cannot be dependent on foreign troops to maintain his power also extends to the conclusion that no military can claim to be powerful until its armaments are manufactured within territories under its direct control. The Muslim world’s dependence on imported weapons is therefore a serious military vulnerability that impacts its ability to prevent the conquest of Muslim nations. Again, the historical record of the Muslim world and its string of military defeats and territorial contraction over the past few centuries confirms this view.

In addition to discussing military matters, Machiavelli also discusses internal political matters. He suggests that there are three main interests a ruler must balance. The people, the nobles[10], and the army[11]. According to Machiavelli, the people are easy to appease because they ask only not to be oppressed while the nobles and the army are the most difficult to placate because the nobles actively seek to oppress the people while the army constantly demands to go to war and will often resort to violence to get its way[12]. In today’s parlance we would replace the word nobles with the word elite, but the same concept applies. The political and economic institutions of the Muslim world are dominated by an elite comprised mostly of its military and large landowning class that have concentrated power in the hands of an extremely small elite which often uses it power to maintain violent control over their people. As such, the rulers of the Muslim world have traditionally come from and served the interests of what Machiavelli would call the nobles and the army. He would likely disapprove of this power structure because he suggests that the first thing a ruler must do to secure power is to seek the friendship of the people as he correctly understands that power is ultimately derived from them[13]. The instability of the Muslim world and the weakness of so many of its governments can therefore be directly attributed to power structures that intentionally marginalize the masses they govern. This is particularly frustrating because Machiavelli states that all a ruler has to do to maintain order is make sure he executes people only when there is good cause to do so and abstain from disturbing the property or women of his subjects.[14] This is consistent with his statement that the only thing people really want is to not be oppressed. Sadly, most of the rulers of the Muslim world have been unable to meet these depressingly low standards. Their inability to check their greedy impulses to steal and enrich themselves and their willingness to use violence against their subjects without proper justification has resulted in the severe oppression of their people. Instead of trying to maintain the friendship of their people as Machiavelli advises, the rulers of the Muslim world have sided with their elites (nobles) and soldiers. This has led to the instability and weakness that has plagued the Muslim world for centuries.

Machiavelli states that one of the key institutions necessary to ensure good laws and governance is a parliament since it alleviates rulers of the need to pick sides with either the people or the nobles. He explains that the nobles and people can use this institution to govern together, stating there is “no better or more sensible institution, nor one more effective in ensuring the security of the king and the kingdom[15].” Although many Muslim nations have governments featuring legislative assemblies, most of them are not adequately empowered to govern their nations as most power is concentrated in the hands of an executive position or within a military/landowner/tribal oligarchy of some sort. As such, the political structure of most Muslim societies concentrates power in the hands of people from its elite and/or military class in a manner that has undermined its ability to develop effective representative bodies, the very institution highlighted as being key to a well governed state and the longevity of the ruler.

Based on their complete disregard for Machiavelli’s advice, the author can only conclude the rulers of the Muslim world have yet to read The Prince. This is unfortunate because they could have benefited from his observations. The fragility of so many Muslim governments proves that these rulers have ignored the advice discussed above to their great sorrow. Those rulers that have survived thus far should not fool themselves into thinking they can ignore the lessons of history either. They have not survived due to their own prowess but rather because fortune has favored them.[16] Eventually fortune will turn as it always does and, given their refusal to adhere to the sensible ideas discussed above, they will likely find themselves unprepared. The author humbly suggests they take some time to read what their former colleagues in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and far too many other Muslim nations ignored to their detriment or they are likely to suffer similar fates.


[1] Machiavelli, Niccolo, Trans by George Bull. The Prince. Penguin Books. London. 1961.

[2] Id. at 5.

[3] Id. at 13-14.

[4] Id. at 14.

[5] Id. at 14.

[6] Id. at 13-15.

[7] Id. at 20.

[8] Id. at 20-26.

[9] Id. at 39.

[10] Id. at 30-33.

[11] Id. at 60-61

[12] Id. at 31; 60-61; 65.

[13] Id. at 32-33.

[14] Id. at 53.

[15] Id. at 59.

[16] Id. at 20-21.

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