America is Pakistan’s enemy, not its friend

On the surface, the world’s geopolitical sands always appear to be shifting, leading states to constantly realign their policies and alliances. However, due to the unchanging nature of geography and the slow, cumulative effects of cultural, idealogical, technological, and economic developments on political systems, states have core interests that rarely change. As a result, many geopolitical “shifts” are often more illusion than reality.

Pakistan’s fluctuating relationship with the United States exemplifies these dynamics perfectly. During the Cold War, the US was one of Pakistan’s closest allies and leading arms suppliers. Cracks in the relationship began to emerge during the late 1970s following General Zia-ul-Haq’s rise to power. These tensions did not result in a complete break, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 forced a reconciliation that deepened bilateral ties for the next decade. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program soon led to another rupture that persisted until Pakistan became relevant again during America’s post 9/11 assault on the Muslim world. 

This rapprochement was characterized by glaring contradictions from the start due to the conflicting core interests guiding America’s and Pakistan’s policies. America’s plan for Afghanistan involved empowering Pakistan’s enemies from the Northern Alliance while marginalizing its traditional allies among the Pashtun tribes and allowing India to establish a presence on its western border. Faced with these developments, Pakistan had little choice but to clandestinely support the Taliban despite realigning itself with America. 

U.S.-Pakistan relations cooled again after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. They remained tepid until recently when Pakistan’s leaders reminded America of their ability to hunt down its enemies while simultaneously enticing it with access to potentially valuable oil reserves and mineral deposits. This led to a flurry of high level meetings, including a visit by Pakistan’s Field Marshal Munir to the White House and talk of a “strategic reset.”

Much like their past realignments, this latest rapprochement is mostly illusory. The enduring mismatch between American and Pakistani core interests makes a true convergence unlikely. 

To understand why, one need only look to America’s relationship with India. Recent tensions aside, the United States is committed to building a strategic partnership with India, with the goal of transforming it into a major regional military power. This effort began in earnest with the 2008 U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement. Since then, the U.S. has sold India over  $20 billion in weapons and is currently investing billions more into its military-industrial base. 

India’s military actions against Pakistan in 2016, 2019, and May of this year are a direct result of these weapons sales, which have empowered India’s fanatical rulers to pursue their dreams of establishing Indian hegemony over the entire Subcontinent. Despite the growing extremism within its ruling elite, America remains committed to arming New Delhi and has no regard for the danger this poses to Pakistan. 

U.S. support for India is part of a broader strategic agenda aimed at ensuring American military dominance across key regions. This includes maintaining a form of neo-imperial military control over substantial portions of the Middle East and supporting apartheid Israel in its quest to destabilize and weaken Iran’s government. 

America’s policies against Iran have been particularly harmful to Pakistan. Its sanctions have prevented the completion of critical infrastructure projects and hindered the development of broader trade relations between the two neighbors, limiting Pakistan’s ability to enhance its energy security and regional connectivity. Attempts to topple Iran’s government also endanger Pakistan’s future by creating the potential for violence to spill over the border and further destabilize its restive western provinces.

America’s malign activities throughout the Muslim world have had a similarly negative impact. Violence in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, or Libya may not impact Pakistan directly. But these countries represent Pakistan’s natural allies and trading partners. By destabilizing them, America is effectively depriving Pakistan of the regional partners it needs to develop its own economic networks and power, impoverishing and weakening it over the long run.  

America’s pattern of military interventions and coercive policies in the Muslim world is driven by an underlying strategy: to prevent the emergence of a Muslim state capable of challenging its regional dominance. This strategic calculus helps explain Washington’s persistent unease towards Pakistan. Despite their history of cooperation, the United States imposed sanctions targeting Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs – clear signs of mistrust that reflect broader concerns about Pakistan’s strategic potential. With its large population, strategic geographic position, and powerful military, Pakistan is well-positioned to emerge as a leading power in the Muslim world – making it a long-term threat rather than a reliable partner in the eyes of American policy makers.

Pakistan’s leadership should carefully assess the historical record of U.S. foreign policy toward states it perceives as threats. Between its weapons sales, sanctions and direct military actions, America has killed millions. Its sanctions against Iraq killed an estimated 1.5 million people, including 576,000 children. The so called “war on terror” killed 4.5 million more and its wide ranging military support for Saudi Arabia’s war against Yemen killed another 377,000. Added together that’s almost 6.4 million people. America’s support for Israel’s ethnic cleansing campaign, which has already led to the slaughter of 60,000 Palestinians including 18,500 children, shows it learned nothing from these crimes and is perfectly capable of committing similar atrocities in the future.

Pakistan’s leaders have responded to the danger with appeasement. Successive governments have acquiesced to American demands by curtailing large scale trade with Iran, avoiding public criticism of U.S. regional policies, and failing to impose even symbolic diplomatic costs for Washington’s violent policies. 

Things recently took a sycophantic turn when Pakistan’s leaders nominated Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace price and gave the US general in charge of helping apartheid Israel massacre tens of thousands of innocent women and children an award. Their plan to grant American companies access to Pakistan’s natural resources is equally servile. By pursuing what amounts to a neo-colonial arrangement, the country’s leadership risks surrendering the lion’s share of wealth from potentially transformative mineral and energy deposits to American corporations – undermining national sovereignty and forfeiting long-term economic benefits in the process. 

The desire to appease America is somewhat understandable given its powerful military and violent tendencies. But appeasement that prevents Pakistan from building the strength needed to protect itself is not a sustainable or strategic path forward. 

America’s irrational justifications for its violence against Iraq and Iran offer sobering lessons. The United States sold Saddam Hussein the chemical weapons his forces used during the Iran-Iraq War, only to later use those same weapons as an excuse for a full-scale invasion—despite evidence Iraq had already dismantled them. Similarly, it backed Israel’s actions against Iran under the pretext of halting a nuclear program that Iran had already shown a willingness to dismantle through negotiations, as it did in the 2015 JCPOA deal. These examples make it clear that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal could easily be used to justify violence against it one day. They also show neither appeasement nor even unilateral disarmament are reliable safeguards against U.S. hostility. 

The geopolitical landscape today is far less forgiving than it was during the Afghan conflict, when Pakistan was able to play a double game—supporting the U.S.-led invasion while simultaneously backing elements of the Taliban. The current circumstances do not lend themselves to such subterfuge. As such, Pakistan must chart a new path rooted in attaining strategic autonomy, rather than one shaped by the shifting goals of an external superpower. 

The foundation of such a policy must be the development of a robust regional alliance with Iran and Turkey centered on economic integration and security cooperation. By fostering such a partnership, Pakistan can assume a constructive role in revitalizing a significant portion of the Muslim world while simultaneously strengthening itself. Achieving this vision will require comprehensive political, legal, and fiscal reforms aimed at building the sort of technologically advanced, export-driven economy needed to support such an alliance. 

Until Pakistan’s leadership embraces these difficult but necessary steps, the country will remain vulnerable. While a few voices, such as Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Asad Durrani, have warned of the danger, most of the country’s elite appear committed to a strategy of accommodation. Their complacency ignores the simple fact that a “strategic reset” with the United States, absent any alignment of core interests that extends beyond resource extraction and counterterrorism cooperation, is illusory. Washington’s arms sales to India and its long-standing policy of trying to subjugate the Muslim world mean America is Pakistan’s enemy, not its friend. It is time Pakistan’s decision-makers recognize this reality and act accordingly.

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When it comes to the Iraq War, neither America nor the Muslim world learned a thing

This article was first published here by the Friday Times on March 21, 2023

The twentieth anniversary of America’s invasion of Iraq led to many pieces discussing the legacy of the war and the lessons it offers. Writing for the Intercept, Peter Maass was one of the few commentators to discuss the horrendous cost to Iraq’s people and the indifference of most Americans to the suffering inflicted by their military as he noted how so few of these commentaries even bothered to mention the death toll from the war. The Los Angeles TimesNew York Times, and Washington Post all ran human interest pieces that focused on the devastation unleashed against Iraq’s people.

But most chose to ignore this aspect of the war. Though they readily admitted it was “disastrous” or a “tragedy,” they seemed to view it as such primarily because of the negative impact on America. Writing for Foreign Affairs Magazine, Hal Brands described the war as an “American tragedy” that was “born of honorable motives and genuine concerns” while he lamented that “critiques of the war have become so hyperbolic that it can be difficult to keep the damage in perspective.” The President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haas, echoed these sentiments as he spent most of his time rationalizing America’s decision to launch what he euphemistically refers to as a “war of choice.”

Let’s get one thing straight about this war. There was no legitimate reason to invade Iraq. War is only ever justified as a means of self-defense or coming to the defense of innocents in extreme situations. Despite having plenty of justification, Iraq never attacked America and it had nothing to do with 9/11. As Mr. Haas so helpfully points out, Ukraine’s war against Russia is a war of necessity born of the need to protect itself from a violent invader. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is another “war of choice.” Despite his attempts to deflect, Mr. Haas’s use of the same phrase to describe both wars is apt because both were illegal and unjust wars of aggression.

As Mr. Brands points out, “no one knows for sure” how many Iraqis were killed as a result of America’s choices, though he estimates between “100,000 and 400,000” died. Mr. Maass, adds that, “millions” were “injured, forced out of their homes, and traumatized for the rest of their lives.” Some estimates place the death toll as high as 2.4 million. Whatever the number, it is too high, and it is abhorrent that anyone would try to whitewash or rationalize the mass murder of anywhere from 100,000 – 2.4 million men, women, and children.

Even the argument that Iraq was believed to possess WMDs fails miserably. America has no right to attack a country for trying to develop the same exact weapons it possesses. Particularly when it is the biggest proliferator of weapons, both conventional and unconventional, in the world. America helped Apartheid South Africa build nuclear weapons. It has turned a blind eye to Apartheid Israel’s nuclear weapons and sells weapons to dictators all over the world. Arguing that Saddam Hussein’s brutality went beyond the pale while ignoring Ariel Sharon’s war crimes, or helping Saudi Arabia commit its own in Yemen shows how hypocritical and non-sensical these arguments have always been. But discussing these obvious truths is a waste of time. As the pieces referenced above indicate, most American’s simply do not care about the double standards and hypocrisy of their actions.

Mr. Haas even tried to exonerate those responsible for unleashing this mayhem by arguing they had no ill intent. Another weak argument that ignores the fact that there are some instances where intent is irrelevant. Culpability must sometimes be based purely on the consequences of one’s actions. Most would probably agree that mass murder falls into this category. Whether George Bush and his cohorts intended to deceive is of no consequence. What does matter is that their decisions led to the murder of a lot of innocent civilians. By any sane legal standard, their actions were criminal, and they must all be held legally accountable. Aside from Mr. Maass, not one of the commentators reflecting on this war was willing to suggest as much. Which further proves that America learned absolutely nothing from this war. As Stephen Wertheim eloquently puts it, “the flawed logic that produced the war is alive and well.”

Since America failed to absorb the correct lessons, the victims of this war, and by extension, those who may find themselves in America’s crosshairs next must work that much harder to learn their own lessons.

Doing so requires examining more than just the war in Iraq, which is not the only part of the world that has been subject to such violence. In fact, the 55th anniversary of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam passed just three days before the anniversary that prompted this piece and the 56th anniversary of Israel’s conquest and continuing occupation of the West Bank is just around the corner.

In addition to contemplating the import of all these anniversaries as well as countless others that we simply do not have the space or time to reference, the victims of America’s various attempts to spread freedom and democracy must also weigh the ramifications of its contradictory actions in support of Ukraine and Israel. And they must do so while they consider the refusal of its leaders to spend less than $800 billion on its military or limit its arms shipments to violent regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, etc.

Thankfully, the lessons gleaned from the cumulative weight of these data points are relatively simple.  First, Iraq will not be the last unprovoked war America or one of its allies starts. That is because we do not live in a “rules based” international system. We live in a world where might equals right and powerful nations can commit mass murder with impunity (unless America decides they should be held accountable). Those nations that do not wish to suffer like Iraq (or Palestine, or Vietnam, etc.) must therefore give serious thought to creating the sort of political, social, and economic institutions that can lead to developing the industrial, technological, and military capabilities needed to protect themselves.

Both China and Japan learned these lessons after their violent interactions with the West. The Muslim world has struggled to do so. Just like America, it has refused to learn the correct lessons from Iraq or the countless other conquests and slaughters that have marred its history over the past several centuries. Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper discussed the impact and aftermath of the war as did Al Jazeera. But neither thought to question the systemic issues that made Iraq, a microcosm of the Muslim world, so vulnerable to conquest or consider ways to prevent such violence from ever happening again.

Muslims refuse to admit that the violence perpetrated against them is a direct result of their own weakness. Societies are never conquered by outsiders until they have sufficiently rotted from within. The authoritarian political and social institutions that have strangled Muslim societies for centuries have stunted its technological and economic development, making it impossible to develop adequate military abilities. Until they wholeheartedly implement serious political, legal, educational, and economic reforms to free themselves from the shackles of dictatorship, Muslim nations will continue to suffer from the same pattern of conquest and violence.

Muslim states must also look to each other for their security needs since none of them can compete with the Great Powers on their own. The only way out of this morass is to embrace the type of unity and collective security architecture built by Europe in the aftermath of WW2. Europe’s unity is, in turn, laid upon a foundation of free trade, which means Muslims must begin the process of learning to work together by linking themselves through trade and infrastructure. These ideas may sound outlandish. Some have even compared them to the quest for nuclear fusion. But the most fundamental lesson of the Iraq war is that without serious changes that address the roots of its weakness, the Muslim world will continue to suffer similar tragedies.  

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Senator Durbin does not understand why we lost in Afghanistan

Senator Dick Durbin recently wrote an opinion piece about Afghanistan in USA Today. In it he argues that America lost its longest war because Afghans refused to “bend to reason or force” and could not accept “outsiders.” I completely disagree with his analysis.

We lost because we repeatedly shot ourselves in the foot in the following ways:

  • We never provided enough troops to properly secure the country once we routed the Taliban.
  • We outsourced security responsibilities to warlords that used their power to enrich themselves through corruption, theft, and drug trafficking while they violently abused the people they ruled over.
  • We wasted far too many resources trying to build a Western style military that Afghanistan could not afford or use properly.
  • We did not adequately manage or control how the vast sums of money we poured into the country were spent. As a result, at least 90% of the nearly $148 billion dollars we provided was either stolen or completely wasted on useless projects or military spending.
  • We never developed a mechanism to integrate those Taliban that tried to surrender back into society, giving many Pashtuns no choice but to support the insurgency.

As he noted in his piece, a lot of people died because of this war. As such, I think it is extremely important that we objectively analyze why we lost instead of relying on simplistic explanations or superficial stereotypes about the Afghan people. We had a small window of opportunity to do something good in Afghanistan and we blew it. That is why we lost.

Senator Durbin’s piece references Afghanistan’s history of violently ejecting invaders. I believe our history at the end of WWII is more instructive. We occupied Germany and Japan for ten and seven years after WWII. The policies implemented to secure both countries turned Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan into two of our closest allies. My point is, we have taken on bigger challenges than the Taliban and resoundingly won.

What is particularly concerning is that, despite fielding the most powerful military the world has ever known, America has forgotten how to win wars. The poor decision making that led to our defeats in Afghanistan and Iraq were remarkably like the mistakes made in Vietnam. Since the end of WW2 America has lost three of the five major military conflicts it has engaged in. This speaks to a troubling pattern that can only be explained by structural issues regarding our policy formulation process when it comes to matters of war and national security.

I realize the Senator’s letter was probably not intended to provide an in-depth explanation, but I still felt obligated to write this because the justifications in his piece are eerily similar to those used to create the unbelievably bad policies that led to our defeat. Until our leaders take the time to seriously reflect on why we lost in Afghanistan, and how this our loss fits within the larger context of the pattern of defeats referenced above, we will continue to waste lives and treasure losing wars that we should have won.

For a more in-depth discussion of these issues please see here.

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