In 1985 Israeli bombers dropped empty fuel tanks on targets inside Saudi Arabia to show their displeasure with its purchase of long-range missiles from China. They wanted to showcase their ability to strike the Kingdom at will and emphasized their point by flying at a low altitude to show how little regard they had for Saudi air defenses[1]. This gesture was designed both to disrespect and warn the Saudis and vividly highlights the depths of Saudi Arabia’s military incompetence.
Saudi Arabia has since turned itself into one of the largest consumers of American weapons to improve its ability to protect itself. It now boasts the sixth largest military budget in the world and an array of sophisticated weapons as well as an army of mercenaries to keep them working. Its conflict with the Houthis indicates this massive spending has done little to improve its fighting abilities.
Aside from their ballistic missiles and drones, the Houthis lack modern weaponry, an air force, or air defenses. Despite the severe disparity in resources and weapons and the fact that America has actively helped with logistical, intelligence, and targeting support, the Saudis have been unable to subdue their poorly equipped enemies.
The Kingdom’s continuing inability to field a competent fighting force presents an existential threat that it must take immediate steps to resolve. Machiavelli famously noted that rulers who cannot independently defend themselves will rarely maintain their power for very long[2]. That the Sauds have survived this long is a testament to their political acumen and unwavering American support. Unfortunately for them, America’s support is no longer guaranteed. As such, they must finally take concrete measures to ensure they can adequately protect their country.
Saudi Arabia presents an interesting case study in military power because the nation’s oil wealth means it does not lack for resources or weapons. Consequently, its poor capabilities are directly attributable to cultural and political factors. Robert Lacey provides some clues regarding the underlying causes of this weakness which stem from the methods the royal family uses to ensure its rule. For example, he explains that due to political considerations, the Ulama was given control over Saudi schools. Naturally, they favored Islamic oriented curriculum that emphasized rote memorization over improving the critical thinking skills of Saudi students[3]. Their control of Saudi schools is just one manifestation of their influence.
The ruling family’s alliance with the country’s conservative religious establishment has given them the power to violently ensure conformity with their strict interpretation of Islamic law. Saudi Ulama believe they have a responsibility to “command the good” and “forbid the bad.[4]” In pursuit of this highly questionable philosophy, they have trampled individual rights and modes of expression while creating a toxic intellectual climate that has affected Saudi society in countless ways. One of which is its ineffectiveness on the battlefield.
According to Ken Pollack’s book Armies of Sand, the poor performance of Saudi soldiers is directly tied to a culture that emphasizes obedience and conformity over individuality and independent thinking[5]. These dominant cultural values have prevented Saudi soldiers from learning to operate independently in the unstructured chaos of war, leading to incredibly poor tactical abilities. As a result, Saudi forces have proven incapable of learning how to conduct combined arms operations (these require different military assets like infantry, tanks, and artillery to work together) or properly execute strike missions against even undefended targets.
They have been given this power because it provides the Sauds the cover they need to suppress political dissent by helping to justify the draconian police state they have built. The suppression of religious and political discourse go hand in hand and serve the same purpose: to ensure the family’s rule.
The Saudi military’s command structure and organization also reflect the royal family’s political needs. Much like its civilian ministries, Saudi Arabia’s military is organized and designed to balance power between various branches of the family and the tribes that support it. It is organized and trained to ensure political control and obedience, not fight battles against external enemies. Its abysmal performance on the battlefield reflects these priorities.
Given these underlying issues, commonsense dictates that the Sauds must end the power of the Ulama over public policy and de-politicize the military by appointing officers based on merit rather than family or tribal affiliation. Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has initiated reforms that are superficially consistent with the former goal while leaving the military’s politically motivated command structure intact. But none of his reforms address the political dynamics that forced his family to ally itself to the Ulama in the first place. Without serious political reforms, Saudi Arabia has no chance of developing adequate military power.
The Sauds need to take a page out of the British royal family’s playbook by creating a constitutional monarchy. This would allow the family to maintain an important, though diminished, role in the nation’s politics while protecting its incredible wealth. It is also the only way it will ever be able to create a military capable of protecting their nation since only a democratic government will be able to adequately de-politicize the military.
As I have mentioned elsewhere, the greatest enemies of commonsense are pride and greed. The Sauds are well-known for both qualities and, as a result, are more likely to laugh at this advice than follow it. They are far more likely to replace America by developing another neo-colonial alliance with China. Which means that instead of becoming one of the longest lasting monarchies in the world like their counterparts in Britain, they will go the way of the Almohads or Hafsids. They will become a footnote in history and join the long list of dynasties that have ruled various parts of the Muslim world only to fade into oblivion. The only real questions are when and what will follow.
[1] Lacey, Robert. Inside the Kingdom. Penguin Books. London. 2009. pgs. 111-12.
[2] Machiavelli, Niccolo, Trans by George Bull. The Prince. Penguin Books. London. 1961. Pgs. 20-26.
[3] Lacey at 50.
[4] Id. at 52.
[5] Pollack, Kenneth, Armies of Sand. Oxford University Press. New York. 2019. Pgs. 371-380; 394-405