This piece was first published here, by the Friday Times on Aug. 28, 2024.
Pakistan is currently dealing with complicated insurgencies in two of its provinces. One is primarily being waged by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) while the other is being waged by an assortment of Baloch ethno-nationalist groups in Balochistan. These developments have rekindled a debate that has flummoxed military strategists throughout the modern era regarding how to implement an effective counter insurgency (COIN) strategy. Doing so requires developing a multi-pronged approach that combines military, intelligence, and law enforcement operations with political and socio-economic policies to form a cohesive strategy while simultaneously challenging the ideology or raison d’etre of the insurgents. To restore peace in its restive provinces, Pakistan’s leaders must use these different prongs together in a mutually reinforcing way to address the many factors fueling these conflicts.
Balancing them properly requires understanding the nature of the fight Pakistan is facing. There are two basic kinds of insurgencies. The first involves guerillas fighting against a foreign military force occupying their land. This is the kind of conflict America faced in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Though the occupying power may consider the problems of maintaining its occupation complicated, in truth such conflicts are easily resolved by ending the illegal occupations causing them and sending the unwanted foreign forces home.
Pakistan is dealing with the second kind, which involves citizens rebelling against their own state. These are infinitely more complicated. All wars are political, but some are more political than others. Domestic insurgencies are perhaps the most political because they involve disputes as to the nature and legitimacy of the political institutions that govern a particular territory between the people meant to share it. They also touch on difficult issues regarding the power of the state to take the lives of its citizens and the extent to which it must comply with due process norms when doing so.
The power to kill represents the ultimate exercise of political authority. Normally, a state is only justified in using this power against those who have been found guilty of a grave crime after they have been given a fair and transparent trial. Most would probably agree that insurrection should be punishable by death, but this depends on the nature of the state and the reason its citizens are rebelling. Not all states are just or legitimate and despite the ubiquitous use of the term, not all insurgents are “terrorists[1].”
For example, Palestinian and Kashmiri insurgents are fighting to be free of repressive states they were never meant to be a part of that have violently disenfranchised them. Compounding the problem, India and Israel have refused to implement political processes to address their grievances. As such, they have every right[2] to take up arms against those who are oppressing and abusing them. So long as they do so within the bounds of civilized society, meaning they limit their attacks to security forces, their actions are not criminal or immoral.
With these general ideas in mind, the rest of this discussion will focus on the role of security forces, political and socio-economic policies, and the need to counter the ideology of insurgents.
MILITARY, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
The most important point to emphasize with respect to the use of the state’s security forces is that, due to the inherently political nature of domestic insurgencies, they have the smallest part to play. Though force will certainly be required at times, the less it is used, the better. Violence tends to exacerbate the underlying causes of such conflicts, not resolve them.
The improper or excessive use of force is counterproductive because the key to defeating an insurgency is cutting it off and alienating it from the population it needs to hide and thrive. An effective COIN strategy will therefore be one that does not place an undue emphasis on military operations or heavy-handed police tactics. Regretfully, the Pakistani government has a history of relying on such tactics. It is believed to have disappeared over 5,000 people in Balochistan alone.
Pakistan’s leaders must understand that human rights abuses, disappearances, staged executions, and similar conduct are immoral and do infinitely more harm than good, which is not a coincidence. They only serve to agitate the population and strengthen the cause of those rebelling against the state. When security personnel act outside the law, they undermine the very institutions they are fighting to protect. Such conduct must never be tolerated and those guilty of abusing the citizenry must be held accountable.
When citizens are merely suspected of being involved in insurrection or have surrendered to security forces, the government must always use the legal system to punish them in a transparent and fair manner. Punishments, especially for capital offenses, must be based on concrete and tangible evidence, not suspicion or circumstance.
Similarly, military operations resulting in civilian casualties, widespread destruction, or the displacement of civilian populations, even if unintentional, will only swell the ranks of insurgents while creating sympathy and space for them to operate. When the state uses force against its own citizens it is imperative it does not abuse their legal or human rights and that it takes great care to avoid civilian casualties in those instances when violence is necessary.
The tendency of most military strategists, especially those with a background in conventional warfare, is to favor kinetic operations to achieve a military victory that is typically measured by counting bodies. Their obsession with tactical victories blinds them to the strategic defeat they inflict upon themselves whenever their bombs kill an innocent human being, or as some prefer to describe it, cause “collateral damage[3].”
Aside from being counterproductive if not properly employed, the use of force will not lead to victory for Pakistan because of geography. Due to the ability of groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and TTP to hide in Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan faces an operational environment like those America faced in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Despite its tactical dominance and superior firepower, it was unable to impose its political will in either of these wars, in part, because it faced insurgents who were able to find sanctuary in neighboring countries. This allowed them to re-group and re-supply in relative safety.
America’s experiences show no amount of firepower can defeat the laws of geography. The long duration of the conflict in Balochistan, which has seen insurgents hiding across international boundaries for decades, and the ability of the TTP to reconstitute itself in Afghanistan after being routed by the Pakistani military is further evidence geography makes a purely military victory impossible.
Although military and law enforcement operations will not, by themselves, lead to victory, they still have an important part to play. Many military strategists believe to win a war one must destroy the enemy’s will and capacity to fight but confuse and conflate the two. Israeli military officers, for example, mistakenly believe destroying the enemy’s will to fight means killing so many people and wreaking so much havoc the enemy is consumed with despair and loses the will to keep fighting. This is a gross misunderstanding of the term.
Neither oppression, murder nor mayhem destroy the enemy’s will to fight. In fact, when directed towards civilians, such actions are more likely to fuel the enemy’s determination. Destroying an enemy’s will to fight is best thought of as resolving the underlying political dispute driving the conflict. It refers to the political dynamics of war. Killing enemy troops, destroying their weapons or their ability to communicate and coordinate with each other, on the other hand, destroys the capacity to fight. This is the domain of violence.
In a conventional war between states, destroying the enemy’s capacity to fight will usually settle the matter, at least in the short term. Egypt’s former ruler Gamal Nasser, for example, may have had the will to fight after the Israeli military destroyed nearly his entire air force, but he no longer had the capacity. Thus ended the Six Day War. Saddam Hussein was equally willing to fight America to hold onto Kuwait, but his military did not have the capacity to do so effectively.
In an insurgency, destroying the will to fight matters most since these are primarily political affairs. Insurgents, by definition, are lightly armed and often blend into the general population to hide and plan attacks. Destroying their capacity to launch hit and run attacks is exceptionally difficult, particularly when they have bases outside the conflict zone or the benefit of rough and expansive terrain in which to hide. Pakistan’s insurgents enjoy both advantages.
Consequently, the primary role of Pakistan’s security forces will be preventing attacks and maintaining law and order. It is a mostly defensive posture; however, when the rare opportunity to go on the offensive presents itself, it must be seized, despite the difficulties.
These operations must be carried out with extreme precision to avoid any civilian casualties. This will entail relying primarily on intelligence and law enforcement personnel with extensive knowledge of the terrain and enemy paired with well-trained infantry and special operations troops to seek them out in their safe havens, disrupt their finances, and their ability to arm themselves. To do so effectively, Pakistan’s security forces will need to develop strong signals and human intelligence capabilities to locate and attack targets. Timely and accurate intelligence is one of the most important assets in a counter insurgency environment. Without it, wielding force with the precision needed to disrupt the enemy while avoiding civilian casualties becomes impossible.
Instead of following America’s example by relying on drones to attack remote targets, Pakistan will need to rely on mobile infantry as the use of long-range munitions like missiles, rockets, and artillery must be avoided at all costs if civilians are nearby. This also means the use of airpower must be limited to reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and rapidly deploying troops.
Due to the refusal of Afghanistan’s rulers to reign in the TTP, safe havens and supply depots across the border should be considered fair game but must be attacked with the same emphasis on protecting civilians and precision. Similar attacks on Iranian territory; however, would do more harm than good since they would damage Pakistan’s relationship with a nation it must court as an ally. The author has already discussed the best way to ensure Iran is not used as a base to attack Pakistan here.
The military and security prongs of Pakistan’s COIN strategy are best thought of as short-term solutions to be employed against those extremists who cannot be reasoned with while the more important job of implementing long term political and socio-economic policies meant to destroy their will to fight and deprive them of their support among the populace is carried out. They must be used sparingly but with ruthless efficiency and, when circumstances allow, in accordance with due process norms.
POLITICAL SOLUTIONS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
At their root, insurgencies involve people taking up arms against their own governments due to the perceived injustices committed by that government or its lack of legitimacy and competency. Insurgencies are almost always a reaction to bad or unresponsive governance. As such, the fact that two of Pakistan’s provinces are currently dealing with one is an indictment of its incompetent political institutions. Their inability to diffuse tensions before they turn violent or deliver vital public services has created a toxic environment that has allowed chaos to thrive[4].
Though there are many similarities between them, the underlying political dynamics driving the conflicts in Balochistan and KP differ in important ways. Balochistan has been an integral part of Pakistan since the beginning; however, it has always suffered from neglect, abuse, and discrimination. As Nazir Ahmad and Muneeb Yousuf explained for Al Jazeera earlier this year, Pakistan’s leaders have spent years abusing its people and then demonizing or dismissing them when they demand accountability. The rebellion consuming it is best viewed as primarily a reaction to this abuse and neglect.
The rebellion being waged by the TTP has different origins since the tribal areas that are the epicenter of its revolt have historically governed themselves and were only recently integrated into Pakistan. The TTP’s fighters are waging war to maintain the independence their tribes have enjoyed for centuries but have also stated their desire to ensure all of Pakistan is governed according to their strict interpretation of Islamic law. As such, the situation in KP is more intractable due to the fundamentally irreconcilable differences driving the Pakistani state’s confrontation with the TTP.
Whereas ending the conflict in Balochistan requires improving and reforming the political institutions that govern it, ending the rebellion in the former tribal areas requires building many of them from the ground up while fully integrating these territories with the rest of Pakistan. Despite their differences, each conflict boils down to issues of governance that would greatly benefit from finally providing the sort of good governance and public services all governments are supposed to provide their people. Taking this simple step would destroy the will of most of Balochistan’s insurgents to fight by resolving the underlying political and socio-economic issues driving them to violence. Destroying the will of the TTP’s extremists to fight may be impossible due to their illogical demands but depriving them of support among the general population by building a competent government that provides the vital public services people need to thrive in the modern age would still deal it a fatal blow.
Pakistan’s leaders must focus on three broad categories of political policies and public services. The first relates to ensuring political institutions are inclusive and responsive to the needs of the people. Much of Pakistan’s legal and bureaucratic system was inherited from the British and designed to assert their control over its people. Its current rulers have maintained many of these repressive legal mechanisms to assert their own power. These antiquated laws must be abolished and replaced with those written and enforced by the people they are meant to govern.
In fact, Pakistan’s entire system must be re-designed from top to bottom to empower its provincial and national legislative bodies. As Machiavelli noted centuries ago, these institutions are the key to a well-run state. They must be designed to represent a wide range of political opinions and interest groups and given primary control of the state’s finances as well as meaningful oversight over its various agencies and departments. The ability to use money to influence their deliberations and policies must be strictly prohibited. Half of their seats must be reserved for women and minority groups must be guaranteed seats according to their proportion of the population. Finally, elections to choose their members must be free, fair, held regularly, and offer people legitimate choices about who should rule them while imposing term limits on the number of times they can hold office. These checks are necessary to ensure legislatures remain beholden to the people instead of the monied interests that have a habit of taking control of them.
Citizens and the civic organizations and associations they create must be free to meet, organize, express themselves, and lobby for their preferred policies without interference. All Pakistani citizens must be able to participate freely in the political systems that govern them and express non-violent opinions without restriction. Empowering people to order their own lives and express themselves are vital parts of creating a political environment conducive to the peaceful expression of ideas which is a critical step in making sure grievances against the state do not lead to violence. The more the government chokes off political speech or represses organizations like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, the more space it creates for violence.
The second set of policies relates to maintaining law and order by protecting citizens from each other, fairly settling disputes between them and preventing government excess, abuse, and corruption. This requires creating honest and effective judicial, law enforcement, and regulatory agencies that can maintain the rule of law and extend the writ of the government to all corners of the country.
Without the rule of law, the prosperity and well-being of the entire society declines. Criminality and chaos reign, commerce retracts, and businesses stop investing. This allows insurgencies to thrive in a variety of ways.
Many of the insurgent groups fighting Pakistan have already tapped into its black market and lawless environment to arm themselves and generate revenue from drugs, smuggling, kidnapping, and protection rackets. The TTP even has shadow governments in at least seven districts to settle disputes and impose governance on the locals. Like a virus, they will only grow and spread until Pakistan’s government builds competent law enforcement and judicial agencies capable of stopping them.
The third set of policies relate to providing for socio-economic development. In the age of the administrative state, governments play a pivotal and multi-faceted role in this arena. Deciding how to invest public funds to spur socio-economic growth touches on the age-old question of whether it is better to teach someone to fish or just give them the fish. A lot of politicians prefer to give the fish away in the form of subsidies, tax breaks, plum contracts, and welfare since these handouts sustain their power. The wiser course is to use public funds to teach people how to fish.
One of the most important ways to do that is by finally building a modern education system that gives Pakistanis the critical thinking, technical, and problem-solving skills required to thrive in the digital age. Pakistan currently spends less than 2% of its GDP on education and its schools are notorious for emphasizing rote memorization over independent or creative thinking. An estimated 26 million Pakistani children are out of school and many of them live in Balochistan and KP.
The need to build vibrant schools transcends these conflicts but it cannot be overstated how much neglecting to do so has contributed to them. The refusal of Pakistan’s elite to invest in public education due to their ability to pay for private schools is yet one more example of their incredibly short-sighted and self-destructive thinking.
Aside from teaching people to fish, governments must create an environment that allows business and commerce to thrive so they can put their fishing skills to good use. This requires a variety of policies too numerous to adequately address here. At a minimum, governments must build economic infrastructure like fiber optic lines, highways, and power plants while providing the essential but often overlooked services like running water, sanitation, internet access, and electricity that make modern life possible. They must also implement fiscal and banking policies that encourage domestic savings so they can be re-invested towards productive ends in the form of loans and reduce regulations that stifle trade or create barriers to entry for new businesses while investing in modern healthcare infrastructure, renewable energy, and boosting exports.
These are all basic, common-sense steps that should be obvious to everyone. Since Pakistan’s leaders have adamantly refused to implement them for decades, it seemed necessary to explain them.
Pakistan’s elite have not been receptive to these ideas due to a variety of historical and institutional factors that we do not have the space to adequately address either. However, it should be noted that land reforms, which are long overdue in Pakistan, would address one of these institutional barriers while improving the socio-economic situations in both provinces, which would also reduce violence.
Despite the desperate need for land reforms designed to distribute smaller parcels to many of the country’s rural poor, no one has devised a mechanism to achieve this goal that is not mired in corruption or subject to abuse. The most logical way to break up large, unproductive land holdings is by using the tax code[5] and market mechanisms to incentivize their owners to sell parcels they are not using to generate revenue by taxing them at a significantly higher rate than productive land. Note the most important variable here is not the size of the tract but whether it is being used productively since those who put large tracts of land to productive use should be rewarded, not penalized. Over the long run, using tax and market-based incentives to break up Pakistan’s many large parcels of unproductive land would slowly ameliorate the negative impact of having so much of its land owned by so few of its people.
To accelerate the process, the 1 million acres of land recently sought by the Army from the Punjab government for “corporate farming” purposes should be re-distributed to the young men and women looking for work throughout the country. To the extent there is unused land in Balochistan and KP, it should be distributed in a similar fashion. Priority should be given to those displaced by climate disasters or conflict and parcels should not exceed 5-10 acres.
To assist these people in putting this land to productive uses, the government must provide them with the training and resources needed to utilize the latest agricultural techniques by funding universities and nurturing local industry that can supply the necessary goods and expertise. Developing these capabilities will require training the scientists and engineers needed to develop new crops, seeds, and technology to improve yields and productivity. It will also require factories that can produce tractors, drip irrigation systems, solar panels, vertical grow equipment, greenhouses, and even microchips to power the sensors, drones, and software used to monitor crops and inputs.
Land reforms combined with modernizing Pakistan’s inefficient agricultural sector and making it self-sufficient would help stabilize both provinces. Aside from stimulating the industrial activity associated with building the goods described above, it would increase the availability of products for export and the raw materials needed to supply other local industries. Most importantly, as Marie Antoinette and the French aristocracy once learned the hard way, providing people with abundant and cheap food plays a part in staving off insurgencies and revolutions too. The need to develop these capabilities is even more pressing due to the looming threat of climate change which has already hurt crop production throughout the country and will only fuel further unrest.
A healthy, self-sufficient agricultural base is the foundation upon which a strong economy and state is built. And building a strong state is the most fundamental element to quelling domestic insurgencies. There will always be extremists who prefer violence over reason. America is full of well-armed extremist groups and militias. But none of them have turned their weapons on their government because the American state is too powerful to challenge. Pakistan must strive to build a state equally capable of dissuading its own extremists from violence. Combined, the policies suggested above would allow its leaders to do exactly that.
IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR OF IDEAS
Another important, but often underrated, aspect to defeating insurgents is defeating the ideology that motivates them and their supporters. Pakistan’s leaders have taken a step in the right direction by labeling the TTP as “kharijites,” however, the term “munafiqun” would be more accurate. Given their determination to divide and weaken a country with the potential to be the Muslim world’s most powerful state, they are clearly unbelievers masquerading as Muslims or working at the behest of foreign powers against the interests of the Muslim community. In either case, they are hypocrites under both Quranic and contemporary definitions and should be labelled as such.
Aside from accurately describing their enemies, they must do more to articulate why the demands of those rebelling against the state are unjust and irrational. The best way to do that is by explaining why they make no sense.
Though the conflict in Balochistan has primarily been driven by the abuse and neglect its people have suffered over the years, there is also a nationalist element to their cause. The Baloch constitute a unique cultural and linguistic group with their own definable territory. Based on these factors, some believe they deserve their own state.
These views are an extension of the nationalist ideologies that spread to the Muslim world from Europe and helped spur and shape many of the anti-colonial struggles that worked to end its rule of the region. As the Muslim world continues to consolidate and rebuild in the aftermath of these conquests, it is inevitable some of the new states created in the post-colonial period will collapse or be re-shaped based on these same ideas. This is a natural process that has been going on since the beginning of civilization. It can currently be seen at work in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, none of which are likely to retain their current boundaries for much longer.
Whether Pakistan suffers a similar fate partially depends on whether the Baloch cause-belli is reasonable or realistic. Thankfully, it is neither. Though the Baloch certainly constitute a unique ethnic group, there are simply too few of them to assert control over their vast province since they are bordered by substantially greater numbers of Persians, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Punjabis. The laws of demographics and the way in which larger and denser populations naturally expand into and assert control over sparsely populated adjacent territories suggests the Baloch are destined to remain minorities within a larger political experiment. Whether this experiment is centered in Persia, Afghanistan, or the Punjab is the only real question. For a variety of practical and political reasons, such as their proximity and established connections, the Baloch are better off linked to the latter than either of the former options. For all its faults, the Pakistani government is far more accommodating than either the Taliban or the Ayatollahs who rule Iran.
On a more philosophical level, it should be noted that nationalist ideologies and sentiments have no place in the Muslim world. They may have been necessary to help organize resistance to European control but have played a mostly toxic role in dividing Muslim societies into ever smaller tribes that no longer recognize each other as family. The consequences of these divisions have been made painfully obvious in Gaza, Kashmir, Yemen, Chechnya, Bosnia, and many other places. While one can certainly empathize with the Baloch and must concede their perspective is not without some merit, overall, the notion that Pakistan must be divided to support their nationalist aspirations is not reasonable or just.
Despite its many flaws, Pakistan is a noble cause worth fighting for. The growing right-wing belligerence and saffron themed fanaticism in India proves exactly why the Muslims of South Asia need their own homeland and why Pakistan must remain a unified and strong nation to protect them. The Pan-Islamic ideas that sparked its creation are still worthwhile, but they must be revitalized in a way that reflects the realities of today’s world.
Doing that will require building political systems that devolve power down to local communities to prevent abuse by distant elites or feelings of marginalization. Only a liberal, democratic system that respects the differences between Pakistan’s incredibly diverse people and allows them to govern themselves can keep the country together.
Conversely, the authoritarian and draconian ideas articulated by the TTP will keep Pakistan at war with itself forever. Compared to the Baloch, the arguments put forth to justify the TTP’s violence are completely unhinged. The TTP take their inspiration from their brothers in arms in Afghanistan, who spent a combined thirty years fighting off Russian and American occupiers. They seek to emulate their example by destroying the Pakistani state and creating an emirate modeled after the one created in Afghanistan. In other words, they want to turn Pakistan into Afghanistan, a mediaeval society, bereft of wisdom, scientific knowledge, industry, or modern armaments that has proven incapable of deterring invaders.
Nothing in Afghanistan’s modern history should be viewed as a victory for Muslims or something to imitate. Afghanistan has been repeatedly invaded by a succession of Great Powers because it is incredibly weak and unstable. As a result, it has been unable to build a central government that can bring its diverse people together or field a modern military to defend them. Millions of innocent Afghan lives were torn apart and destroyed because their rulers were too weak to protect them.
Afghans may have been able to fight off their occupiers, but the fact they were forced to resort to guerrilla tactics to win their freedom is a testament to their enduring weakness, not their strength. They are not an ideal to aspire to but a cautionary tale that should inspire others to avoid making similar mistakes by studying why Afghanistan has been so weak and easily conquered for so long.
Part of the answer lies in the extreme and illogical views espoused by the TTP and their Afghan compatriots. Both believe in a harsh and vicious interpretation of Islam that not only contradicts many of the precedents set during the early Islamic period they claim to idealize but makes no sense in the modern era. Like many authoritarian political movements in the Muslim world, the TTP believe the government’s job is to “command the good” and “forbid the bad.”
Giving the government the power to police religious behavior is the most poisonous and inappropriate use of political power imaginable. It inevitably leads to dictatorship and abuse while corrupting a nation’s political and religious institutions. The only way to prevent this corruption is by keeping politics and religion separate. The government’s role is not to enforce religious practices or conformity but to protect the nation from invasion, maintain law and order, and nurture socio-economic development.
The TTP’s refusal to countenance change, accommodate those with differing religious views or empower women epitomizes the sort of incredibly self-destructive and reactionary ideas that allowed Europe to conquer and colonize the Muslim world in the first place. To embrace their worldview is to embrace suicide by inviting more conquest and destruction. It is the very definition of insanity.
If Muslims ever want to put an end to the massacres and violence that have consumed so many of their communities, they must shun the insane arguments articulated by groups like the TTP and Afghan Taliban. They must also change the authoritarian legal environment and culture that allows them to flourish. Pakistan’s sporadic lynchings by angry mobs, blasphemy laws, and the blatant and violent discrimination Ahmadis face are all tied to the same destructive mentality that allows groups like the TTP to take root. Until Ahmadis are free to worship as they please and people are free to speak their minds without fear of mob violence or legal proceedings, Pakistan will remain a land where evil men try to impose their will on others.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, implementing these ideas requires the sort of consensus Pakistan’s rulers are currently incapable of reaching. The country’s most popular leader sits in jail alongside the former director of its premier intelligence agency. Pakistan’s elite is too fractured and focused on doing business as usual to face the nation’s many challenges.
The farcical “election” that brought the current government to power shows the military and its allies have learned nothing from their past mistakes. None of the changes or policies recommended herein will work so long as Pakistan’s military remains its most powerful political and economic actor. As we have explained, defeating insurgencies requires an emphasis on political, not military solutions. Which means Pakistan’s military rulers are ill-equipped to resolve these issues. Nevertheless, they refuse to give way to the civilians best suited to the job or contemplate meaningful reforms. Instead, they appear determined to maintain their power and privileges until the entire country collapses around them or they are swept away in the tumult of revolution.
[1] Also, it should be noted that even “terrorists” deserve due process.
[2] Although the Palestinians are well within their rights to rebel against Israel’s apartheid policies and occupation, as the author has argued many times before, their best course of action is still non-violent resistance.
[3] Another euphemism popular in the West that highlights its moral depravity and ability to de-humanize the victims of its many wars of imperial conquest.
[4] Spill over from the Russian and American occupations of Afghanistan have also contributed to the current situation; however, the choice to arm the most extreme elements within the Mujahideen and support their offspring in the Taliban was made by the government of Pakistan and its short-sighted political elites. As such, Pakistan’s government is guilty of laying the foundations for these insurgencies and exacerbating the issues driving them because of its incompetence.
[5] This will, of course, require building tax agencies capable of enforcing the tax code and collecting funds without siphoning them.
It would make your essays more accurate if you use the word “Sunni” before the words “Muslim” or “Islam”.
In this manner, you would not be extending your observations to the Shia Islam, which is a different religion and culture.