When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, he left no instructions for his followers about choosing his successor or how they should govern themselves[1]. As a result, his death started a debate about who should rule them, how they should choose their rulers, and what sort of powers to confer upon them that continues even today.

I have argued on many occasions that contemporary Muslims must create democratic forms of government on the basis that they are the most effective at allowing societies to govern themselves, prosper, and protect themselves from invasion. Though there is certainly a moral component to these arguments, they are somewhat Machiavellian too since they are focused on results and increasing the power of Muslim societies. I shall now endeavor to show that democracy is also consistent with Islamic values based on an examination of the historical record and a bit of common sense, or as some have called it, reason.

Many within the Muslim world have already made these points; however, the degree to which Muslim rulers continue to disregard them means we must continue to re-hash them in the vain hopes they will eventually listen.

Who should rule:

After his passing, the Prophet was succeeded by the elderly Abu Bakr who was then followed by the renowned Umar. As Numani explains, there are competing narratives surrounding the events that led to their successions[2]. Ansary[3], Kennedy[4], and Numani[5] all relate that Umar chose Abu Bakr by swearing loyalty to him to diffuse brewing tensions between the Quraysh and the Ansar of Medina though the particulars of their descriptions vary somewhat. According to Hourani, Abu Bakr was “chosen” while “at a meeting of close associates and leaders[6].” Lapidus states that “an all-night debate” led to Abu Bakr being “elected” Caliph and that since he was “selected by a minority with no special competence, Abu Bakr had his nomination ratified the following day by the community as a whole[7].” Given the turmoil surrounding the Prophet’s death and the growing fears that the young Muslim community might fracture, his selection seems to have been a relatively speedy affair designed to prevent conflict among his followers.

With respect to Umar, Kennedy simply states that Abu Bakr “nominated[8]” him. Numani adds that he “consulted with senior figures before making his choice known” and that he “asked the assembly if they accepted his nomination[9].” While Ansary says that Abu Bakr “called in a few of the community’s top notables and told them he wanted to nominate Umar as his successor[10].” This caused a debate among the community since many doubted Umar’s temperament was suited to the office of caliph; however, “Ali stepped forward to endorse Omar, and his word tipped the scales[11].”

After Umar was fatally wounded, the community’s notables asked about nominating his son, but he emphatically rejected this idea. Instead, he appointed a consultative council of six men to choose his successor to “seek the consensus of the Umma on their choice[12],” which came down to Ali or Uthman. “The chairman of the shura interviewed both men in front of an assembly of the people[13],” and, based on their differing answers, they chose Uthman.

Uthman’s murder then led to the selection of Ali and civil war.  Hourani states that Ali’s foes “disputed the validity of his election,[14]” but does not provide any details about it.

Ibn Khaldun’s description of Ali’s conflict with Mu’awiya is worth discussing in detail. In a section entitled, “the transformation of the caliphate into royal authority[15],” he explains how this conflict led to the end of the caliphate.

When discussing Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali, he says “these caliphs renounced royal authority and kept apart from its ways. They were strengthened in this attitude by the low standard of living in Islam and the desert outlook of the Arabs. The world and its luxuries were more alien to them than to any other nation, on account of their religion, which inspired asceticism where the good things of life were concerned[16].” 

According to Khaldun, these men established the caliphate because they were guided by a devotion to Islam. Instead of embracing luxury and the trappings of power, they spurned the wealth that their new conquests could have brought them, maintaining humble leadership styles.

But “soon, the desert attitude of the Arabs and their low standard of living approached its end. The nature of royal authority – which is the necessary consequence of group feeling as we have stated – showed itself[17].” This led Mu’awiya to challenge Ali because the “group feeling[18]” he developed as head of the Umayyad clan and governor of Syria gave him the power and incentive to do so.

Though his discussion is uncharacteristically convoluted, Khaldun explains how Mu’awiya’s seizure of power led to the establishment of a political system he calls “royal authority” based on hereditary succession. He adds that “the restraining influence that had been Islam now came to be group feeling and the sword[19],” meaning the form of government established by the first four caliphs based on consensus and dialogue had been replaced by one based on force. According to Khaldun these events show “how the caliphate was transformed into royal authority[20],” meaning a monarchy. The clear turning point that brought about the end of the caliphate is therefore the point at which Mu’awiya seizes power and passes it to his son.

The very basis for Khaldun’s generational decay model is rooted in the unstable and violent nature of hereditary dictatorships and the “group feeling” used to establish them, which became the norm after Mu’awiya’s actions. But Khaldun insists that those who question Mu’awiya are “heretics[21]” and that his conflict with Ali was merely the result of each man using “their independent judgment as to where the truth lay[22].”

He is curiously kind to Mu’awiya throughout his work, even though he is explaining how Mu’awiya ended the caliphate. He often criticizes and defends him in the same breath, stating that “even though Ali was in the right, Mu’awiyah’s intentions were not evil. He wanted the truth but missed it[23].” Even when he says, “the first to use a throne in Islam was Mu’awiya,”[24] he immediately adds that he sought permission from the people first.

Though not directly relevant to the topics at hand, this is important to highlight for a few reasons. One, even the best among us gets it wrong sometimes. As will be seen later, this is not the only example of faulty analysis by Khaldun. In this instance, the most likely explanation is political and doctrinal. Speaking truth to power is hard. By the time he wrote his book he had already spent nearly two years locked in a dungeon for unrelated reasons and he knew that insulting Mu’awiya would lead to charges of heresy and execution. To question Mu’awiya would be to question all the Muslim monarchs that came after him, including those who ruled over Khaldun. All while adopting a position sympathetic to the Shia.

As Khaldun himself explains, facts must be digested with a critical mind and evaluated in the proper context to provide useful insight[25].  Here, we must consider that the intellectual and political environment of his time and place was not one that allowed for a completely frank discussion as part of our understanding of the material.

This is, unfortunately, not an isolated incident. Similar instances of mental acrobatics have been performed by scholars and Ulama throughout the Muslim world, all to support the dictators who followed Mu’awiya’s example. Ulama in Iran during the Qajar era went so far as to declare “only dynastic rule was permitted by Islam[26]” despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Ulama in Saudi Arabia have made similar performances in service of the Sauds. The same sort of acrobatics can be seen at work among those who argue that leadership belongs to those with the strength to seize it[27]. These are all examples of how the usurpation of power by the Muslim world’s dictators have led scholars to adopt incongruous positions, prevented reasoned debate and created the toxic intellectual climate that made the Muslim world so susceptible to conquest. 

Khaldun continues his mental gymnastics when he rationalizes Mu’awiya’s nomination of his son to succeed him even though none of his predecessors did and Umar adamantly refused to do so. “Had Mu’awiyah appointed anyone else his successor, the Umayyads would have been against him. Moreover, they had a good opinion of Yazid. Mu’awiya would not have been the man to appoint Yazid his successor, had he believed him to be really so wicked. Such an assumption must be absolutely excluded in Mu’awiyah’s case[28].”

Despite his odd attempts to deflect, Khaldun’s narrative shows that when Mu’awiya violently seized power and passed it to his son, he began the process that ended the caliphate and led to the prevalence of monarchial dictatorships.  The record indicates he convened a Shura council to discuss his succession, following Umar’s example. But Ansary[29] and Lewis[30] both relay that the meeting of the council was also attended by a man brandishing a sword to ensure there was no dissension, indicating there was no element of choice or open dialogue. Kennedy adds that Mu’awiya “seems to have known that the adoption of hereditary succession to decide the caliphate would be controversial” and that he was “careful not to claim a hereditary right for his son to succeed but simply to assert that he was the best candidate[31].”

But as Hourani explains, Mu’awiya’s reign marked “the end of one phase and the beginning of another” and highlights that the position of caliph became “virtually hereditary. Although some idea of choice, or at least formal recognition, by the leaders of the community remained, in fact from this time power was in the hands of a family[32].” Mu’awiya actions converted the Caliphate into a traditional monarchy and led the Muslim world down its current path. Having inherited or seized power, instead of being chosen by their communities, those who called themselves caliph afterwards were but poor imitations.

Many Muslims believe that the precedents set by the first four caliphs represent the ideal to which today’s Muslims should aspire[33], and that contemporary governments should be modeled after their example. The reign of the first four caliphs is known as the Rashidun, or “rightly guided” era.” Groups such as ISIS have even waged war to try and re-establish their own version of the caliphate, while the Taliban also claim to model their government after it. But most of them do not understand the defining characteristics of the government they idealize or the lessons they should learn from its example.

Though the exact circumstances surrounding the appointment of the Rashidun are unclear, certain facts are not in dispute. Not one of them tried to pass power onto their son. Each left the choice to the community or engaged it in the process when circumstances allowed. Not one of them used violence or the threat of violence to secure their reigns. Instead, they built a consensus through dialogue.

Though it was the source of much consternation and Islam’s great schism, Ali, as the Prophet’s closest male heir was not passed over just once, but thrice. Even poor Uthman was selected before him. This is not meant to cast aspersions on Ali, who by all accounts appears to have been a lion among men, wrongly denied his dues based on his merits and talent alone. But the fact is, that despite his talents and position as the logical candidate to replace the Prophet by virtue of being one of his most trusted and capable followers, he was not chosen to do so three times.

This makes sense when weighed against one of the Prophet’s most fundamental teachings. The historical record unequivocally shows that he never claimed to possess divine powers[34]. He insisted he was God’s messenger, nothing more. He even insisted that no one should depict his person in artistic form because he was afraid people would worship his image. Arguments that confer leadership on the Prophet’s family are illogical because they implicitly confer a divine status on his descendants when the Prophet himself explicitly and vehemently insisted he had none.

People have the right to believe whatever they want, and nothing written here should be seen as an attack on the personal beliefs of others. But objective analysis requires a logical interpretation of the facts. The facts show that Ali was passed over by the Prophet’s closest companions on multiple occasions. The partisans of Ali may argue these Companions were false and strayed from the true path immediately upon his death. But it seems unlikely those who were so devoted to him would knowingly take a course of action they felt would dishonor his memory or the values he taught them. Their humble lifestyles support this argument, indicating the more likely explanation is they believed their actions were consistent with his teachings.

Their precedents show that power should not automatically pass to a male heir but to one chosen by the community to lead based on merit and talent. Which means monarchies are the furthest from the Islamic ideal, or as Lewis puts it, that Islam is “strongly opposed to hereditary privileges of all kinds, even including, in principle, the institution of monarchy[35].” Khaldun’s analysis on the subject, though tortured, reinforces this argument because it shows that the establishment of a hereditary monarchy led to the end of the caliphate.

If hereditary succession, even within the Prophet’s family, contradicts the example of the Rashidun, then by analogy arguments that political leadership must stay within the Quraysh tribe are also misguided, though not in the cynical self-serving way of those monarchs claiming to represent Islamic values with a straight face. If the Prophet’s family cannot claim a divine right to rule by virtue of their relationship to his legacy, then those related through the even more tenuous bonds of tribal affiliation cannot claim a similar right either.

Instead of arguing that leadership belongs to the Quraysh tribe, the example of the Rashidun is best understood as supporting the principal that political leadership should come from the merchant class, not the military or religious elite. The Prophet, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were all merchants, and the Quraysh was known as a merchant tribe. The political and social dynamics of the time made these men the most logical choices to rule and their membership in the influential Quraysh tribe was certainly a factor in their selection, but those examining these events have always misunderstood the relevance of their tribal affiliation.

As always, sound logic is reinforced by facts. This argument is supported by the reality of the Muslim world today. There are over 1.9 billion Muslims living in over fifty independent nations. The idea that leadership over the vast lands and diverse people that comprise these nations must be descended from a particular tribe is ludicrous on its face. The only broad principal that can be gleaned from the choice of the Quraysh is that government is best left in the hands of merchants. A statement that is also supported by Europe’s rise and Islam’s fall these past five centuries since Europe’s ascent coincided with the increased political prominence of its merchants while Islam’s long decline saw Muslim merchants marginalized by their soldiers.

How to choose rulers and how they should govern:

Having established that leadership should pass to someone chosen by the community based on that individual’s talent and reputation, not their familial relationship with the prior ruler or tribe, we must discuss the methods for selecting the ruler.

Despite the ambiguities surrounding their selection, certain trends are evident. Every scholar that discusses the process uses words like consensus, election, consultation, and so on. Khaldun states the caliphate was one based on “general consensus[36]” that should be “left to the discretion of all competent Muslims[37].” Lewis adds that the caliphate’s “authority derived from the freely given and revocable consent of the Muslims[38].” The exact circumstances changed with each caliph and the facts surrounding his death, but each was peacefully chosen after dialogue between competing factions. And the losers, like Ali or the Ansar, abided by the decisions of their peers.

In addition to being chosen from among the community, Lewis explains, “the early caliphs had little force at their disposal – no praetorian guard nor indeed regular forces[39].” As a result, they “ruled less by armed force than by personal prestige and authority[40].” Ansary described their reigns as featuring “democratic participation in decision making[41]” and highlights that Umar made decisions after consulting the community “of several hundred men and women[42].”

The caliphate may not have been a democratic system compared to modern standards, but it was a far cry from the dictatorships that dominate the Muslim world today. Caliphs were chosen after getting input from the community in Medina and they ruled by engaging with this same community to get its opinion regarding policy debates. 

The only real question is how to apply these principles to modern-day realities considering the vast cultural, technological, and demographic changes that have taken place over the past fourteen centuries. The Muslim world is no longer comprised of a small elite ruling over masses of non-Muslims in distant lands. Instead, it has been separated into independent Muslim nations like Turkey and Iran populated by millions. Pakistan has over 220 million people, 97% of whom are Muslim but separated through myriad linguistic, ethnic, regional, and doctrinal differences. Engaging in dialogue or achieving consensus is a lot harder today than it was in the much smaller community of Medina.

Groups like ISIS and the Taliban believe the answer is simple: nothing changes. Not only do they believe nothing changes, but they have violently tried to stop their societies from making some necessary changes. Many even blame the changes various Muslim societies tried to make for Europe’s conquest of the Muslim world. A laughable and completely insane argument that highlights the irrational nature of their ideas. It was the Muslim world’s refusal to change that led to its conquest. And its continuing refusal to do so makes it incredibly weak today.

Despite the incoherence of these literalists, it should be obvious that it is the broad values and ideals of this era that must guide Muslims, not the minutiae of how they were implemented. The blatant hypocrisy exhibited by these groups in their attempts to recreate the past proves the point. A cursory examination of those broad values indicates both rulers and policies must be chosen after reaching a consensus with the community, including its women. The seeds for democracy were sown at this time and then cynically left to rot or ignored after Mu’awiya’s power grab. The only practical way to reach that consensus today given the much larger populations and advances in communications technology is to create democratic systems that give citizens a say in these matters and the ability to voice their opinions freely.

At the least, democracy is far closer to the precedents established by the Rashidun than those offered by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, or Afghanistan. The Taliban may claim to follow the Rashidun but its use of a shura council to govern is almost as genuine as Mu’awiya’s use of one to confirm his son into power. Instead of a sword, theirs derives its power from the AK-47 which is inexplicably not treated as a forbidden innovation while democracy is. One of many inconsistencies resulting from their illogical interpretations of Islamic law that contradicts simple notions of common sense.

The examples of the Rashidun, when weighed against modern realities suggests that today’s Muslims can only claim to be following their example if they can vote for their leaders in free elections and provide them feedback on policy through free and open debates of the sort commonly provided by legislative bodies and a free press today. The alternative of force and repression offered by Mu’awiya and so eagerly taken up by all who followed him is clearly un-Islamic.

Scope and proper function of government:

Having discussed who can attain power and how to choose this person, we must address the purpose of government since doing so is necessary before deciding how much power to confer upon it.

The opening of this discussion indicated that democratic forms of government are ideal on the basis that they are the most effective at allowing societies to govern themselves, prosper, and protect themselves from invasion. This description also succinctly captures the purpose of government.

In the Muslim world, many have argued that governments must also compel adherence with Islamic religious law like forcing women to wear the hijab. This role no longer makes sense. To show why, we will once again rely on Ibn Khaldun while contradicting some of his thoughts. 

Khaldun believed that “to exercise the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this world[43],” meaning the caliphate should enforce religious orthodoxy and practice.

He also believed that “to exercise political royal authority means to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the means of furthering their worldly interests.[44]” To Khaldun, the government’s primary job is to act as a “restraining influence[45]” to prevent people from attacking or cheating each other. But he also spends a great deal of time talking about good governance, the need for secure property rights[46], and why rulers should not engage in trade (it’s bad for long term growth and tax revenue)[47]. Overall, Khaldun’s philosophy of Islamic governance is based on the idea that governments should help their people to prosper by encouraging business and trade and governing justly.

To that end, Khaldun believed “it is necessary to have reference to ordained political norms, which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits” and that if “norms are ordained by the intelligent and leading personalities and minds of the dynasty, the result will be a political (institution) with an intellectual (rational) basis[48].” Khaldun’s ideas regarding rational government that promotes healthy commerce and protects property rights have been ignored in the Muslim world for far too long. But Muslim rulers have had 600 hundred years to absorb his advice and failed to do so, so we will not spend too much time on the subject.

It is the part about enforcing religious orthodoxy that is problematic for a variety of reasons and worth more discussion. The easiest way to end this debate would be to point out that Khaldun’s statement is limited to the caliphate, which he has already explained no longer exists. But that would not be very satisfying, particularly since contemporary Muslim governments continue to enact policy under the mis-guided belief that their role is to “command the good” while “forbidding the bad[49].” A sentiment shared by Khaldun when he says one of the purposes of the caliphate is to make people “do the things that are good for them and forbid them to do those that are harmful[50].”

There are two arguments that show why this approach is so illogical. The first requires a bit of context. The legal basis for allowing Muslim governments to control the personal lives and religious expressions of their citizens finds its genesis in the Ridda Wars that Abu Bakr and Umar fought in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death.

After the Prophet died, the young Muslim community began to fracture. Tribes that had sworn fealty now rebelled. Some tribal leaders even insisted that they were now the messengers of God. Things were unravelling. Abu Bakr and Umar responded by attacking and destroying these rebels in the Ridda Wars. They justified this violence by arguing that once someone accepts Islam, they are not allowed to lapse. Changing your mind was now punishable by death.[51]

Based on modern notions of free will, the idea of forcing someone to continue practicing a particular religious faith under penalty of death seems crazy. As it should. As such, the intent here is not to justify Abu Bakr’s actions but to provide some context that might make them easier to understand. The Islamic world, such as it was, in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death was still small and fragile. It had not yet become a global power spread across multiple continents, instead it was still a regional phenomenon specific to the Arabian Peninsula. Given its precarious position, Abu Bakr’s harsh actions and views make sense since they prevented the new community from coming apart in its infancy. Though the apostacy laws were articulated in religious terms, they were meant to deal with a specific political situation since much of the Arabian Peninsula was now in open rebellion.  

Considering the well-known maxim within Islam that there is no compulsion in religion, the only logical way to reconcile these contradictory ideas is to understand that the death penalty instituted for apostacy was an emergency measure meant to deal with a specific political crisis. Now that there are almost 2 billion Muslims in the world, the impetus for these laws is no longer applicable or relevant. Unfortunately, most of the Ulama disagree with this interpretation. Instead, they have used these measures as a basis to justify more violence against people expressing their personal religious convictions over the years.

This faulty logic is yet one more example of the toxic role the Ulama have played in supporting the region’s dictators and the extent to which the Muslim world’s intellectual climate has decayed due to the restrictions on free speech and debate common throughout it.

It is also another point on which Khaldun errs. Thankfully, he redeems himself when he says, “blind acceptance of tradition is a shortcoming[52].” Which brings us to our second argument. When traditions or decisions, particularly those from a long time ago, no longer match our values, they can and must be discarded. Common sense and logic dictate that traditions and past precedents should only guide us if they still make sense considering the values and sensibilities of the time. A position most of the justices on America’s Supreme Court disagree with but a sound one, nonetheless.

Given the additional data that has been added to the historical record since Khaldun shared his thoughts, it is now painfully obvious that governments should have absolutely no role in enforcing religious or personal expressions of any sort. Freedom to practice or not to practice one’s faith is an inherently personal choice in which government should play no part.

Instead of finding ways to walk back from an impossible position that contradicts the fundamental truth that religious beliefs must be adopted voluntarily, the Muslim world’s rulers and their enablers have spent centuries using the actions of Abu Bakr to rationalize more repression. Modern day Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iran all prove that allowing governments to control how people pray or express their religious beliefs only leads to dictatorship and repression. Governments are political entities, and by their very nature corrupt. As a result, giving governments the power to enforce religious laws is an invitation to both political and spiritual corruption. Logic therefore dictates that governments cannot be trusted with such powers.

The state’s job is not to enforce Islamic values or laws but to create an environment where those who choose to live according to them may do so in peace, as they see fit. So long as they respect the state’s monopoly on violence and do not interfere with those who choose to live differently, the religious views of all citizens must be respected. The government’s primary concern should be enacting policies that allow its citizens to work together to prosper and protect each other from invasion, not enforcing compliance with religious edicts. Aside from being illogical, the obsession of so many Muslim governments with enforcing religious laws has directly undermined their ability to competently execute their core functions, like protecting their nations from attack. 

The best way to create Islamic governments capable of fulfilling their most important duties is to create secular, democratic political systems comparable to America’s that are given limited powers to carry out their core governmental functions. “Secular” has become a bad word in the Muslim world because it is associated with authoritarians like the Turks or hypocrites like the French who have used secularism as a cudgel to prevent people from freely practicing their faith. But secularism like that practiced in America would give all Muslims the freedom to practice their faith freely while still preserving the core Islamic values established by the Rashidun.

Not coincidentally, creating secular democracies is also the only viable path to greater unity within the Muslim world. The only way to bring the incredibly diverse people of the Muslim world together is by creating political systems that respect their differences. Violently trying to ensure orthodoxy or conformity, on the other hand, will always keep Muslims divided.

Conclusion

The historical record shows the Rashidun era featured pluralistic and inclusive political institutions that passed power and enacted laws based on the consensus of the community. This history strongly supports the argument that creating democratic political institutions is consistent with Islamic values.

The question Muslims have struggled with is how to adapt these values to modern realities. Trying to replicate exactly how things were done centuries ago or refusing to discard what no longer makes sense in light of changed circumstances are absurd propositions. The only way to reconcile religious teachings that are centuries old with common sense is to adapt them to modern circumstances and ideas. Muslims can look to the era of the Rashidun for guidance and should certainly strive to create governments inspired by their democratic and egalitarian values but trying to re-create a system of government that existed for the blink of an eye nearly 1400 years ago is impossible and irrational.

Muslims have bathed themselves in conservative ideologies and stagnant thoughts for too long. As a political philosophy, conservatism makes no sense for one simple reason: it is opposed to one of the most basic natural laws. As humans learn through the simple process of aging, change is an intrinsic part of life. Philosophies that seek to deny this truth are incapable of forming coherent or moral ideologies because they are inherently illogical and, as a result, must usually resort to authoritarian methods to maintain power. Hence, the violent oppression instigated by men using religion and tradition as an excuse to stop their societies from evolving.

But this religious repression is based on the political absurdities created by the dictators who have taken over the region and the mental acrobatics they force their scholars to perform. Enforcing religious orthodoxy goes hand in hand with suppressing political speech. The two reinforce each other and help to buttress the region’s many dictators who have spent centuries obscuring the fact that the ideal Islamic government is, and always has been, a democratic one based on consent rather than force.

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[1] Kennedy, Hugh. Caliphate The History of an Idea. New York: Basic Book, 2016, at 2.

[2] Numani, Shibli. Umar. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004, at 20.

[3] Ansary, Tamim. Destiny Disrupted. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009, at 35-36.

[4] Kennedy at 4.

[5] Numani at 20.

[6] Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Warner Books, 1991, at 22.

[7] Lapidus, Ira. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, at 38.

[8] Kennedy at 16.

[9] Numani at 21.

[10] Ansary at 40.

[11] Id. at 41.

[12] Id. at 52.

[13] Id. at 52.

[14] Hourani at 25.

[15] Khaldun, Ibn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1967), at 160-66.

[16] Id. at 162.

[17] Id. at 163.

[18] Id. at 107-09.

[19] Id. at 166.

[20] Id. at 165.

[21] Id. at 164.

[22] Id. at 164.

[23] Id. at 164.

[24] Id. at 216.

[25] Id. at 5.

[26] Ansary at 278.

[27] Kennedy at 170 discussing Ghazali.

[28] Khaldun at 164.

[29] Ansary at 67.

[30] Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East: A Brief History of the last 2,000 years. New York: Scribner, 1995 at 65.

[31] Kennedy at 39.

[32] Hourani at 25-26.

[33] Lewis at 62.

[34] Ansary at 29, or Lewis at 54.

[35] Lewis at 212.

[36] Khaldun at 156.

[37] Id. at 157.

[38] Lewis at 72.

[39] Id. at 63.

[40] Id. at 63.

[41] Ansary at 47.

[42] Id. at 50.

[43] Khaldun at 155.

[44] Id. at 154-55.

[45] Id. at 47.

[46] Id. at 238-42.

[47] Id. at 232-34.

[48] Id. at 154.

[49] Lacey, Robert. Inside the Kingdom. New York: Viking Penguin, 2009, at 52.

[50] Khaldun at 159.

[51] Ansary at 39.

[52] Khaldun at 158.