In defense of nuclear fusion

I once asked a relative to review an article I wrote about how the Muslim world should react to America’s looming military withdrawal. It is available here, if you are interested. He compared my proposal for an alliance between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey to the quest to develop nuclear fusion as a way of wryly highlighting the lofty and implausible nature of my argument. At first, I interpreted this statement negatively because I thought it meant my ideas were unattainable. I have since realized the comparison was a compliment, even if it was not intended as one.

Nuclear fusion may be a daydream today, but it has the capacity to fundamentally change how we harness and use energy. Similarly, the development of a new Muslim political entity comprised of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey (P.A.I.T.) is also a daydream that, if realized, could fundamentally alter the political and economic dynamics of the entire world by finally stabilizing one of its least stable regions. One that happens to connect India, Africa, China, Russia, and Europe. Geography dictates that an unstable Muslim world has the capacity to sow chaos throughout all these regions whereas a stable one has the capacity to serve as a bridge between them. Trying to develop nuclear fusion may seem like an impractical and difficult goal but given the potential payoff, it is well worth the effort.

Obviously, a complex project like building an entirely new entity out of four countries that must overcome substantial ethnic, linguistic, and doctrinal differences while they reform their governments and economies before they can even begin construction will face many difficulties. But the inescapable truth is that the Muslim world has been suffering from an existential crisis for centuries. The only way to resolve the many issues facing it will be by taking bold steps that can finally allow it to genuinely modernize.

Unfortunately, most of the Muslim world’s rulers have refused to implement substantive reforms that could lead to meaningful change. As such, the best way to start the process is by taking incremental steps towards realizing them focused on increasing trade and tourism. That way, the elites of the Muslim world can see the benefits of having access to each other’s markets. Hopefully, that will create a reinforcing loop that leads to further integration and trade in the same way that a customs union for coal paved the way for European integration. The goal would be for such incremental progress to eventually lead to a fully developed and integrated alliance comparable to the EU and NATO.

Ultimately, the elites of the Muslim world must make the choice to reform their countries or face a constant cycle of conquest or rebellion. Given the frequency with which the Muslim world’s despotic governments keep failing, one would think its leaders might be receptive to ideas that can finally help stabilize their nations.

There was a time when the Muslim world was blessed with rulers who had the wisdom and strength to create some of the world’s most powerful empires. The days of empires have ended but the rulers of the Muslim world must still learn to think in grander terms and have loftier goals than merely enriching themselves or clinging to power. They must strive for nuclear fusion, not as some grandiose goal, but as a last desperate lifeline. One that offers them some glimmer of hope before the technological and economic gap between the Great Powers of the world and their nations become so wide it develops into a permanent condition. If Muslims ever want to see an end to the conflicts that have led to the death and displacement of countless millions over the past few centuries, they will need to fundamentally reform their societies as discussed here and hope they can develop nuclear fusion.

For those who are not convinced of the dangers, here is a short summary of some of the military calamities suffered by Muslims during the past few centuries:

1798: French forces conquer Egypt, an Ottoman province at the time. They are eventually forced to withdraw by the British since the Ottomans do not have the power to challenge Napoleon’s forces.

1830: France conquers and colonizes Algeria. It took the Algerian people around 130 years and countless ruined lives before they were able to re-gain their freedom. They are still suffering from the legacy of French colonial rule and exploitation.

1857: The Muslims and Hindus of the Subcontinent revolt against their British masters and are ruthlessly suppressed, allowing Britain to maintain control of the entire subcontinent for another 90 years. Despite being vastly outnumbered and relying on indigenous troops to form the bulk of their forces, the British crushed the rebellion. One of their favored tactics was strapping captured prisoners to cannons who were executed by having a cannonball shot through their chest at close range.

1890: To secure their conquest of Egypt, the British invade Sudan with an army of roughly 25,000, defeating a much larger force of 60,000 and maintaining control until the 1950s.

1922: In the aftermath of WWI, the British and French take control of several former Ottoman provinces within the Arab world. Dividing them as spoils of war which they controlled until the end of the colonial era.

1947: Jewish refugees defeat six different Arab armies, creating the state of Israel by conquering Palestine and dispossessing many of its people of their land.

1948: India essentially annexes Kashmir, making it the only Muslim majority state in the Union. Forces from Pakistan try to seize Kashmir too but are repelled. The majority of Kashmir remains under Indian control.

1956: Israel, France, and the U.K. seize the Suez Canal. The US forces them to withdraw so Egypt treats the episode as a victory even though its military forces were completely incapable of protecting their most vital economic asset. It was returned due to political pressure from the US, which only forced its allies to withdraw to prevent angering the Soviet Union. In other words, the Egyptian military was a non-factor.

1965: Pakistan starts its second war with India. It loses. Again.

1967: Israel starts a war with its Arab neighbors. It wins. Again. It also takes over the entire Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza strip, all of Jerusalem, and the Golan heights. Aside from the Sinai, it still controls (either directly or indirectly) all the territory it conquered during those six days.

1971: India attacks Pakistan. Pakistan loses. Again. Pakistan is dismembered, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. 90,000 of its troops are captured and held in POW camps. In a repeat of 1857, Muslims from the Northwest of the Subcontinent slaughter Muslims from the Bengal and rely on racist tropes to justify their barbaric behavior towards their fellow Muslims.

1973: Egypt and Syria launch a coordinated attack against Israel, scoring a few small wins in the early stages but ultimately succumbing to Israel’s counterattack which highlights the complete inability of the Arab forces to engage in maneuver warfare or adjust their tactics without the benefit of a pre-planned script.

1979: The Soviet Union invades and occupies Afghanistan. The US and Pakistan arm Afghanistan’s mujaheddin forces who use guerilla tactics to defeat the Soviet forces. They withdraw in 1989, marking one of the few victories for Muslim military forces. A victory that only took 10 years and 2 million dead Afghan civilians to achieve.

1980: Iraq invades Iran, starting one of the longest conventional wars in modern history. Though their militaries are incompetent in different ways and for different reasons, neither side has the military power to achieve a decisive victory. Roughly 500,000 casualties and 9 years later the war ends.

1982: Israel invades Lebanon, occupying the south of the country. Israeli forces are eventually forced to withdraw in 2000 after a guerilla campaign by South Lebanon’s Shi’ites. Another Muslim victory but one that took 18 years to achieve and claimed thousands of innocent lives. Even today, Israel still occasionally launches airstrikes and artillery bombardments against Lebanon which has yet to develop the military abilities to prevent these attacks.

1987: The first Intifada, or Palestinian uprising against Israel begins. Palestinian youth fight for their freedom by throwing stones at Israeli tanks. They do not achieve any military victories but pave the way for peace talks a few years later.

1989: Kashmir’s Muslims, tired after years of political oppression and mismanagement from New Delhi, revolt. India responds by stationing between 500,000-900,000 security personnel in the territory to brutally put the revolt down relying heavily on extra-judicial murder, torture, and systematic rape. They succeed. Although the insurgency continues today, Kashmiris have yet to develop military capabilities that can secure their freedom despite sacrificing roughly 100,000 sons and daughters to the cause.

1991: Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. The U.S. responds by destroying and routing the Iraqi army, sustaining very few casualties in the process. Iraq’s defeat is so complete that it irrevocably changes the military dynamics of the entire region by showing the incompetence and weakness of what had been considered one of the most powerful Muslim militaries. In the aftermath of its victory, the US begins permanently stationing its forces in the Middle East. It also enforces a no-fly zone and embargo against Iraq that leads to the death of roughly 576,000 Iraqi children. 

1994: The war in Bosnia. Muslims are slaughtered by both Croats and Serbs. Various Muslim nations, with the support of the U.S., arm and train Bosnia’s Muslims who eventually ally themselves with the Croats to fight the Serbs to a stalemate. Thousands of Muslim women and children are raped and murdered before this happens.

1998: Kargil. Pakistan attacks India. It loses. Again. Bringing its record against India to an impressive 0-4.

2000: The second Intifada. After peace talks fail, the Palestinians revolt again but use brutal tactics that intentionally target Israeli civilians. Their tactics backfire because they turn the Israeli public against any peace deal. Israel’s security forces respond by crushing the insurgency so thoroughly that they end any hope for an independent Palestinian state.

2001: 9/11. Radical Islamists launch a surprise attack against the United States, killing roughly 3,000 Americans. The U.S. responds by conquering Afghanistan, relying on special forces troops backed by airstrikes. Its actions set off a chain of events that leads to a civil war in Pakistan that claimed the lives of roughly 80,000 Pakistanis. After nearly 20 years and over 40,000 dead Afghan civilians the Taliban force the US to withdraw, handing the Muslims yet another hollow victory.

2003: As part of the War on Terror, the US also invades Iraq. Like the first Gulf War, Iraq’s military stands no chance. The US establishes control with lightning speed but gets bogged down in a guerilla war (largely of its own making). It is eventually able to defeat the insurgency and the government it created to replace Saddam (barely) survives today. An estimated 200,000 – 2.4 million Iraqis die.

2006: Israel responds to an incursion by Hezbollah by sending military forces into Southern Lebanon again and bombing much of its rebuilt infrastructure. The short conflict is mostly seen as a win for Hezbollah which manages to inflict relatively heavy casualties on the IDF; however, casualty figures for both sides show much heavier losses on the Lebanese side and highlight, once again, how vulnerable Lebanon is to Israel’s more powerful air forces.

2011: Syria erupts in civil war. Its government is only able to survive because of help from allies in Russia, Iran, and Lebanon but its territory devolves into anarchy. Millions are forced to flee Bashar Asad’s horrific violence, turning much of its population into refugees.

2017: Saudi Arabia and the UAE attack Yemen’s Houthis but must rely on logistical and intelligence support from the US even though the Houthis have no modern air defenses and limited access to heavy weapons. Despite this support and the huge disparity in resources between the belligerents, they prove incapable of defeating the Houthis who frequently target Saudi energy infrastructure. They do; however, manage to kill 400,000 Yemeni civilians.

This list, which only highlights some of the consequences of the Muslim world’s military incompetence and political instability shows exactly how little has changed over the past few centuries. The only “victories” took many years, millions of deaths, and immeasurable economic damage to achieve. The same weakness that allowed the French to conquer one of the Ottoman Empire’s richest provinces in 1798 continues to haunt Muslims today and led to the conquest of both Afghanistan and Iraq by US forces in 2001 and 2003. This weakness has cost the lives of countless millions over the centuries and will continue to do so until it is corrected. The Muslims of Palestine, Russia, and Kashmir all live under brutal military occupations with no end in sight.

Even China has begun forcing many of its Muslims to live in horrid detention camps where they are subject to systematic rape and sterilization while the Chinese Communist Party attempts to convince them to abandon their religious and cultural identifies. Despite these crimes, Muslim nations are so weak and uninterested in protecting each other they continue to trip over each other to do business with China. Many Pakistani leaders have even gone out of their way to argue their “iron brother” is guilty of no crimes against its Muslim populations. Part of the reason Muslim nations do not challenge China is they know they do not have the strength to do so.

Without serious reforms, the pattern of conquest and destruction that has gripped the Muslim world will continue. Unity, by itself, will not be enough. It is just one of many changes Muslims must implement if they ever hope to stabilize their societies.

Chief among them is the need to guarantee freedom of expression because without that creating a vibrant, prosperous society is impossible. The ability to express oneself freely is the key to unlocking the true potential of individuals and by extension, entire societies. Without strong free speech protections, societies fall into dictatorship because the ability of citizens to speak their minds is the ultimate check on a government’s power. It is also the key to nurturing intellectual curiosity of the sort required to build good schools and drive technological innovation. America’s founders guaranteed the right to free speech in the very first amendment of their constitution for a reason. Their understanding of its importance laid the foundation for its rise.

By contrast, the weakness of the Muslim world is a result of the prevalence of authoritarian political and cultural institutions that trample freedom of expression as part of their refusal to share power with or properly educate their people. Thankfully, the diagnosis reveals the cure.

If authoritarianism is the culprit, then liberalism and democracy are the remedies. Muslims must study the causes of the Western world’s dominance and apply those lessons to their own ends. Just as our ancestors once borrowed from the Chinese to create powerful armies and record powerful ideas, today’s Muslims must borrow from all the world’s communities and use their knowledge and experiences to better themselves.

Rather than fear change, Muslims must embrace it. That is the only way to evolve and, as nature teaches us, evolution is the key to survival. The inability of Muslims to evolve, if left unchecked, will inevitably lead to more conquest, enslavement, and death.

When I argue for the lofty goal of nuclear fusion it is, indeed, out of desperation. Desperation to see the slaughter of innocents stop and prevent looming disasters. Instead of arguing that such goals are too difficult to attain, I suggest it is time to think about ways to end the cycle of violence that has destroyed so many lives. If its history is any guide, the Muslim world is on a path to a dystopian future that will be characterized by intense violence and economic stagnation. I propose Muslims begin working towards a “Star Trek” future by seeking nuclear fusion rather than sit idly as their leaders march them towards slavery and destruction.

To that end, I have given the best advice I can, even though I knew it would be ignored. My primary audience has been the soldiers and thugs that rule much of the Muslim world. That is why I have presented most of my ideas in military or national security terms even though there are so many ways to address these issues that transcend war and politics. The best and most persuasive have to do with life and liberty. But that is not the language my audience speaks. Thus, I have tailored my message accordingly even though war is a wasteful and destructive activity. Civilizations only achieve greatness when they prioritize intellectual development and come together based on logic and justice. Men may worship war, but it is false god that only leads to ruin and damnation.

Yet, it is a topic we must all understand. I have studied the various military defeats suffered by the Muslim world to develop a coherent explanation for the weakness that has gripped so much of it. Thankfully, understanding what ails it is not terribly complicated.

The seminal work, Why Nations Fail, shows exactly how dictatorships lead to weak economic growth while stifling technological innovation. Aside from its discussions of Uzbekistan and Egypt, it does not spend a great deal of time on the Muslim world. However, it does not take much imagination to see the relevance. The great majority of the Muslim world has been living under a dictatorship of some form or another since the Umayyad Empire and this has severely stunted its political, social, and technological development.

In Armies of Sand, Ken Pollack explains why Arab armies have performed so poorly in battle. According to Mr. Pollack these defeats are largely attributable to cultural factors that have prevented Arab soldiers from mastering the intricacies of modern warfare. Though he limits his analysis to the Arabs, his conclusions are applicable to many non-Arab Muslim militaries too, just to a lesser degree.

Last, we have Prof. Kuru’s important work about authoritarianism in the Muslim world. Prof. Kuru provides the historical background and context for the observations made by Mr. Pollack and Messrs. Acemoglu and Robinson.

Combined, these works show why the Muslim world has been so weak for so long. I have done my best to explain how their ideas work together and apply them to the current geo-political environment. My goal was to raise the alarm and provide a brief discussion while working on more detailed explanations in my books.

But I have played the town crier long enough. And I am reasonably satisfied that I have presented my arguments as clearly as possible, using a variety of angles. As a result, I will be taking a hiatus from sharing my gloomy prognostications and analysis while I work on my books. The first, a fictional work called “How the assassination of Donald Rumsfeld led to the fall of the Milky Way” uses the garb of science fiction and fantasy to explain the same points raised throughout my blog. The second “Mirrors for the Prince: a commonsense explanation of how dictators are destroying the Muslim world and why democracy can save it” will provide a far more in-depth explanation of the ideas presented herein with stricter annotations and evidentiary support.

I am confident in my theories and analysis because they are based on a careful study of the available data and common sense. As such, when I argue that Muslim societies must develop democratic political institutions, it is not because I am repeating the mantra of a predetermined political viewpoint. It is because the evidence shows that democratic political institutions lead to creating wealthy and powerful societies. I have presented my analysis in a somewhat unorthodox style as an attempt to pay respect to Ibn Khaldun and Machiavelli by updating their styles for modern sensibilities. My attempt to revive a long extinct literary genre was my way of paying homage to those who inspired me the most. Despite these quirks, those who read my ideas with an open mind, without letting their civilizational biases or ideological preferences get in the way will see that I have not only correctly assessed the Muslim world’s surest path to rehabilitation but given America some good advice too.

As discussed elsewhere, the parallels between the Muslim world and America are startling. Since America is my adopted tribe, I have done my best to dissuade it from its destructive policies. I have criticized its actions, not out of hatred but love and the belief that patriotism is best expressed through criticism, not blind allegiance. Some might come away thinking I hate America. Nothing could be further from the truth. If my family had emigrated to France, I would either be in jail or working a menial job. But we did not move to France. We moved to America, so I got to be a lawyer instead. Despite my affections, I vehemently disagree with its foreign policies. America has turned itself into a merchant of death and a hypocrite, forcing me to speak uncomfortable truths.

I will close by pointing out some of my predictions have already come true. I predicted that America was ripe for a right-wing coup about a year before Jan. 6th[1]. I also predicted the Afghan Republic’s dependence on US military support was a fatal weakness that would lead to “an entirely new government in Afghanistan that, at best, will have to share power with the Taliban in the near future” on Nov. 20, 2020, nearly a year before the Taliban took over. I can only hope that someone pays attention before my bleaker predictions come true.

I wanted to record these ideas and explain the theories behind them because I felt it was important to provide an intellectual foundation that could pave the way for change. My sincere hope is that these words will eventually lead to action based on reason and logic.

For my part, once I am done with my books, I am going to build a farm. One that features solar powered greenhouses growing healthy fruits, greens, and vegetables vertically using as little water as possible. I have always believed that a healthy agricultural sector driven by innovation and technology is the foundation upon which a strong economy must be built. My dream is to build this farm and the necessary infrastructure to support it in Pakistan as a way of nurturing both its technological capabilities and socioeconomic development. But investing in Pakistan is risky since it is run by jackals who use their power to steal and enrich themselves. Which means, it will take some time to realize these plans. I only mention them to illustrate how I intend to act on some of the ideas expressed in my essays.

I hope some of you will be inspired to come up with your own contributions and ideas. As Prof. Kuru explains, the marginalization of the Muslim world’s merchants by its soldiers has severely stunted its growth. As such, the best way for those of us with no political power to start rebuilding it is to revitalize its merchant class by swelling its ranks. History has shown that the development of a healthy merchant class is often the catalyst for the exact sort of political, social, and technological changes the Muslim world desperately needs. Perhaps that is the role destined for those of us who found refuge in the West? To return to and invest in our homelands using the skills and capital we have acquired while living among our conquerors. That would certainly be a fitting way to finally transition the Muslim world away from the neo-colonial era that has trapped it. It would also quiet my growing fear that our descendants will one day suffer the same fate as Spain’s Muslims.

For those of you who have stuck with me to the end: thank you. I hope I have provided some insights worthy of further consideration.

For those reading this in the future, wishing my contemporaries had followed my advice. All you can do is use these ideas to prevent similar mistakes. As Ibn Khaldun pointed out centuries ago, “the past resembles the future more than one drop of water another[2].” History is a guide for future generations. It is not to be lamented or worshipped but learned from. A knowledge of history combined with a bit of logic can go a long way towards avoiding future calamities. But one must take the time to study the past and train the mind to properly analyze and learn from it first.


[1] I didn’t get it all right though. I was talking about developments decades from now, or so I thought at the time. I also thought the military would be the culprit. Thank God it was just the Orange One. His incompetence and narcissism saved the day. I was half right but nailed the big picture analysis and none of those factors have changed. Things will only get worse as America’s white population shrinks. We will see more coup attempts both violent and non. I did not publish my predictions since I wrote them as part of a draft for the non-fiction book referenced above when the chapter explaining that outside interference is a symptom, not a root cause of the Muslim world’s weakness veered off course. Luckily, I have receipts.

[2] Khaldun, Ibn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1967) at 12.

Towards the ideal Islamic government

When the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, he left no instructions for his followers about choosing his successor or how they should govern themselves[1]. As a result, his death started a debate about who should rule them, how they should choose their rulers, and what sort of powers to confer upon them that continues even today.

I have argued on many occasions that contemporary Muslims must create democratic forms of government on the basis that they are the most effective at allowing societies to govern themselves, prosper, and protect themselves from invasion. Though there is certainly a moral component to these arguments, they are somewhat Machiavellian too since they are focused on results and increasing the power of Muslim societies. I shall now endeavor to show that democracy is also consistent with Islamic values based on an examination of the historical record and a bit of common sense, or as some have called it, reason.

Many within the Muslim world have already made these points; however, the degree to which Muslim rulers continue to disregard them means we must continue to re-hash them in the vain hopes they will eventually listen.

Who should rule:

After his passing, the Prophet was succeeded by the elderly Abu Bakr who was then followed by the renowned Umar. As Numani explains, there are competing narratives surrounding the events that led to their successions[2]. Ansary[3], Kennedy[4], and Numani[5] all relate that Umar chose Abu Bakr by swearing loyalty to him to diffuse brewing tensions between the Quraysh and the Ansar of Medina though the particulars of their descriptions vary somewhat. According to Hourani, Abu Bakr was “chosen” while “at a meeting of close associates and leaders[6].” Lapidus states that “an all-night debate” led to Abu Bakr being “elected” Caliph and that since he was “selected by a minority with no special competence, Abu Bakr had his nomination ratified the following day by the community as a whole[7].” Given the turmoil surrounding the Prophet’s death and the growing fears that the young Muslim community might fracture, his selection seems to have been a relatively speedy affair designed to prevent conflict among his followers.

With respect to Umar, Kennedy simply states that Abu Bakr “nominated[8]” him. Numani adds that he “consulted with senior figures before making his choice known” and that he “asked the assembly if they accepted his nomination[9].” While Ansary says that Abu Bakr “called in a few of the community’s top notables and told them he wanted to nominate Umar as his successor[10].” This caused a debate among the community since many doubted Umar’s temperament was suited to the office of caliph; however, “Ali stepped forward to endorse Omar, and his word tipped the scales[11].”

After Umar was fatally wounded, the community’s notables asked about nominating his son, but he emphatically rejected this idea. Instead, he appointed a consultative council of six men to choose his successor to “seek the consensus of the Umma on their choice[12],” which came down to Ali or Uthman. “The chairman of the shura interviewed both men in front of an assembly of the people[13],” and, based on their differing answers, they chose Uthman.

Uthman’s murder then led to the selection of Ali and civil war.  Hourani states that Ali’s foes “disputed the validity of his election,[14]but does not provide any details about it.

Ibn Khaldun’s description of Ali’s conflict with Mu’awiya is worth discussing in detail. In a section entitled, “the transformation of the caliphate into royal authority[15],” he explains how this conflict led to the end of the caliphate.

When discussing Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali, he says “these caliphs renounced royal authority and kept apart from its ways. They were strengthened in this attitude by the low standard of living in Islam and the desert outlook of the Arabs. The world and its luxuries were more alien to them than to any other nation, on account of their religion, which inspired asceticism where the good things of life were concerned[16].” 

According to Khaldun, these men established the caliphate because they were guided by a devotion to Islam. Instead of embracing luxury and the trappings of power, they spurned the wealth that their new conquests could have brought them, maintaining humble leadership styles.

But “soon, the desert attitude of the Arabs and their low standard of living approached its end. The nature of royal authority – which is the necessary consequence of group feeling as we have stated – showed itself[17].” This led Mu’awiya to challenge Ali because the “group feeling[18]” he developed as head of the Umayyad clan and governor of Syria gave him the power and incentive to do so.

Though his discussion is uncharacteristically convoluted, Khaldun explains how Mu’awiya’s seizure of power led to the establishment of a political system he calls “royal authority” based on hereditary succession. He adds that “the restraining influence that had been Islam now came to be group feeling and the sword[19],” meaning the form of government established by the first four caliphs based on consensus and dialogue had been replaced by one based on force. According to Khaldun these events show “how the caliphate was transformed into royal authority[20],” meaning a monarchy. The clear turning point that brought about the end of the caliphate is therefore the point at which Mu’awiya seizes power and passes it to his son.

The very basis for Khaldun’s generational decay model is rooted in the unstable and violent nature of hereditary dictatorships and the “group feeling” used to establish them, which became the norm after Mu’awiya’s actions. But Khaldun insists that those who question Mu’awiya are “heretics[21]” and that his conflict with Ali was merely the result of each man using “their independent judgment as to where the truth lay[22].”

He is curiously kind to Mu’awiya throughout his work, even though he is explaining how Mu’awiya ended the caliphate. He often criticizes and defends him in the same breath, stating that “even though Ali was in the right, Mu’awiyah’s intentions were not evil. He wanted the truth but missed it[23].” Even when he says, “the first to use a throne in Islam was Mu’awiya,”[24] he immediately adds that he sought permission from the people first.

Though not directly relevant to the topics at hand, this is important to highlight for a few reasons. One, even the best among us gets it wrong sometimes. As will be seen later, this is not the only example of faulty analysis by Khaldun. In this instance, the most likely explanation is political and doctrinal. Speaking truth to power is hard. By the time he wrote his book he had already spent nearly two years locked in a dungeon for unrelated reasons and he knew that insulting Mu’awiya would lead to charges of heresy and execution. To question Mu’awiya would be to question all the Muslim monarchs that came after him, including those who ruled over Khaldun. All while adopting a position sympathetic to the Shia.

As Khaldun himself explains, facts must be digested with a critical mind and evaluated in the proper context to provide useful insight[25].  Here, we must consider that the intellectual and political environment of his time and place was not one that allowed for a completely frank discussion as part of our understanding of the material.

This is, unfortunately, not an isolated incident. Similar instances of mental acrobatics have been performed by scholars and Ulama throughout the Muslim world, all to support the dictators who followed Mu’awiya’s example. Ulama in Iran during the Qajar era went so far as to declare “only dynastic rule was permitted by Islam[26]” despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Ulama in Saudi Arabia have made similar performances in service of the Sauds. The same sort of acrobatics can be seen at work among those who argue that leadership belongs to those with the strength to seize it[27]. These are all examples of how the usurpation of power by the Muslim world’s dictators have led scholars to adopt incongruous positions, prevented reasoned debate and created the toxic intellectual climate that made the Muslim world so susceptible to conquest. 

Khaldun continues his mental gymnastics when he rationalizes Mu’awiya’s nomination of his son to succeed him even though none of his predecessors did and Umar adamantly refused to do so. “Had Mu’awiyah appointed anyone else his successor, the Umayyads would have been against him. Moreover, they had a good opinion of Yazid. Mu’awiya would not have been the man to appoint Yazid his successor, had he believed him to be really so wicked. Such an assumption must be absolutely excluded in Mu’awiyah’s case[28].”

Despite his odd attempts to deflect, Khaldun’s narrative shows that when Mu’awiya violently seized power and passed it to his son, he began the process that ended the caliphate and led to the prevalence of monarchial dictatorships.  The record indicates he convened a Shura council to discuss his succession, following Umar’s example. But Ansary[29] and Lewis[30] both relay that the meeting of the council was also attended by a man brandishing a sword to ensure there was no dissension, indicating there was no element of choice or open dialogue. Kennedy adds that Mu’awiya “seems to have known that the adoption of hereditary succession to decide the caliphate would be controversial” and that he was “careful not to claim a hereditary right for his son to succeed but simply to assert that he was the best candidate[31].”

But as Hourani explains, Mu’awiya’s reign marked “the end of one phase and the beginning of another” and highlights that the position of caliph became “virtually hereditary. Although some idea of choice, or at least formal recognition, by the leaders of the community remained, in fact from this time power was in the hands of a family[32].” Mu’awiya actions converted the Caliphate into a traditional monarchy and led the Muslim world down its current path. Having inherited or seized power, instead of being chosen by their communities, those who called themselves caliph afterwards were but poor imitations.

Many Muslims believe that the precedents set by the first four caliphs represent the ideal to which today’s Muslims should aspire[33], and that contemporary governments should be modeled after their example. The reign of the first four caliphs is known as the Rashidun, or “rightly guided” era.” Groups such as ISIS have even waged war to try and re-establish their own version of the caliphate, while the Taliban also claim to model their government after it. But most of them do not understand the defining characteristics of the government they idealize or the lessons they should learn from its example.

Though the exact circumstances surrounding the appointment of the Rashidun are unclear, certain facts are not in dispute. Not one of them tried to pass power onto their son. Each left the choice to the community or engaged it in the process when circumstances allowed. Not one of them used violence or the threat of violence to secure their reigns. Instead, they built a consensus through dialogue.

Though it was the source of much consternation and Islam’s great schism, Ali, as the Prophet’s closest male heir was not passed over just once, but thrice. Even poor Uthman was selected before him. This is not meant to cast aspersions on Ali, who by all accounts appears to have been a lion among men, wrongly denied his dues based on his merits and talent alone. But the fact is, that despite his talents and position as the logical candidate to replace the Prophet by virtue of being one of his most trusted and capable followers, he was not chosen to do so three times.

This makes sense when weighed against one of the Prophet’s most fundamental teachings. The historical record unequivocally shows that he never claimed to possess divine powers[34]. He insisted he was God’s messenger, nothing more. He even insisted that no one should depict his person in artistic form because he was afraid people would worship his image. Arguments that confer leadership on the Prophet’s family are illogical because they implicitly confer a divine status on his descendants when the Prophet himself explicitly and vehemently insisted he had none.

People have the right to believe whatever they want, and nothing written here should be seen as an attack on the personal beliefs of others. But objective analysis requires a logical interpretation of the facts. The facts show that Ali was passed over by the Prophet’s closest companions on multiple occasions. The partisans of Ali may argue these Companions were false and strayed from the true path immediately upon his death. But it seems unlikely those who were so devoted to him would knowingly take a course of action they felt would dishonor his memory or the values he taught them. Their humble lifestyles support this argument, indicating the more likely explanation is they believed their actions were consistent with his teachings.

Their precedents show that power should not automatically pass to a male heir but to one chosen by the community to lead based on merit and talent. Which means monarchies are the furthest from the Islamic ideal, or as Lewis puts it, that Islam is “strongly opposed to hereditary privileges of all kinds, even including, in principle, the institution of monarchy[35].” Khaldun’s analysis on the subject, though tortured, reinforces this argument because it shows that the establishment of a hereditary monarchy led to the end of the caliphate.

If hereditary succession, even within the Prophet’s family, contradicts the example of the Rashidun, then by analogy arguments that political leadership must stay within the Quraysh tribe are also misguided, though not in the cynical self-serving way of those monarchs claiming to represent Islamic values with a straight face. If the Prophet’s family cannot claim a divine right to rule by virtue of their relationship to his legacy, then those related through the even more tenuous bonds of tribal affiliation cannot claim a similar right either.

Instead of arguing that leadership belongs to the Quraysh tribe, the example of the Rashidun is best understood as supporting the principal that political leadership should come from the merchant class, not the military or religious elite. The Prophet, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman were all merchants, and the Quraysh was known as a merchant tribe. The political and social dynamics of the time made these men the most logical choices to rule and their membership in the influential Quraysh tribe was certainly a factor in their selection, but those examining these events have always misunderstood the relevance of their tribal affiliation.

As always, sound logic is reinforced by facts. This argument is supported by the reality of the Muslim world today. There are over 1.9 billion Muslims living in over fifty independent nations. The idea that leadership over the vast lands and diverse people that comprise these nations must be descended from a particular tribe is ludicrous on its face. The only broad principal that can be gleaned from the choice of the Quraysh is that government is best left in the hands of merchants. A statement that is also supported by Europe’s rise and Islam’s fall these past five centuries since Europe’s ascent coincided with the increased political prominence of its merchants while Islam’s long decline saw Muslim merchants marginalized by their soldiers.

How to choose rulers and how they should govern:

Having established that leadership should pass to someone chosen by the community based on that individual’s talent and reputation, not their familial relationship with the prior ruler or tribe, we must discuss the methods for selecting the ruler.

Despite the ambiguities surrounding their selection, certain trends are evident. Every scholar that discusses the process uses words like consensus, election, consultation, and so on. Khaldun states the caliphate was one based on “general consensus[36]” that should be “left to the discretion of all competent Muslims[37].” Lewis adds that the caliphate’s “authority derived from the freely given and revocable consent of the Muslims[38].” The exact circumstances changed with each caliph and the facts surrounding his death, but each was peacefully chosen after dialogue between competing factions. And the losers, like Ali or the Ansar, abided by the decisions of their peers.

In addition to being chosen from among the community, Lewis explains, “the early caliphs had little force at their disposal – no praetorian guard nor indeed regular forces[39].” As a result, they “ruled less by armed force than by personal prestige and authority[40].” Ansary described their reigns as featuring “democratic participation in decision making[41]” and highlights that Umar made decisions after consulting the community “of several hundred men and women[42].”

The caliphate may not have been a democratic system compared to modern standards, but it was a far cry from the dictatorships that dominate the Muslim world today. Caliphs were chosen after getting input from the community in Medina and they ruled by engaging with this same community to get its opinion regarding policy debates. 

The only real question is how to apply these principles to modern-day realities considering the vast cultural, technological, and demographic changes that have taken place over the past fourteen centuries. The Muslim world is no longer comprised of a small elite ruling over masses of non-Muslims in distant lands. Instead, it has been separated into independent Muslim nations like Turkey and Iran populated by millions. Pakistan has over 220 million people, 97% of whom are Muslim but separated through myriad linguistic, ethnic, regional, and doctrinal differences. Engaging in dialogue or achieving consensus is a lot harder today than it was in the much smaller community of Medina.

Groups like ISIS and the Taliban believe the answer is simple: nothing changes. Not only do they believe nothing changes, but they have violently tried to stop their societies from making some necessary changes. Many even blame the changes various Muslim societies tried to make for Europe’s conquest of the Muslim world. A laughable and completely insane argument that highlights the irrational nature of their ideas. It was the Muslim world’s refusal to change that led to its conquest. And its continuing refusal to do so makes it incredibly weak today.

Despite the incoherence of these literalists, it should be obvious that it is the broad values and ideals of this era that must guide Muslims, not the minutiae of how they were implemented. The blatant hypocrisy exhibited by these groups in their attempts to recreate the past proves the point. A cursory examination of those broad values indicates both rulers and policies must be chosen after reaching a consensus with the community, including its women. The seeds for democracy were sown at this time and then cynically left to rot or ignored after Mu’awiya’s power grab. The only practical way to reach that consensus today given the much larger populations and advances in communications technology is to create democratic systems that give citizens a say in these matters and the ability to voice their opinions freely.

At the least, democracy is far closer to the precedents established by the Rashidun than those offered by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, or Afghanistan. The Taliban may claim to follow the Rashidun but its use of a shura council to govern is almost as genuine as Mu’awiya’s use of one to confirm his son into power. Instead of a sword, theirs derives its power from the AK-47 which is inexplicably not treated as a forbidden innovation while democracy is. One of many inconsistencies resulting from their illogical interpretations of Islamic law that contradicts simple notions of common sense.

The examples of the Rashidun, when weighed against modern realities suggests that today’s Muslims can only claim to be following their example if they can vote for their leaders in free elections and provide them feedback on policy through free and open debates of the sort commonly provided by legislative bodies and a free press today. The alternative of force and repression offered by Mu’awiya and so eagerly taken up by all who followed him is clearly un-Islamic.

Scope and proper function of government:

Having discussed who can attain power and how to choose this person, we must address the purpose of government since doing so is necessary before deciding how much power to confer upon it.

The opening of this discussion indicated that democratic forms of government are ideal on the basis that they are the most effective at allowing societies to govern themselves, prosper, and protect themselves from invasion. This description also succinctly captures the purpose of government.

In the Muslim world, many have argued that governments must also compel adherence with Islamic religious law like forcing women to wear the hijab. This role no longer makes sense. To show why, we will once again rely on Ibn Khaldun while contradicting some of his thoughts. 

Khaldun believed that “to exercise the caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this world[43],” meaning the caliphate should enforce religious orthodoxy and practice.

He also believed that “to exercise political royal authority means to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the means of furthering their worldly interests.[44]” To Khaldun, the government’s primary job is to act as a “restraining influence[45]” to prevent people from attacking or cheating each other. But he also spends a great deal of time talking about good governance, the need for secure property rights[46], and why rulers should not engage in trade (it’s bad for long term growth and tax revenue)[47]. Overall, Khaldun’s philosophy of Islamic governance is based on the idea that governments should help their people to prosper by encouraging business and trade and governing justly.

To that end, Khaldun believed “it is necessary to have reference to ordained political norms, which are accepted by the mass and to whose laws it submits” and that if “norms are ordained by the intelligent and leading personalities and minds of the dynasty, the result will be a political (institution) with an intellectual (rational) basis[48].” Khaldun’s ideas regarding rational government that promotes healthy commerce and protects property rights have been ignored in the Muslim world for far too long. But Muslim rulers have had 600 hundred years to absorb his advice and failed to do so, so we will not spend too much time on the subject.

It is the part about enforcing religious orthodoxy that is problematic for a variety of reasons and worth more discussion. The easiest way to end this debate would be to point out that Khaldun’s statement is limited to the caliphate, which he has already explained no longer exists. But that would not be very satisfying, particularly since contemporary Muslim governments continue to enact policy under the mis-guided belief that their role is to “command the good” while “forbidding the bad[49].” A sentiment shared by Khaldun when he says one of the purposes of the caliphate is to make people “do the things that are good for them and forbid them to do those that are harmful[50].”

There are two arguments that show why this approach is so illogical. The first requires a bit of context. The legal basis for allowing Muslim governments to control the personal lives and religious expressions of their citizens finds its genesis in the Ridda Wars that Abu Bakr and Umar fought in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death.

After the Prophet died, the young Muslim community began to fracture. Tribes that had sworn fealty now rebelled. Some tribal leaders even insisted that they were now the messengers of God. Things were unravelling. Abu Bakr and Umar responded by attacking and destroying these rebels in the Ridda Wars. They justified this violence by arguing that once someone accepts Islam, they are not allowed to lapse. Changing your mind was now punishable by death.[51]

Based on modern notions of free will, the idea of forcing someone to continue practicing a particular religious faith under penalty of death seems crazy. As it should. As such, the intent here is not to justify Abu Bakr’s actions but to provide some context that might make them easier to understand. The Islamic world, such as it was, in the immediate aftermath of the Prophet’s death was still small and fragile. It had not yet become a global power spread across multiple continents, instead it was still a regional phenomenon specific to the Arabian Peninsula. Given its precarious position, Abu Bakr’s harsh actions and views make sense since they prevented the new community from coming apart in its infancy. Though the apostacy laws were articulated in religious terms, they were meant to deal with a specific political situation since much of the Arabian Peninsula was now in open rebellion.  

Considering the well-known maxim within Islam that there is no compulsion in religion, the only logical way to reconcile these contradictory ideas is to understand that the death penalty instituted for apostacy was an emergency measure meant to deal with a specific political crisis. Now that there are almost 2 billion Muslims in the world, the impetus for these laws is no longer applicable or relevant. Unfortunately, most of the Ulama disagree with this interpretation. Instead, they have used these measures as a basis to justify more violence against people expressing their personal religious convictions over the years.

This faulty logic is yet one more example of the toxic role the Ulama have played in supporting the region’s dictators and the extent to which the Muslim world’s intellectual climate has decayed due to the restrictions on free speech and debate common throughout it.

It is also another point on which Khaldun errs. Thankfully, he redeems himself when he says, “blind acceptance of tradition is a shortcoming[52].” Which brings us to our second argument. When traditions or decisions, particularly those from a long time ago, no longer match our values, they can and must be discarded. Common sense and logic dictate that traditions and past precedents should only guide us if they still make sense considering the values and sensibilities of the time. A position most of the justices on America’s Supreme Court disagree with but a sound one, nonetheless.

Given the additional data that has been added to the historical record since Khaldun shared his thoughts, it is now painfully obvious that governments should have absolutely no role in enforcing religious or personal expressions of any sort. Freedom to practice or not to practice one’s faith is an inherently personal choice in which government should play no part.

Instead of finding ways to walk back from an impossible position that contradicts the fundamental truth that religious beliefs must be adopted voluntarily, the Muslim world’s rulers and their enablers have spent centuries using the actions of Abu Bakr to rationalize more repression. Modern day Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Iran all prove that allowing governments to control how people pray or express their religious beliefs only leads to dictatorship and repression. Governments are political entities, and by their very nature corrupt. As a result, giving governments the power to enforce religious laws is an invitation to both political and spiritual corruption. Logic therefore dictates that governments cannot be trusted with such powers.

The state’s job is not to enforce Islamic values or laws but to create an environment where those who choose to live according to them may do so in peace, as they see fit. So long as they respect the state’s monopoly on violence and do not interfere with those who choose to live differently, the religious views of all citizens must be respected. The government’s primary concern should be enacting policies that allow its citizens to work together to prosper and protect each other from invasion, not enforcing compliance with religious edicts. Aside from being illogical, the obsession of so many Muslim governments with enforcing religious laws has directly undermined their ability to competently execute their core functions, like protecting their nations from attack

The best way to create Islamic governments capable of fulfilling their most important duties is to create secular, democratic political systems comparable to America’s that are given limited powers to carry out their core governmental functions. “Secular” has become a bad word in the Muslim world because it is associated with authoritarians like the Turks or hypocrites like the French who have used secularism as a cudgel to prevent people from freely practicing their faith. But secularism like that practiced in America would give all Muslims the freedom to practice their faith freely while still preserving the core Islamic values established by the Rashidun.

Not coincidentally, creating secular democracies is also the only viable path to greater unity within the Muslim world. The only way to bring the incredibly diverse people of the Muslim world together is by creating political systems that respect their differences. Violently trying to ensure orthodoxy or conformity, on the other hand, will always keep Muslims divided.

Conclusion

The historical record shows the Rashidun era featured pluralistic and inclusive political institutions that passed power and enacted laws based on the consensus of the community. This history strongly supports the argument that creating democratic political institutions is consistent with Islamic values.

The question Muslims have struggled with is how to adapt these values to modern realities. Trying to replicate exactly how things were done centuries ago or refusing to discard what no longer makes sense in light of changed circumstances are absurd propositions. The only way to reconcile religious teachings that are centuries old with common sense is to adapt them to modern circumstances and ideas. Muslims can look to the era of the Rashidun for guidance and should certainly strive to create governments inspired by their democratic and egalitarian values but trying to re-create a system of government that existed for the blink of an eye nearly 1400 years ago is impossible and irrational.

Muslims have bathed themselves in conservative ideologies and stagnant thoughts for too long. As a political philosophy, conservatism makes no sense for one simple reason: it is opposed to one of the most basic natural laws. As humans learn through the simple process of aging, change is an intrinsic part of life. Philosophies that seek to deny this truth are incapable of forming coherent or moral ideologies because they are inherently illogical and, as a result, must usually resort to authoritarian methods to maintain power. Hence, the violent oppression instigated by men using religion and tradition as an excuse to stop their societies from evolving.

But this religious repression is based on the political absurdities created by the dictators who have taken over the region and the mental acrobatics they force their scholars to perform. Enforcing religious orthodoxy goes hand in hand with suppressing political speech. The two reinforce each other and help to buttress the region’s many dictators who have spent centuries obscuring the fact that the ideal Islamic government is, and always has been, a democratic one based on consent rather than force.


[1] Kennedy, Hugh. Caliphate The History of an Idea. New York: Basic Book, 2016, at 2.

[2] Numani, Shibli. Umar. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004, at 20.

[3] Ansary, Tamim. Destiny Disrupted. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009, at 35-36.

[4] Kennedy at 4.

[5] Numani at 20.

[6] Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Warner Books, 1991, at 22.

[7] Lapidus, Ira. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, at 38.

[8] Kennedy at 16.

[9] Numani at 21.

[10] Ansary at 40.

[11] Id. at 41.

[12] Id. at 52.

[13] Id. at 52.

[14] Hourani at 25.

[15] Khaldun, Ibn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1967), at 160-66.

[16] Id. at 162.

[17] Id. at 163.

[18] Id. at 107-09.

[19] Id. at 166.

[20] Id. at 165.

[21] Id. at 164.

[22] Id. at 164.

[23] Id. at 164.

[24] Id. at 216.

[25] Id. at 5.

[26] Ansary at 278.

[27] Kennedy at 170 discussing Ghazali.

[28] Khaldun at 164.

[29] Ansary at 67.

[30] Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East: A Brief History of the last 2,000 years. New York: Scribner, 1995 at 65.

[31] Kennedy at 39.

[32] Hourani at 25-26.

[33] Lewis at 62.

[34] Ansary at 29, or Lewis at 54.

[35] Lewis at 212.

[36] Khaldun at 156.

[37] Id. at 157.

[38] Lewis at 72.

[39] Id. at 63.

[40] Id. at 63.

[41] Ansary at 47.

[42] Id. at 50.

[43] Khaldun at 155.

[44] Id. at 154-55.

[45] Id. at 47.

[46] Id. at 238-42.

[47] Id. at 232-34.

[48] Id. at 154.

[49] Lacey, Robert. Inside the Kingdom. New York: Viking Penguin, 2009, at 52.

[50] Khaldun at 159.

[51] Ansary at 39.

[52] Khaldun at 158.