India and Pakistan are likely to fight another war sometime during the next few decades. Given their history, this is not a particularly bold prediction. But perhaps this is: Pakistan will lose this war in dramatic fashion. It has already lost every war it has fought against India, so maybe this is not a bold prediction either. But India’s growing power means their next war will result in a catastrophic defeat for Pakistan.
The next South Asian war will be driven by a mix of factors. The primary one being that Pakistan will soon run out of water. Its exploding population, archaic agricultural practices, climate change, and the fact that the headwaters of its major river systems all emanate in Indian controlled Kashmir (rivers India keeps promising to dam) will significantly increase the risk of war over the next few decades. Though primarily driven by resource scarcity, ideology and hubris will also play decisive roles.
Pakistan’s recent victory in Afghanistan has already led to a resurgence in the popularity of right-wing Islamists ideas. This will inevitably lead to more violence in Kashmir once the Taliban consolidates its victory (which may take a few years). Having spent decades sponsoring guerrilla groups against both the Soviet and American empires, it is unlikely Pakistan’s generals will hesitate to continue using similar tactics against an Indian state they view as significantly weaker than both.
The popularity of right-wing Islamist ideology among its military elite and their overconfidence after events in Afghanistan will lead Pakistan’s generals to sponsor attacks that could easily lead to another war. India’s airstrikes near the town of Balakot in 2019 indicate Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will not deter similarly aggressive responses in the future.
Although Indian leaders will blame this violence entirely on Pakistani machinations, the truth is that the primary catalyst will be their refusal to give Kashmiris their democratic rights. It is a universal truth that repression always breeds resistance. If Kashmir was meant to be a part of India, it would not take 500,000 troops enforcing a brutal military occupation to keep it and roughly 100,000 Kashmiris would not have sacrificed their lives fighting to be free of Indian rule. India’s elite is incapable of understanding this simple truth because they have embraced their own right-wing Hindutva ideology. Their shift to the right has turned India into the world’s most authoritarian democracy while illustrating the prescience of those who fought so hard to create Pakistan. The Indian elite’s Jai Hind mentality will make it impossible for them to empathize with the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people, making conflict inevitable. The BJP’s continuing electoral popularity and speculation about Modi’s potential successor indicate India will only shift more to the right with time, meaning its government will get even more aggressive towards its restless Muslim populations.
Realizing the tea leaves point to war is not that hard. What is more difficult is understanding why Pakistan is destined to lose its next war. India and Pakistan have been locked in conflict since the moment they gained their freedom from the British. Due to the size and resource disparity between them, India has always had a distinct advantage over its smaller neighbor. Despite these advantages, Pakistan has managed to attain a minimal degree of parity with its larger rival. Unfortunately, India’s advantages are poised to grow exponentially over the next few decades as it reaps the rewards of its economic liberalization. The growing gap in power between the two nations represents an existential threat to Pakistan that can no longer be ignored. Consequently, its military leaders must fundamentally rethink many of their national security strategies and policies.
WHY PAKISTAN WILL LOSE ITS NEXT WAR
Let’s start with the obvious comparison: defense budgets. India has been spending a lot on its military over the past few years. But since its economy has been growing, the ratio of these expenditures to GDP has not increased significantly. For example, in 2019 it spent a little over $71 billion on its military versus just over $10 billion for Pakistan. But that sum was only 2.4% of its GDP whereas Pakistan’s defense spending represented nearly 4% of its GDP.
These defense budgets and their relationship to GDP reflect each country’s economic strength. India liberalized its economy by empowering its private sector in 1991. Since that time its economy has grown from $266 billion dollars to $2.3 trillion in 2018. India’s growth has been uneven at times, and like all world economies, it has been seriously hurt by the COVID-19 Pandemic; however, the trends are clear. India’s economy will continue growing, giving it the wealth to continue upgrading its military.
India’s reforms have not only made it wealthier, they have also made it a partner worthy of American and Israeli attention. Its growing alliance with these nations will provide it access to some of the most sophisticated weapons available. India has historically underinvested in its military, but over the next few years it will undergo a massive modernization of its arsenal with the best weapons the West has to offer. The Balakot incident may have ended in serving India’s downed pilot tea, but future engagements will have very different endings once its aging MIG jets are replaced with advanced stealth fighters from the West.
As Saudi Arabia’s military incompetence in Yemen so vividly illustrates, larger budgets and access to fancy new weapons are not, by themselves, enough to guarantee victory. But they certainly help. And they speak to trends that should give Pakistan’s generals pause because India has already won all their wars without heavily investing in its military. Now that it is finally committing substantial resources to its armed forces, its dominance will only become more pronounced.
Lastly, India also benefits from a technological advantage. Predicting how technology will impact war is always a tricky business. But it seems likely computers and AI software will play important roles in the wars of the future. Those nations capable of harnessing this technology to engage in wide ranging cyberwarfare while controlling the flow of information will be able to cripple their enemies without firing a shot. India’s educational institutions and technology sector will give it another massive advantage over Pakistan in this emerging arena as well.
By comparison, Pakistan’s economy was worth a little over $45 billion in 1991 and had grown to $263 billion by 2020. Pakistan’s economy suffers from a variety of structural defects that all work together to prevent strong growth. Chief among them are its repressive political and social institutions which have prevented building a government capable of providing the services necessary for dynamic economic and technological growth such as competent law enforcement agencies, courts, or regulatory agencies, and vibrant educational institutions. As long as Pakistan’s economy is hamstrung by its non-responsive government and repressive social institutions, it will never be able to keep pace with India’s development.
Both nations are on drastically different trajectories that will eventually place Pakistan at a severe and dangerous disadvantage. Despite vague promises to focus on “geo-economics,” Pakistan has yet to implement the type of reforms that could allow it to close the gap with India. Paul Kennedy’s work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, shows why it should be wary. His theories indicate wars are usually won by the party with the greater industrial and scientific capacity to wage them. Given India’s growing abilities in these areas, it will soon develop an overwhelming edge against its longtime foe. Its growing defense budgets are merely a reflection of these changing dynamics and are the easiest way to quantify the effects of each nation’s differing economic policies which are, in turn, based on their differing political systems.
A BRIEF RECAP – WHY PAKISTAN LOST ITS LAST TWO WARS
Pakistan features a mixed political system with an elected government and a powerful military that holds the lion’s share of power. Its generals have been the architects of its national security policies for most of its history. Their unchecked power is the primary reason Pakistan has lost all its wars with India and best explains its economic and technological underdevelopment.
To illustrate why, we need to start in 1971. That was the last time both nations fought a major war. Pakistan lost so badly that it was dismembered, leading to the creation of Bangladesh and the capture of 90,000 of its troops. Pakistan’s military was firmly in charge at the time and prosecuted the war without any civilian oversight. As such, responsibility for this defeat belongs entirely to the incompetent generals in charge at the time.
Pakistan’s generals have always blamed this embarrassing loss on the impossible predicament of having to defend its disconnected Western and Eastern wings. This analysis misses the issue entirely. Pakistan was dismembered because its Punjabi and Pathan military and political elite refused to share power with their Bengali countrymen. Instead of honoring the democratic wishes of their fellow Pakistanis, they responded with brutality and widespread human rights abuses, creating a situation that India was able to exploit with ease. West Pakistan’s defeat in 1971 was a direct result of the military’s refusal to compromise or share power with its ethnically and linguistically distinct East Pakistani citizens. In other words, it was a political and human rights failure totally attributable to its generals.
It took nearly thirty years for another major conflict to erupt. Though not as catastrophic as the loss suffered in 1971, Kargil was a complete disaster for Pakistan and was the result of incredibly poor tactical and strategic decision making. Again, the generals who planned and initiated the operation did so with no civilian involvement.
Tactically, Pakistan’s military planners deployed light infantry into fixed defensive positions with no means of resupply or maneuver. They sent their soldiers to die and congratulated themselves on the high cost imposed upon their enemies for re-taking these positions.
Strategically, Kargil was planned with no coherent political or even military goal other than to inflict damage. The idea that taking those few peaks would result in a permanent change to the LoC without also taking the entire province is so laughable that Pakistan’s generals could not possibly have thought their stated objectives were realistic. Their only real goals were to inflict losses on their enemies and embarrass them by exposing a weakness in their defenses. Not only did this operation needlessly waste the lives of many brave Pakistani soldiers, it tipped India to a weakness that could have been exploited in a meaningful conflict and spurred it towards improving its defenses. It also made Pakistan the subject of nearly universal condemnation and highlighted India’s preeminence on the world stage like never before. Kargil may not have been as disastrous as the debacle in ’71 but it was still a complete failure in every respect.
Both conflicts, though spaced nearly three decades apart, highlight patterns of governance and civil-military relations that have crippled Pakistan’s ability to competently wage war. Despite its horrible track record, Pakistan’s military has retained its dominant political position and uses this power to give itself control over the country’s most important policies. The methods it has developed to assure its power and the policies favored by its military elite have stunted Pakistan’s economic and technological development which has prevented it from building a military that can protect it from India.
HOW PAKISTAN’S MILITARY PREVENTS ECONOMIC GROWTH
As India’s growing military abilities and America’s military dominance show, military power in the modern age is correlated to economic and technological power. The ability to develop this sort of power is, in turn, dependent on the presence of inclusive and open political systems that can provide the government services necessary to stimulate and nurture them. Pakistan’s history of military coups and the ways in which its military undermines its civilian leaders and institutions has therefore significantly undermined its economic potential. Additionally, the opportunity cost of its high military spending also limits growth by preventing the re-investment of tax revenue for economic or social spending. Pakistan’s generals have always used their political power to secure the largest share of the nation’s resources on the grounds that doing so was necessary to counter India. But by undermining their civilian counterparts and prioritizing military spending, they have impoverished the nation in both the short and long term.
The military’s involvement in commercial activity has also hurt long term economic growth. According to Ayesha Siddiqa, its businesses were worth roughly $20 billion dollars and controlled about a third of the nation’s manufacturing as far back as 2008. Pakistan’s generals justify their behavior by arguing that their businesses generate economic activity that benefits the entire nation. Once again, they are missing the bigger picture.
Since they have ignored or vilified all the modern scholars that have highlighted the negative impact of their involvement in trade, we will rely on one of the Muslim world’s greatest thinkers to explain why the military’s involvement in commerce is so unhealthy. According to Ibn Khaldun, when “Amirs[1] and other men in power[2]” engage in commerce they depress economic activity over the long run. They eventually crowd out private merchants who cannot compete with the favorable pricing and access to resources these men enjoy. This leads to decreased investment, long-term growth, and tax revenue. The degree to which Pakistan’s military elite have used their political power to build personal wealth for themselves while preventing the development of a strong commercial class proves Khaldun’s point. Allowing those with both political and military power to use that power to create wealth for themselves creates an unfair and inefficient trade environment that reduces economic growth.
Economics aside, as a matter of common sense, it should be obvious that allowing those charged with defending the nation to also engage in trade will distract them from their primary mission. Despite these glaring drawbacks, Pakistan’s military has worked tirelessly to become the nation’s most powerful political and economic institution. By prioritizing power and wealth above all else they have prevented their country from acquiring both.
HOW SUPPORT FOR ISLAMISTS AND INSURGENTS STUNTS ITS TECHNOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
One of the military’s key policies since the Zia years has been propping up Islamist groups as domestic political allies and guerrilla proxies. Support for guerillas in Afghanistan eventually led to the creation of similar groups focused on Kashmir and led to increased domestic support for these groups which entailed supporting their political and social agendas. This “alliance[3]” with Pakistan’s Islamists also illustrates the short-sighted thinking that dominates Pakistan’s military.
With respect to Kashmir, proxies have been used to keep India involved in low intensity anti-guerilla operations that are best viewed as a short-term holding action. By continuing to arm Kashmiri separatists, Pakistan has gained a slight tactical advantage in that its minimal investment of resources has forced India to commit large numbers of troops to maintain security in Kashmir in a manner that has been financially burdensome. Forcing India into counter-insurgency operations has also compelled it to reduce its training and preparedness for more conventional conflicts, which gives Pakistan a slight advantage should another armed conflict arise. Ultimately, however, this strategy is self-defeating because the short-term tactical gains are overshadowed by the long-term strategic losses.
The problem with supporting guerillas in Kashmir is that they will never inflict enough damage to convince India to withdraw without first provoking a wider war that Pakistan cannot win. Comparisons with the successful campaigns to evict Russia and America from Afghanistan are mis-placed because Afghanistan was never important to either nation. As such, the cost imposed by Pakistan’s proxies was enough to convince them to leave, though it still took several decades. Similar tactics will never force India out of Kashmir because its elite views the province as an integral part of their country.
In the long run, the support provided to these groups has only hurt Pakistan’s ability to develop the scientific and economic base necessary to defend itself because it has made it harder to create the political and educational institutions required to support such development. If Pakistan is ever going to build an economy and scientific base that can support an advanced armaments industry it must prioritize political stability and education. But doing so is impossible if its domestic Islamists are supported by the military and intelligence agencies because of their adamant opposition to modern education, intellectual freedom, and inclusive political systems.
The Taliban’s victory has only emboldened likeminded groups within Pakistan who have always fought against the deep-rooted legal and social reforms necessary to modernize to the degree required to build an industrial and scientific base that can support an armaments industry capable of protecting it from India’s growing strength. Neither a friendly government in Afghanistan, proxies in Kashmir, or an alliance with domestic Islamists will provide for Pakistan’s security in the way that developing its own scientific and technical abilities would.
Although Pakistan’s current technical abilities have allowed it to develop an armaments industry that is sufficient to meet many of its military’s basic needs, it is not technically advanced enough to provide dominant capabilities like those enjoyed by Israel in its confrontation with its Arab neighbors. Pakistan must strive to develop such capabilities if it is ever going to have a realistic chance of reducing the power disparity between itself and India given the differences in size and resources between the two belligerents.
PAKISTAN’S ALLIANCE WITH CHINA
Part of the reason Pakistan’s military has been content to let the nation’s educational institutions and intellectual climate rot while its economy languishes is because of their relationship with China, its “iron brother” which it uses as a crutch to compensate for its weak economy and technical abilities. The military has been a key driver of this alliance and has also taken a leading role in CPEC, which is based on using Chinese assistance to make significant improvements to its infrastructure. Despite wholeheartedly agreeing with the goal of improving Pakistan’s infrastructure, an excessive reliance on China is not the best way to achieve this result for a myriad of reasons.
The difference in power between China and Pakistan will eventually turn Pakistan into a Chinese client and will lead to development that is more conducive to growing China’s economy than Pakistan’s. Also, the opaque nature of the CPEC agreement creates significant room for waste and corruption which will ultimately reduce the efficiency of these infrastructure projects and wastefully increase the debt burden on an already impoverished Pakistan.
The bigger issue, however, is that relying on China is merely a continuation of the neo-colonial alliance patterns that nearly all the Muslim world’s authoritarian leaders have used to avoid implementing the political and social reforms necessary to modernize on their own. Just as the Ottoman alliance with Germany ended in failure, Pakistan’s alliance with China is also doomed to fail. Cracks in the Sino-Pakistani alliance are already visible. Pakistan’s muted response to the wholesale imprisonment of China’s Muslim population is a natural consequence of the power disparity between the two nations and shows that this relationship will disappoint Pakistan in the same way its alliance with America did.
Relying on China to supply the capital, equipment, and technical expertise used to develop its infrastructure only provides the false hope of modernization. Genuine modernization cannot occur without first empowering and educating the masses. By allowing themselves to become dependent on China, Pakistan’s leaders are once again taking a short-sighted approach that creates the illusion of modernization without any of the substance.
KNOWING IS HALF THE BATTLE…SORT OF
The solutions to the many issues highlighted above are obvious and have been for a long time. Pakistan’s soldiers need to stay in their barracks. They must re-evaluate their relationship with Pakistani civilian leaders and their involvement in economic activity. By constantly undermining Pakistan’s weaker civilian led institutions, they have significantly increased their own political and economic power but in a way that has seriously hurt Pakistan’s overall geopolitical and economic strength.
Instead of using their political power to ensure the military receives a disproportionate share of economic resources, its generals would be better served striking a bargain like the one struck between China’s generals and civilian leadership in the 1970s. When China first began to reform its economy, its generals agreed to prioritize the development of its industrial base for several decades before using this new wealth to develop their military-industrial base.
Pakistan’s national security establishment must also stop supporting Islamist allies and using them as proxies in Kashmir. Though the plight of the Kashmiri people must never be forgotten, armed resistance at this point has proven counterproductive. Pakistan must always provide its long-suffering people diplomatic and economic assistance while making sure the world knows about India’s horrific human rights abuses. But it should no longer arm them.
It must also re-think its relationship with China. Instead of replacing their former American patrons with Chinese ones, Pakistanis must learn to look to themselves for their development needs. They must reform their government institutions to create an efficient and effective government apparatus that can provide the services necessary to promote economic growth. They must drastically increase spending on education, the judiciary, agriculture, healthcare, and infrastructure and do so using capital generated internally to prevent the further ballooning of Pakistan’s debt. These steps, if taken together, would allow Pakistan to rely on its nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive action by India while its economic, scientific, and industrial capabilities developed.
Domestic reforms and increased social spending will not be possible until Pakistanis start paying taxes. Although Pakistan has attempted to expand its tax base in the past, it has yet to tackle the biggest impediment to such reforms: corruption. Pakistan is currently ranked as the 120th most corrupt nation out of 180. Its high levels of corruption have been used by its military to justify their power grabbing and it has been used by Pakistanis to rationalize their refusal to pay taxes. Reforming Pakistan’s tax code and expanding its tax base will be impossible until Pakistan tackles its endemic corruption.
Though the solutions are obvious, implementing them is an entirely different story. Considering the political and economic realities, it is extremely unlikely Pakistan’s military elite will ever agree to any of these changes despite the growing chorus of voices begging them to do so. Ayesha Siddiqa, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Ahmed Rashid, and countless others have been sounding the alarm for years and have either been ignored or banished.
HOW TO FOCUS ON GEO-ECONOMICS
The refusal of Pakistan’s generals to listen to reason has not only mired the nation in ineffective and counter-productive policies, but it has also prevented it from building meaningful relationships with Muslim allies. Which, ironically enough, is the only way it will ever have the strength to resist Indian hegemony.
Pakistan is one of the most populous Muslim countries in the world and it is the only one armed with nuclear weapons. It has never assumed a place of leadership within it; however, because of its massive underdevelopment. As such, for most of its history it has been a recipient of aid from sympathetic Muslim allies but has never been able to develop strong relationships with them based on trade. The reforms suggested above would not only allow Pakistan to prosper individually, they would also allow it to form the sort of mutually beneficial relationships with other Muslim states upon which strong, enduring alliances are built.
Even if Pakistan were to fully adopt all the reforms suggested above, India’s larger size would still give it considerable advantages. As a result, Pakistan needs allies, but it needs allies that can enhance its long-term power rather than just provide subsidies.
CPEC is designed to enhance China’s power while throwing some crumbs to Pakistan’s elite. Real power comes from building semiconductors, machine tools, satellites, solar panels, construction equipment, etc. because only an industrial base capable of building such goods can support an advanced armaments industry. CPEC is not designed to help Pakistan build real power but to turn it into a FedEx distribution route for everything China makes.
If Pakistan’s generals want real power, they should develop an alliance with their Muslim neighbors predicated on creating a free trade zone between them that can lead to building such goods. Pakistan could easily use its valuable geographic position to turn itself into the linchpin of an alliance between itself, Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey (P.A.I.T) that would significantly increase its power and wealth.
This alliance would simultaneously solve the strategic and economic dilemmas of all four nations while creating an entity that could finally stabilize much of the Muslim world. It may sound grandiose but there is already a blueprint for building one. In fact, the European Union provides not only a blueprint of what to do, but what not to do.
Here’s the kicker though: the only way this works is if the leaders in all four nations genuinely commit to implementing the reforms described above. Because creating responsive governments that can ensure a healthy trade environment is a vital pre-condition for European Union style integration. The corrupt, patronage dominated systems currently in place in all four countries makes such integration impossible. The author has addressed the merits of such an alliance on several occasions such as here and here. As such, the following analysis will provide a condensed discussion.
The benefits to Pakistan in its conflict with India are obvious but the benefits to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan would be just as great. Turkey is equally desperate for dependable allies as its days in NATO are coming to an end. As the two most militarily powerful Muslim states, Pakistan and Turkey have the potential to create a powerful block but for two small problems: geography and doctrine. Pakistan and Turkey must, of necessity, include Shi’ite Iran to create a viable alliance. Luckily, entering this alliance would also solve many of Iran’s problems since it may be the only way to convince America and Israel to leave it in peace.
The inclusion of Afghanistan would complete the puzzle and create a sustainable balance of power between all four states. Only a combination of Pakistani, Turkish, and Iranian influence can provide Afghanistan with the stability and economic assistance its needs to finally end its four decades of conflict. Pakistan’s generals may view Afghanistan as their domain, but history shows what happens to outsiders who try to rule that rugged land. The only way to stabilize Afghanistan is to build a government that represents the interest of all its people and the only way to do that given the current dynamics is to create an alliance between PAIT that can allow them to use their influence to help all of Afghanistan’s people to work together.
Such an alliance, comprised of over 400 million people, if properly connected could control trade from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, creating an entity with the potential to fundamentally re-balance power in favor of the Muslim world. But the only way to bring together the mosaic of tribes, ethnic groups, and sects that populate these lands is by creating governments in each country that allow all these groups to work together and trade with each other. And the only way to do that is to build inclusive, democratic political institutions that adhere to the rule of law. Only once those institutions are in place can additional ones designed to facilitate trade and connectivity between all four nations be created.
By aligning their economic interests and developing shared infrastructure, these nations have the potential to turn their trade relationships into a security alliance as well. Essentially, Pakistan’s generals must re-think their goal of attaining strategic depth by taking a more expansive and deep-rooted approach to establishing the sort of relationships that will allow for the creation of meaningful strategic depth with its Muslim neighbors.
Pakistan must also re-orient its current relationships with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf nations and begin to focus on developing closer ties to Iran. The amount of trade between these two neighbors is pitiful and it is imperative that both nations begin to develop infrastructure and trade as a precursor to stronger relations. Pakistan has avoided developing close relations with Iran to avoid angering its allies in the Gulf and the US and has received large financial subsidies and help absorbing its excess labor in return. This assistance, though generous, is not nearly enough to satisfy its development needs. Pakistan’s elite have been happy to rely on these subsidies because doing so has allowed them to avoid making the difficult policy choices that will be necessary to modernize their economy. But the days of allowing outsiders to dictate who Pakistan trades with must end if it is ever going to create the sort of wealth it will need to compete with India. If America or the Arabs want to punish Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan for doing business together as neighbors should, they are welcome to do so but are only hurting themselves.
By choosing to establish client relationships with the Gulf nations, the US, and China, Pakistan’s elites have used the subsidies from their patrons for their own benefit and to alleviate pressure from the masses to manage the economy better. But doing so has caused severe structural deficiencies in Pakistan’s economy and it has reduced pressure to implement the sort of political and socio-economic reforms that will be necessary if Pakistan ever wishes to develop an advanced industrial and scientific base.
CONCLUSION
Despite Pakistan’s many missteps and miscalculations, it has not suffered more in its conflict with India due to the latter’s incompetence. India has relied on its superior size to dominate its smaller neighbor but has always suffered from poor management that has directly impacted its ability to counter its nemesis. Its gradual shift to the right and the long-term problems this will create for the political cohesion of India’s heterogeneous society only reinforces this argument. However, relying on the incompetence of an adversary is not a strategy. Particularly when that enemy is using its newfound wealth to invest massive resources into its military.
The policies pursued by Pakistan’s military have put it on a path towards continued instability and weakness that could eventually lead to the disintegration of Pakistan as it is currently constructed or a sever reduction in its geopolitical power. Pakistan’s smaller size and more precarious geo-strategic position do not afford it much margin for error.
Its leaders clearly believe their nuclear weapons will protect them. That may be true today but also shows their short-sighted perspective. Technology is always changing and advances in anti-missile defenses, nanotechnology or cyber warfare could easily be used to attack their delivery systems, rendering their powerful nuclear bombs useless. Instead of putting all their eggs in a nuclear basket, they must take a holistic and multi-faceted approach to ensuring the nation’s security. The wars of the future will not be decided by nuclear technology but by those who possess the means to attack and defend from space, the fastest computers, and the best software. Acquiring those capabilities will require massive investments in Pakistan’s scientific and educational base. As such, its leaders must immediately begin to recalibrate their policies consistent with the suggestions offered above if they wish to resolve this conflict in their favor. Pakistan’s leaders must stop seeking short term gains that reduce their ability to achieve their long-term strategic goals.
It may be easy to dismiss the arguments presented above as overly alarmist since the full extent of the threat posed by India’s reforms will take decades to fully manifest themselves. But if drastic measures are not taken to correct course soon, the next generation of Pakistanis will suffer for our mistakes. It is time for Pakistan’s leaders to start thinking about the impact their short-sighted policies will have on their future. The changes proposed above would be extremely controversial and cause significant upheaval; however, if managed properly by leaders with the vision to see them through, these reforms would significantly change the balance of power on the subcontinent.
The author is a Pakistani-American, US Navy veteran, attorney, and creator of the blog www.MirrorsforthePrince.com where he discusses ways to reverse the Muslim world’s military weakness. He is currently working on a book that will provide a holistic explanation of these issues. You can find him on Twitter under the handle @mirrors_for_the.
[1] “Amir” in this context is a direct reference to military commanders.
[2] Khaldun, Ibn, Trans by Franz Rosenthal. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Princeton University Press. Princeton and Oxford. 1967. At pgs. 232-34.
[3] Kuru, Ahmet. Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment. Cambridge University Press. 2019. At pgs. 3-6; 45.
